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ABSTRACT
NAVAL AVIATION SQUADRON RISK ANALYSIS PREDICTIVE BAYESIAN 
NETWORK MODELING USING MAINTENANCE CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
SURVEY RESULTS
Harry Michael Robinson 
Old Dominion University, 2014 
Director: Dr. John A. Sokolowski
Associated risks in flying have resulted in injury or death to aircrew and 
passengers, and damage or destruction o f the aircraft and its surroundings. Although 
the Naval Aviation's flight mishap rate declined over the past 60 years, the proportion 
of human error causal factors has stayed relatively constant at about 80%. Efforts to 
reduce human errors have focused attention on understanding the aircrew and 
maintenance actions occurring in complex systems.
One such tool has been the Naval Aviation squadrons’ regular participation in 
survey questionnaires deigned to measure respondent ratings related to personal 
judgments or perceptions o f organizational climate for meeting the extent to which a 
particular squadron achieved the High Reliability Organization (HRO) criteria of 
achieving safe and reliable operations and maintenance practices while working in 
hazardous environments. Specifically, the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey 
(MCAS) is completed by squadron maintainers to enable leadership to assess their 
unit’s aggregated responses against those from other squadrons.
Bayesian Network Modeling and Simulation provides a potential methodology 
to represent the relationships o f MCAS results and mishap occurrences that can be 
used to derive and calculate probabilities o f incurring a future mishap. Model 
development and simulation analysis was conducted to research a causal relationship
through quantitative analysis o f conditional probabilities based upon observed 
evidence o f previously occurred mishaps. This application would enable Navy and 
Marine Corps aviation squadron leadership to identify organizational safety risks, 
apply focused proactive measures to mitigate related hazards characterized by the 
MCAS results, and reduce organizational susceptibility to future aircraft mishaps.
This dissertation is dedicated to my family, especially Anne and Andrew, 
for their support and understanding. I am grateful to my father, Captain “Fast Eddie” 
Robinson, U.S. Naval Reserve, who introduced me to Naval Aviation and my mother, 
Deborah Lowenthal Robinson who pinned on my wings o f gold.
The research conducted and detailed here within is for the men and women who 
ardently serve in the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Their determination and 
spirit is the bedrock of Naval Aviation which enables the capability to
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. PURPOSE
The main objective for pursuit of this research effort was to accurately model 
the impact o f naval aviation squadron maintenance on mishap occurrence. The 
purpose o f the developed model(s) would serve as an effective predictive tool for 
leadership to enable conduct of proactive risk management that would reduce 
likelihood for sustaining an aviation related mishap.
1.2. BACKGROUND
From its inception, flying has been accompanied by inherent, unique, and 
sometimes unforgiving risks. The exposure to these associated hazards results in 
injury or death to aircrew and passengers, and damage or destruction o f the aircraft 
and its surroundings. In the effort to improve aviation safety, post-crash inspections 
continue to be conducted to identify specific material and mechanical failure modes. 
Initially, attention was directed towards improving aircraft material defects. The 
iterative engineering process of developing and manufacturing better aircraft based 
upon lessons learned from previous material and component failures led to significant 
reductions in aviation mishap rates. Continued post-mishap analysis demonstrates 
that there has been a decrease in material failures as contributing causal factors; 
however, human error is still a leading cause of numerous aircraft accidents. [Nagel,
2Two approaches have been directed to mitigate the effects of human error.
First, application of Human Factors engineering and ergonomics enhanced the 
interfaces between the human operator and individual component system. Second, 
Human Factors programs were implemented to define and enforce acceptable 
standards in maintenance proficiency, aircrew skills, and safety in the effort to further 
reduce the risks associated with aviation. These programs served to train key 
personnel within the aviation field to improve their capabilities, knowledge, and 
imperviousness to committing errant actions. Aircraft mishap investigations continue 
to focus on human error. "Indeed, estimates in the literature indicate that somewhere 
between 70 and 80 percent of all aviation accidents can be attributed, at least in part, 
to human error." [Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003, p. 2] As shown in Table 1 below, 
during Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Aviation 
Characterization Factors, human factors error contributed to 61% of sustained Class A 
mishaps. [Naval Safety Center, 2013]
Table 1. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps Aviation Characterization Factors 
Leading up to Class A Mishaps for Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012 
[Naval Safety Center, 2013]
Characterization Factor 2011 2012 Total
Maintenance Failure only 1 1 2
Material Failure only 5 3 8
Aircrew Related Human Factors Error only 6 7 13
Maintenance / Material Failure Leading to Aircrew Related 
Human Factors Error 4 3 7
Undetermined 0 0 1
Total 16 15 31
3Since 1950, Naval Aviation has employed several intervention strategies to 
reduce the occurrences o f aircraft mishaps. A standard measurement to evaluate 
aviation safety performance uses the number of aviation mishap events per 100,000 
flight hours. Naval Aviation classifies mishaps under three different severity 
classifications and three mishap categories. Class A mishaps are the most severe and 
are described by the result in which the "total damage cost is $ 1,000,000 or more 
and/or aircraft destroyed and/or fatal injury and or permanent disability." 
[OPNAVINST 3750.6R, 2003, Appendix 3C] On October 6, 2009, the Class A cost 
threshold was revised to $2,000,000 total damage. Mishap severity categories range 
from Class A through Class C depending upon the cost of damage and amount of 
personnel injury sustained. A complete description of mishap type and severity can be 
found in Appendix A.
Figure 1 shows a clear reduction in the Class A mishap rate from 1950 through 
1980. However in recent years, the slope o f the incidence rate has leveled out at 
approximately 2 per 100,000 flight hours through application of various additional 
engineering and administrative control measures.
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Note:
•  NAMP-Naval Aviation Maintenance Program. Established 3 tiered maintenance 
system, organizational level at squadron, intermediate level, and depot level.
• FRS-Fleet Replacement Squadron designed to train aviators in their specific 
aircraft after earning wings in the training command and prior to fleet squadron 
assignment.
• NATOPS-Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization. A 
program consisting o f general and specific instructions that provide guidance and 
constraints for all naval aircraft and associated activities.
Figure 1. U.S. Naval Aviation Accident Rate and Intervention Strategies 
[U.S. Naval Safety Center, Aviation Statistics]
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that "World-class 
organizations do not tolerate preventable accidents...! challenge all of you to reduce 
the number of mishaps and accident rates by at least 50% in the next two years. These 
goals are achievable, and will directly increase our operational readiness." [Rumsfeld,
52003] The data presented in table 2 indicate that Naval Aviation has not met the 
Secretary's goals.
Table 2. Navy and Marine Corps Class A Mishap Rates For Fiscal Years 2000-2013 
per 100,000 Flight Hours [Source: U.S. Naval Safety Center]
Fiscal 
Year (FY) Flight Hours Mishaps Mishap Rate
FY00 1,460,003 29 1.99
FY01 1,479,915 19 1.28
FY02 1,577,217 36 2.28
FY03 1,516,049 37 2.44
FY04 1,360,632 30 2.20
FY05 1,229,555 22 1.79
FY06 1,218,498 20 1.64
FY07 1,260,083 16 1.27
FY08 1,243,350 21 1.69
FY09 1,225,297 15 1.22
FY10 1,175,929 11 0.94
FY11 1,244,903 16 1.29
FY12 1,175,830 15 1.28
FY13 1,084,016 12 1.11
FY00-13 18,251,277 299 1.64
Although the Naval Aviation's flight mishap rate declined over the past 60 
years, the proportion of human error causal factors has stayed relatively constant at 
about 80% [Naval Safety Center, 2010]. Efforts to reduce human errors have focused 
attention on understanding the aircrew and maintenance actions occurring in complex 
systems. In 1996, a Human Factors Quality Management Board was tasked to analyze 
and recommend processes, programs, and systems that would improve human 
performance with the purpose of reducing the aviation mishap rate. The board's 
recommendations included Naval Aviation squadrons' regular participation in survey
6questionnaires. These were designed to assess the operational and maintenance 
practices from a safety perspective as a tool for leadership to proactively employ the 
command's influence on the chain of events that may lead to an aircraft mishap. The 
Command Safety Assessment (CSA) surveys are taken by squadron aircrew and 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) are completed by squadron 
maintainers. Leadership may view anonymous results and compare their unit’s 
aggregated responses against those from other squadrons.
The Aviation CSA questionnaire was first used in 1996 to survey Navy and 
Marine Corps aviation units to measure respondent ratings related to personal 
judgments or perceptions of command climate for meeting the High Reliability 
Organization (HRO) criteria o f achieving safe and reliable operations and maintenance 
practices while working in hazardous environments. HROs two key characteristics 
were defined by Roberts as capability to proactively manage organizational 
complexity and tightly coupled operations. [Roberts, 1990b] These characteristics 
were further refined into the Model o f Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) 
that is based upon the framework by Roberts [1990a, 1990b] and Libuser [1994], The 
MOSE conceptual model consists of:
1. Process Auditing. Continuing analysis for hazard identification and establishment 
of corrective measures.
2. Reward System and Safety Culture. Use o f rewards and discipline to achieve and 
maintain desired safe behavior.
3. Quality Assurance. Policies and procedures that promote and reinforce high 
quality of work performance.
74. Risk Management. Processes to accurately perceive risk, identify hazards, and 
implement control measures.
5. Command and Control. Consists of unit climate, effectiveness o f leadership, 
policies, and management processes.
Subsequent to refinement and statistical validation, the 57 item CSA was 
conducted through secure internet-based evaluations that provide unit commanders 
feedback regarding their command climate, safety culture, workload, resource 
availability, estimated success of certain safety intervention programs, and other 
associated factors related to managing safe flight operations. [Ciavarelli, 2001 ] 
Aircrew respondents provide their assessments using a quantitative Likert-type, five- 
point rating scale (i.e., Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, or Strongly 
Agree). “These responses are given numeric values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively. 
For all but one of the survey's Likert items, a positive response to the Likert item 
implies that the respondent takes a view that his/her squadron is addressing that issue 
in a safe manner." [Schimpf, 2004b, p. 3]
The CSA was augmented by the 43 question Maintenance Climate Assessment 
Survey (MCAS) to determine the significance o f a unit’s maintenance effort in 
achieving safe flight operations. The MCAS is utilized to provide a maintenance 
centralized focus to measure an organization’s ability to safely conduct operations in 
terms of leadership, culture, policies, standards, procedures, and practices. [Figlock,
2004] It is one o f 14 climate assessment surveys used within the Department of 
Defense that provides individual response anonymity, organizational confidentiality,
8and restricted access to the results. A study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate 
School determined the MCAS survey adequately assesses a maintenance technician's 
perception of safety climate and that there is a positive correlation between the human 
errors in squadron mishaps and their corresponding survey results. [Adamshick, 2007]
Although research studies have been conducted to evaluate correlation of 
survey results to mishap occurrence, these have not resulted in providing a suitable 
metric that would support use of the survey results as a predictive tool to accurately 
assess the risk of a squadron incurring a future mishap. Over the last 10 years, the 
Navy-Marine Corps Class A - Aviation Mishap Rate has not significantly decreased 
despite leadership directives to do so. This research effort was undertaken to study the 
potential of a new methodology to achieve improved aviation safety by using MCAS 
response data as input for Bayesian Network Modeling to predict a squadron's 
likelihood to incur a future mishap.
1.3. PROBLEM  STATEM ENT
Decreases in naval aviation mishap occurrence rates and percentage of mishap 
causal errors related to human errors have plateaued in recent years. Although 
squadron CSA and MCAS participation has been conducted, related intervention 
programs implemented, and research efforts executed to analyze correlation between 
survey results and subsequent mishap occurrences, no definitive tool has been 
demonstrated to serve as a predictive model for risk analysis. As currently 
implemented, CSA and MCAS results comparisons to similar organizations do not 
adequately support squadron leadership / supervisors planning and execution o f risk
9management to prevent the potential occurrence o f an aviation mishap. Accurate 
predictive modeling would provide squadron leadership with better understanding and 
situational awareness to deploy proactive risk mitigation to reduce incurring future 
mishaps.
1.4. THESIS STATEM ENT
The Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey provides the means for Naval 
Aviation squadron leadership to obtain a measurement produced from internal 
organizational personnel. Although this metric tool may be used to compare results to 
other organizations flying similar Type/Model/Series aircraft, it has limited ability to 
serve as a predictive instrument for incurring a future mishap. Bayesian Network 
Modeling and Simulation provides a potential methodology that might be used to 
represent the relationships of MCAS results and mishap occurrences that can be used 
to derive and calculate probabilities of incurring a future mishap. Model development 
and simulation analysis will support defining causal relationships through quantitative 
analysis o f conditional probabilities based upon observed evidence o f previously 
occurred mishaps. This application would enable Navy and Marine Corps aviation 
squadron leadership to identify organizational safety risks, apply focused proactive 
measures to mitigate related hazards characterized by the MCAS results, and reduce 
organizational susceptibility to future aircraft mishaps
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1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The dissertation research was conducted to address the follow questions and 
corresponding hypotheses.
1.5.1. RESEARCH QUESTION 1
Does Bayesian Network Modeling provide a better predictor for future mishap 
occurrence than the MCAS frequency observation reference study of observed 
probabilities?
H1A: Use of Bayesian Network Modeling to represent the relationship between 
organizational MCAS results and mishap occurrence will provide improved 
methodology compared to MCAS frequency observed reference study analysis to 
predict occurrence of future mishaps.
Hlo: Use o f Bayesian Network Modeling to represent the relationship between 
organizational MCAS results and mishap occurrence will not provide improved 
methodology compared to MCAS frequency observation reference study analysis 
to predict occurrence of future mishaps.
1.5.2. RESEARCH QUESTION 2
Do any of the individual MOSE components serve as a better indicator for 
future mishap occurrence using Bayesian Network Modeling?
H2a : Use of Bayesian Network Modeling with specific individual component 
MCAS results will provide improved methodology compared to aggregated 
MCAS results to predict occurrence of future mishaps.
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H20: Use o f Bayesian Network Modeling with specific component MCAS results 
will not provide improved methodology compared to aggregated MCAS results to 
predict occurrence o f future mishaps.
1.6. RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS
The expected outcome and goal from this research was to derive an accurate 
computational Bayesian Network Model that:
1. Characterizes the causal relationships between MCAS results and aircraft mishap 
occurrence within a Naval Aviation squadron;
2. Enables model execution and analysis for both individual specific MOSE 
components and aggregated-averaged data;
3. Represents a Naval Aviation squadron’s defined relationship between maintenance 
safety climate and conduct of safe flight operations.
Research questions focused on the adequacy o f the computation model to accomplish 
the three above listed goals.
1.7. ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions for this dissertation were made as they were required for model 
development, execution, and analysis. Initial general assumptions which shaped the 
overall effort include:
• ASSUMPTION 1. Design and implementation of a computational Bayesian 
Network Model using MCAS derived inputs does not substantially change the
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intent of the original framework. MCAS was implemented to capture maintenance 
related items within the MOSE framework.
• ASSUMPTION 2. Use o f a computational model to accurately produce 
conditional probability predictions that reflect causal network relationships 
between MCAS results and mishap occurrences continues to provide the means to 
accurately represent MOSE components.
• ASSUMPTION 3. Averaging aggregated organizational response scores of 
MCAS questions does not alter the accuracy o f survey results.
• ASSUMPTION 4: Changes in an organization's safety climate reflected by 
MCAS results occur at a linear rate for the time period between implementation of 
successive safety surveys
1.8. SCOPE AND LIM ITATIONS
This dissertation focuses upon establishing conceptual and computational 
Bayesian Network Models that reflect causal relationships between an organization's 
MCAS results and mishap occurrences. Data analysis was limited to information that 
was made available by the Naval Safety Center. Due to availability of furnished data, 
the scope of this research was limited to Naval and Marine Corps squadrons that flew 
aircraft that deployed onboard aircraft carriers. Mishap narrative and causal factor 
identification resulted from defined procedures for conduct of Aviation Mishap 
Boards for producing reports and were vetted via respective chains of command for 
ultimate concurrence and/or rejection of findings. Other internal and external aspects 
were not examined or modeled in this study.
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1.9. M OTIVATION
The value of this research is to create a computational model that enables 
squadron leadership to identify defensive gaps in their organizations and to quantify 
associated risks. Ideally, subsequent to obtaining results from an MCAS survey, 
squadron leadership could compare the data to previous survey results and actual 
mishap occurrence and use the models developed from this research to proactively 
identify risks for future mishap occurrence. Model result would enable directed 
application of proactive risk management to mitigate potential mishap likelihood and / 
or severity. The ability to develop, test, and evaluate the desired model for application 
in Naval Aviation is supported by existing data and metrics.
Due to the tasking o f military aircraft and service members for use in armed 
conflict or supporting missions, military aviation represents a significant investment in 
financial and human capital. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 budget submission for the 
Naval Aviation Enterprise included $17.9 Million in Aircraft Procurement and $8.6 
Million in Operations and Maintenance. [Kelly, 2013]
Personnel, air vehicle, and weapons system attrition may be expected in 
combat as a result of engagements against an armed enemy. However, loss of or 
degradation to either military aircraft or related service members as the consequence 
of human error during maintenance evolutions adversely affects combat readiness and 
impairs the nation's capability to achieve its strategic, operational, and tactical goals. 
Analysis by the Naval Safety Center indicates that losses due to human error are 
greater than those sustained from direct enemy action in the Global War on Terrorism.
14
During most recent participation in prolonged combat operations through the first 11 
months of FY 2006, Naval Aviation sustained 25 Class-A mishaps consisting of 21 
aircrew deaths and 17 aircraft destroyed compared against the combat loss o f a single 
AH-1W helicopter and 2 aircrew. "The vast majority o f our aviation losses are not 
because of engagements with enemy forces. Our losses overwhelmingly are due to 
mishaps." [Mayer, 2006. p. 2]
1.10. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION
The contributions provided by this dissertation research include:
• Providing Naval Aviation squadron leadership with a tool to enable timely 
identification of risks related to their maintenance safety climate and use of 
proactive measures to reduce occurrence of future mishaps.
• In addition to Naval Aviation, this application o f Bayesian Network Modeling was 
designed to be of utility to other military and commercial aviation activities. This 
research was undertaken to provide a foundation that might be adapted for use by 
industries striving to achieve (near) error free processes for highly reliable and safe 
operation under hazardous conditions.
• Narrowing the research field for utility o f questionnaire surveys for measuring 
impacts of an organization's safety climate.
1.11. RESEARCH APPROACH AND ORGANIZATION
The research presents a formal simulation architecture that focuses on a 
Bayesian Network Model of risk and probabilities using the MCAS / MOSE
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framework as a supporting element. The derived computational model's purpose is to 
accurately represent the associated risks resulting from a squadron's maintenance 
safety climate in supporting the operational demands for providing aircrew with 
mission capable aircraft. Model input was derived through decomposition o f the 
MCAS by specific individual MOSE components. Validation of the model's 
credibility was accomplished using statistical comparison against Aviation Mishap 
Board investigation reports.
This dissertation consists of the chapters detailing the following sub-divisions:
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Methodology
4. Results
5. Interpretation, Conclusions, and Recommendations.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. DEFINITION OF TERM S
Safety is a desirable characteristic o f a squadron's culture; however, safety in 
itself is not the ultimate priority. If it were, no risks of any degree would be 
undertaken. "Risk is inherent in everything that the Navy does. Managing risk 
requires an in-depth understanding o f the issues and trade-offs associated with key 
decisions." [Mullen. 2006, p. 2 1 ] Mission accomplishment is of primary efficacy to a 
military organization. Safety is a critical trait in obtaining and executing combat 
proficiency to successfully achieve assigned tasking. Some degree o f risk is inherent 
to aviation, and safety allows for effective management of risk. These terms are 
further defined below:
• Safety. The result of preservation of human lives and material resources through 
conduct o f hazard detection, hazard elimination, and awareness enhancement o f all 
concerned individuals. [OPNAVINST 3750.7R, 2003] As such, safety does not 
include the absence of incurring a material failure or personal injury simply as a 
matter of insufficient exposure length. Safety applied to military aviation 
positively influences mission accomplishment. Losses or injuries sustained 
directly from combat or sabotage are not considered representative aspects o f a 
unit's safety posture. Reason defined safety as a dynamic non-event. A stable and 
reliable outcome is due to the application of constant change rather than 
continuous repetition. To achieve stability, a change in one system must be 
compensated for by changes in other parameters. [Reason, 1997, p. 37]
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• Hazard. Any real or potential risk that can cause personal injury, property 
damage, mission degradation, or damage to environment. The severity of a hazard 
is an assessment of the expected consequence, defined by degree of injury, 
occupational illness, loss, or damage that could occur from exposure to a hazard.
• Risk. The chance o f adverse outcome or bad consequences; such as injury, illness, 
or loss. Risk level is expressed as a function o f both hazard probability and 
severity. [OPNAVINST 3500.39, 2004]
2.1.1. ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY, SAFETY CULTURE, AND SAFETY  
CLIMATE
As a means o f planning and performing operations related to and required for 
flight, safety is a critical feature in obtaining and executing combat proficiency to 
successfully achieve assigned tasking. However, in response to operational stress, 
safety requirements such as wearing protective equipment, reviewing checklists, and 
inspections by quality assurance representatives are often seen by front line operators 
as impediments to achieving short-term goals associated with flight operations. 
Whether at a local or global level, safety then may be considered an emergent 
behavior that is not completely captured by the behavior of individual organizational 
divisions or personnel. Safety is emergent in that it characterizes collective behavior 
that may be understood through study of the components in the context of the whole 
organization in which global emergent properties are formed from interdependent 
parts. [Bar-Yam, 1997] Achievement of safety requires the coordination o f the entire
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organization at each hierarchical level. The conflicting requirements for safety and 
combat readiness can lead to unpredictability and non-ergodicity.
An aviation squadron's organization is detailed in numerous instructions as to 
components, functions, and interrelationships. These are rational systems with formal 
structures and hierarchical organization. As such, a squadron exists in a positivistic 
reality where objective analysis and degrees o f causal linkage may be determined. 
However, applying analytic reduction to a squadron's organization does not reduce it 
to independent subsystems. Decomposition results in non-linear interactions and 
feedback channels, which often produces different behavior when examined 
individually or as part of the whole system. As an organization, the functions of an 
aviation squadron are easily bounded, reducible, frequently irreversible, and often 
contain multiple feedback loops, numerous people and process interactions, and non­
linear procedures.
Both safety culture and safety climate are used to describe attributes o f an 
organization to achieve its goals and accomplish its vision while reducing 
susceptibility to personnel injuries or equipment damage. Safety culture delineates an 
enduring trait that is reflective o f the fundamental values, norms, assumption and 
expectation that to some extent exist within the group’s societal culture. [O'Connor, 
et. al., 201 lb] The culture is passed on to successive generations within the 
organization. It serves to mold individual behaviors by systematic use of rewards, 
status expectations, power, authority, inclusion/exclusion of group boundaries, and 
underlying concepts for managing behavioral deviations. Organizational culture is
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strongly influenced by its operational / associative structure and
leadership/subordinate relationships. [Ciavarelli, 2007]
An organization’s safety climate represents a significant component of a High
Reliability Organization. Safety climate is the surfaced manifestation o f culture and
refers to the shared perception organizational personnel that their leaders and
personnel are: genuinely committed to safety of operations; have taken appropriate
steps to implement and communicate safety standards, processes, and procedures; and
ensure adherence. [Goodrum, 1999] Their leaders are genuinely committed to safety
of operations, take appropriate measure to communicate safety principles, and ensure
adherence to safety standards and procures. [Ciavarelli, 2007] An organization’s
safety climate is considered to be a more visible manifestation o f the culture at a
particular moment in time. It is generally accepted that am organization's safety
climate at a specific point in time can be measured through use o f survey
questionnaires. [O’Connor et al, 2011 b]
Metrics of components that comprise an organization's safety climate are
considered to have utility as both lead and lag indicators.
“Safety climate introduces the notion that the likelihood of accidents occurring can 
be predicted on a basis of certain organizational factors. These organizational 
factors can be used as leading indicators to identify, in advance, the strengths and 
weaknesses of an organization that influence the likelihood o f accidents occurring. 
Once weaknesses are identified, remedial actions can be taken." [O'Connor et al., 
2011a, pp. 27-28]
2.1.2. RISK M ANAGEM ENT
Accident prevention initiatives are the primary means Naval Aviation has to 
reduce personnel losses and material costs associated with mishaps. [Schmorrow,
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1998] The purpose of this research is to provide a tool to conduct risk management 
enabling proactive measures to be taken to prevent aviation mishaps. Risk 
management is a process used to mitigate the undesirable effects of an event that may 
cause damage or loss to personnel or equipment. Figure 2, below, depicts a structure 
for implementing risk management as a continuous and iterative cycle.
Risk Management
Risk
Planning
Risk
A ssessm en t
Risk
Handling
Risk
Monitoring
4 11 1 i
1 1
Risk Risk
Identification Analysis
t t ........... ....................... '
Risk D ocum entation
Figure 2. Risk Management Structure [Bahnmaier, 2003, p. 6]
Steps include:
• Risk Assessment. Identification o f critical events and analysis to determine their 
impact. Risks are rated or prioritized based upon their respective probability of 
occurrence, severity of associated consequences, and relationship to other risks.
• Risk Planning. Conducted in response to continual risk assessments to determine 
impact of change in associated risks. This process defines and documents the 
strategy to assign adequate resources to mitigate risks enabling mission 
accomplishment.
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• Risk Handling. Identifies, evaluates, selects, and implements mitigation options to 
bound risk at an acceptable level given governing constraints and objectives.
• Risk Monitoring. Tracking and appraisal of the success of employed risk handling 
techniques through use o f performance evaluation metrics. It provides a feedback 
channel for the management cycle.
• Risk Documentation. Data gathering and maintenance to support assessment, 
handling, planning, and monitoring.
Conduct of aircraft maintenance provides the opportunity for inducing human 
error. To ensure aircraft are ready for tasking, they require both scheduled upkeep to 
accomplish routine periodic servicing as well as unscheduled maintenance to correct 
discrepancies that impede proper system operation. [Commander, Naval Air Forces 
Instruction (CNAFINST) 4790.2 Change 1, 2006] Aircraft maintenance includes 
troubleshooting to determine the exact source of a fault, component removal and 
replacement, repair o f defective items, preventive measures that decrease potential 
failures during flight, and servicing o f consumable items that are designed for wear. 
Quality assurance inspections are conducted on all maintenance actions to ensure the 
effort was correctly performed. Considerable maintenance efforts are expended for 
each flight, and maintenance man-hours per flight hours in the range o f 10-40 are 
common for the current inventory of fleet aircraft. As such, each maintenance action 
provides an opportunity for human error to adversely impact an organization's defense 
against a mishap.
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Design and use of a computational model that may be accurately used to 
calculate risks resulting from maintenance error would allow applicable squadron 
personnel to maximize use of Operational Risk Management (ORM). All naval 
activities are required to apply the ORM process in planning, training, and execution 
to optimize their operational capability and readiness. [OPNAVINST 3500.39B, 
2004, p. 2] This is accomplished through the five-step process of:
1. Hazard Identification
2. Hazard Assessment
3. Risk Decisions
4. Control Implementation
5. Supervision
The goal o f this dissertation was to provide a tool for the predictive risk 
assessment o f a squadron's maintenance organization to successfully accomplish its 
mission of providing and launching aircraft ready for tasking. The intent for the 
model output is to furnish squadron leadership accurate information to subsequently 
reach proper risk decisions, implement adequate controls, and provide required 
supervision to reduce aviation mishaps.
2.2. INFLUENTIAL W ORK
This section details key published works that led to crafting the problem and 
thesis statements and provided direction for this research.
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2.2.1. HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS
Roberts [ 1990b] investigated organizations that had achieved near error free 
operations for considerable periods o f time. An interdisciplinary research team 
selected three "high reliability” organizations (HROs) that maintained safe and 
reliable operations under hazardous conditions. HROs consistently conduct operations 
on the order o f tens of thousands of opportunities for experiencing a mishap without 
experiencing a catastrophic consequence due to human error. [Roberts, 1990b] 
Operational procedures were examined at Pacific Gas and Electric Company (operator 
of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant and Western U.S. electrical services power 
grid), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control Centers, and U.S. 
Navy aircraft carriers. [Roberts, 1990a]
Roberts identified two groups of key traits in common among the three 
organizational examples to explain their respective successes. First, they were capable 
of managing complexity through reaction to unexpected sequences of events. On­
going training that presented several possible emergency situations prepared essential 
personnel to face actual crises. The HROs countered the effects of losses by providing 
for redundancy of essential personnel and equipment. Each establishment used 
advanced technology requiring high degrees of specialized understanding and 
interdependence requiring high degrees of generalized understanding. Each of the 
three entities assigned exceptional responsibility and accountability to low-level 
employees. The study revealed the HRO personnel understood and managed the 
potential for the interaction of systems that supported incompatible functions, took 
advantage of both direct and indirect sources of information, and educated their staffs
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concerning the complexities resulting from human-machine interfaces to minimize 
baffling interactions.
Second, the HROs were characterized for management controls o f tightly 
coupled, mechanistic, and brittle (in an engineering sense) operations. Due to 
execution of time dependent processes, specific functions were decomposed to achieve 
dispersed redundancy. Flexibility resulted from the coordination of component 
actions. The HROs defined one way to reach a goal and accepted minimal deviation 
in performance.
Weick and Sutcliffe [2007] expanded upon the concept of HROs through a 
social psychology approach to studying the effect of cognitive dissonance on 
performance. Introducing the themes of collective mindfulness and collective 
enactment, they described the impact of people on the behaviors of others.
Weick and Sutcliffe identified that HROs contain distinctive structures and their 
actions are a result o f mindful organizing for the unexpected as well as the expected 
through anticipation and containment.
Anticipation includes both application o f early warning mechanisms and 
control of undesirable events. Components for anticipation include:
• Preoccupation with failure through sensitivity to early signs of failure
• Reluctance to simplify by further investigating to determine and analyze causes
• Sensitivity to operations in understanding dynamic and non-linear organizational 
inter-relationships.
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For unanticipated consequences that occur, containment serves to limit damage 
and exposure. Elements of containment are:
• Commitment to resilience by maintaining operational functionality during high 
demand events by absorbing strain and preserving functionality during adversity; 
maintaining ability to regain functionality after untoward events; and learning / 
applying lessons from previous events.
• Deference to expertise regardless of organizational hierarchy.
2.2.2. NORM AL ACCIDENT THEORY
Perrow developed the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) after examination of 
the incident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in 1979. He proposed that 
two related characteristics, complex interactions between system components and tight 
coupling, made certain technologically advanced systems susceptible to unavoidable 
accidents. He contrasted the two theories stating that HRO "believes that if only we 
try harder we will have virtually accident-free systems even if their inter-relationships 
and feedback represent complexity (i.e., difficult to quantify)and tightly coupled, 
while NAT believes that no matter how hard we try we will still have accidents 
because o f intrinsic characteristics of complex/coupled systems." [Perrow. 1999. p. 
369] Perrow acknowledged that the four HRO fundamentals are sufficient for linear, 
looser coupled systems, but trying harder would not prevent a systems accident. He 
found fault with attempts to make safety the first priority, and he elicited reasons for 
organizations not achieving increased learning. Perrow characterized NAT and HRO 
disparities concerning systems prone to multiple errors resulting in unanticipated
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interactions that defeat the constraints of safety systems. He identified the following 
characteristics that determine the scope of inevitable failures: operating scale 
experience, experience with critical processes, information errors, close proximity of 
"elites" to the system, organizational control over personnel, and organizational 
density within the system environment.
2.2.3. COM M AND SAFETY CLIM ATE SURVEYS
A common method to obtain data that provides measurement of an 
organization's safety climate is through use o f survey questionnaires. This analysis of 
this information has been used over the past two decades to demonstrate relationships 
across many safety climate components and mishap occurrence rates in a variety of 
high-risk industries. [O’Connor et al., 201 la] Naval Aviation uses several surveys for 
defining organizational safety climate. Climate assessment surveys are used as a 
measurement of an organization's capability to safely conduct operations in terms of 
leadership, culture, policies, standards, procedures, and practices. [Figlock, 2004] 
These include those administered at the squadron level, Fleet Readiness Centers 
(previously referred to as Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Departments and 
Aviation Depots), higher headquarters, support personnel, and contractors. Surveys 
provide for respondent anonymity, organizational confidentiality (due to limited 
access to survey results), World Wide Web implementation, and comparative analysis 
to prior results and like squadron flying similar aircraft. Quantitative data are 
generated by: demographic questions (e.g., rank, years o f experience, service, status, 
parent command, and location); closed-ended questions and Likert-scale responses;
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and qualitative data are supplied through open-ended questions and free text responses 
to describe unit specific issues.
The squadron level surveys are the Command Safety Assessment and 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey. In 2004, Vice Admiral Zortman, 
Commander, U.S. Naval Air Forces ordered mandatory compliance for all aviation 
squadrons to complete assessment surveys semiannually and within 30 days following 
a change of command. [Buttrey, 2010] The CSA provides aircrew interpretation of 
key organizational issues that relate to a command's influence on the organizational 
safety climate factors that may lead to an aircraft mishap. It was developed using the 
HRO framework for entities that operate in high-risk environments, but have fewer 
failures than would be predicted. Similarly, the MCAS was designed as a diagnostic 
tool to capture the maintainers' perspective of risk management and safety climate.
The MCAS was developed two years after the CSA and added a sixth component to 
the MOSE conceptual model, Command and Functional Relationships (C/FR). C/FR 
consists o f the internal organizational communications paths for timely distribution of 
information to support safe job accomplishment, coordination, and execution of 
aircraft maintenance.
Schimpf used both squadron CSA and MCAS data for statistical comparison 
against actual mishap occurrence. He used MathCAD software to develop a 
mathematical model to predict the frequency o f squadrons experiencing 0, 1,2, 3, or 4 
mishaps within 12 months post survey and a provide a means to relate the safety 
climate survey score to a quantitative measure o f mishap likelihood. [Schimpf, 2004b]
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Schimpf s research project for the School of Aviation Safety, Naval 
Postgraduate School at Monterey, California had the primary goal of quantitatively 
defining a squadron's probability of incurring a mishap based upon survey results. 
"Toward this aim, a MathCAD model was implemented to simulate the mishap 
probability process. This simulation generated an equation that predicts the frequency 
of squadrons experiencing zero, one, two, three, or four mishaps within 12 months 
post survey and also provides a means to relate survey score to a quantitative measure 
of mishap likelihood." [Schimpf, 2004b. p. 20] The research showed quantitative and 
descriptive statistical relationships between survey results and squadron safety 
performance using the following assumptions:
• Gaussian distribution of survey results.
• Numbers of mishap events within a fixed period are the result of a Poisson 
process.
• Future mishap probability increases in an exponential manner corresponding to the 
average survey score (i.e., increased risk resulting from lower average score, and 
vice versa).
Schimpf developed a mathematical model using a Gaussian score distribution 
with each datum contained within distribution generating a Poisson distribution of 
mishaps proportional to the probability. The Poisson distribution was modified by 
exponential variation of average risk (denoted as “a ” in the Poisson equation) 
dependent on survey score.
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where n is the number of mishaps that have occurred in the last 12 months since 
the MCAS
[Schimpf, 2004b, p. 21]
In a follow on study, Schimpf and Figlock averaged all 43 MCAS survey items 
to derive a metric o f overall safety climate which was compared to individual unit 
performance. The analysis was based on the sample of 17,228 completed MCASs 
from 168 Naval Aviation squadrons (65% Navy and 35% Marine Corps). Mishap data 
were provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center for the period from August 10, 2000 
through April 1, 2004. This study was conducted to explore the potential relationship 
between safety climate score and occurrences of mishaps. As shown in Figure 3, there 
were substantial differences in incurred mishap occurrence among the safety climate 
quartiles. The aviation units in the lowest quartile (interval 2.90-3.59) had nearly 
twice the number o f accidents (94 versus 49) in the 24 month time frame. [Ciavarelli, 
2007]
a  = a(x)  =  a 0e (EQ 4)
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Figure 3. MCAS Survey versus Mishaps Within 24 Months After Survey 
[Ciavarelli, 2007, Schimpf and Figlock, 2006]
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Conditional probabilities of future mishap occurrence within 24 months after survey 
based upon the frequency events for quartile distribution shown in Figure 3, above, 
were computed. The equation for conditional probability used was:
Conditional Probability (Qj)  = frequency / total occurrence, such that:
£ f=1 Conditional Probability (Qj) =  1 (EQ 5)
The conditional probability data are depicted in Table 3 below:
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Table 3. Conditional Probability of Future Mishap Occurrence within 24 Months 
after Survey Dependent upon MCAS Quartile Results
Quartile/ 
Class Mishap Category
Qi Q2 Q 3 Q 4
Alpha 0.3231 0.2923 0.1846 0.2000
Bravo 0.3243 0.3514 0.2432 0.0811
Charlie 0.3987 0.1699 0.2157 0.2157
Total A, B, and C 0.3686 0.2275 0.2118 0.1922
2.2.4. HUM AN ERROR
Human error has resulted in numerous well-known catastrophes resulting in 
significant loss o f life and equipment destruction. Some recent examples include the 
Tenerife runway collision in 1977 [Weick, 1990], Three Mile Island in 1979 [Bowen, 
1983], Bhopal methyl isocyanate release in 1984 [Fischer, 1996], Challenger 
destruction [Rogers, 1986], Chernobyl tragedy o f 1988 [World Nuclear Association, 
2006], and Columbia mishap in 2003. [Columbia Accident Investigation Report, 
2003] Effects of industrial growth, technology, and automation have significantly 
increased the inherent consequences o f mishaps due to human error.
In his seminal work, Human Error. Reason asserted "that the relatively limited 
number of ways in which errors actually manifest themselves are inextricably bound 
up with the 'computational primitives' by which stored knowledge structures are 
selected and retrieved in response to current situational demands." [Reason, 1990a, p. 
1] He defined the nature of error, reviews influential studies on human error, and 
presented a Generic Error Modeling System which categorized three basic error 
types: skill-based slips and lapses; rule-based mistakes; and knowledge-based 
mistakes. He addressed the human input to mishaps occurring in fields o f high-risk,
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complex technologies, and he distinguished between active and latent errors. Active 
errors are committed by personnel who implement controls that have immediate 
impact on system operation. Latent errors most commonly reside within higher 
organizational levels and "may lie dormant for a long time, only making their presence 
felt when they combine with other 'resident pathogens' and local triggering events to 
breach the system's defenses." [Reason, 1990a, p. xi] The author stated that latent 
errors pose a greater threat to technologically advanced systems than active failures 
and are much harder to recognize. He defined dynamics of accident causation with the 
trajectory o f an accident opportunity having to penetrate several defensive layers. 
These layers served as a defense-in-depth representing the complex inter-relationships 
between latent failures and a variety of local triggers. As shown in Figure 4, Reason 
characterized the chances of an opportunity trajectory finding aligned holes in 
successive defensive layers at any one time as very small. This research effort was 
undertaken to develop models that would represent multiple characteristics that 
comprise a naval aviation squadron’s defenses against mishap occurrence.
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Figure 4. Dynamics of Accident Causation [Reason, 1990a, p. 208]
Investigation data for mishaps provided by the Naval Safety Center identified 
that human error or failure causal factors were identified for 91% of 244 Class A, 76% 
of 207 Class B, and 54% of 606 Class C mishaps which occurred between October 
1999 and August 2009. [O’Connor et al., 201 la]
2.2.5. HUM AN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
Wiegmann and Shappell in 2000, adapted Reason's theory to produce a model 
o f accident causation. They depicted latent and active failures as producing "holes" 
within layers categorized as Unsafe Acts, Preconditions for Unsafe Acts, Unsafe 
Supervision, and Organizational Influences. Depending upon the alignment of the 
"holes" or gaps in each layer, the failures may provide the opportunity for a single 
vector of causal elements to pass unimpeded and result in a mishap. This model, 
shown in Figure 5, represents a mishap as the result of aligned failures or absence of 
defenses in each layer. “It is well established that mishaps are rarely attributed to a 
single cause, or in most instances even a single individual. Rather, mishaps are the
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end result of a myriad of latent failures or conditions that precede active failures." 
[Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3750.6R, 2003, 
0 - 1]
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CJ
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Latent Failures
Active Failures
Failed or Absent 
Defenses
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Figure 5. Swiss Cheese Model of Accident Causation 
[Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 4]
Through decomposition of the four layers into their respective causal elements, 
Wiegmann and Shappell developed the Human Factors Analysis Classification System 
(HFACS) shown in Figure 6, as an accident investigation and analysis tool 
[Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003] Each layer is comprised of categories which represent 
specific causes for failed or absent defenses against mishaps. Human errors that are 
the consequence of aircrew, maintenance personnel, and supervisors represent three 
prevalent categories in aviation. [Fry, 2000] HFACS is used throughout the 
Department o f Defense and many different government agencies for post-mishap 
investigation and analysis of human error.
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[Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000]
Wiegmann and Shappell [2003] developed HFACS to provide aviation mishap 
investigators with the required tools to analyze the causal effects o f human error. The 
development of HFACS was an iterative process of verification and improvement. 
HFACS categorization and decomposition were empirically derived and refined 
through the analysis of the causal factor data listed in numerous mishap investigations.
Supplementary extensions of the HFACS have been developed to focus 
specifically upon a common subset of related human factors errors that may present 
causal factors for a mishap. The Maintenance Extension is a subset of the HFACS 
domain that provides a unique perspective for analyzing the impact of individual 
malpractices and organizational / supervisory failures in triggering an aviation-related
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casualty or loss. The HFACS-ME uses a three-tiered order of effects perspective to 
precisely characterize a lapse in the respective defensive layers found within an 
aviation unit's maintenance department. A breakdown of contributing mishap causal 
factors, organized by first, second, and third order tiers is listed below in Table 4.
37
Table 4. HFACS-ME Taxonomy [OPNAVINST 3750.6R, 2003, 0-16]
First Order Second Order Third Order
Management Conditions
Organizational
Inadequate Processes 
Inadequate Documentation 
Inadequate Design 
Inadequate Resources
Supervisory
Inadequate Supervision 
Inappropriate Operations 
Uncorrected Problem 
Supervisory Misconduct
Maintainer Conditions
Medical
Adverse Mental State 
Adverse Physical State 
Unsafe Limitation
Crew Coordination
Inadequate Communication 
Inadequate Assertiveness 
Inadequate Adaptability/Flexibility
Readiness
Inadequate Training/Preparation 
Inadequate Certification/Qualification 
Personnel Readiness 
Infringement
Working Conditions
Environment
Inadequate Lighting/Light 
Unsafe Weather/Exposure 
Unsafe Environmental Hazards
Equipment
Damaged/Unserviced
Unavailable/Inappropriate
Dated/Uncertified
Workspace
Confining
Obstructed
Inaccessible
Maintainer Acts
Error
Attention/Memory 
Knowledge/Rule 
Skill/Technique 
J udgment/Decision
Violation
Routine
Infraction
Exceptional
Fragrant
The HFACS-ME framework provides an effective methodology for classifying 
mishap causal factors resulting from maintenance errors. Its capability mirrors that of 
the overall system with full applicability in scope from near miss to major damage and 
significant personnel loss. A study of aircraft mishap information contained within the 
Maintenance Error Information Management System (MEIMS) database analyzed the 
third order effects (found in Table 4) for correlation. Of 1,016 aviation mishaps that
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occurred between 1996 and 2001 in which maintenance issues were attributed as 
causal factors, 4,235 associated third-order factors were identified. As shown in 
Figure 7, there is a non-uniform distribution o f causal factors with the highest 
frequencies falling under the first-order classifications of unsafe management 
conditions and unsafe maintainer acts.
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Figure 7. Mishap Occurrence Percentage for Selected HFACS-ME Third- 
Order Factors (n=l,016) [Source, Krulak, 2004, p. 431]
"It is apparent from the graphical frequency data that the different HFACS-ME 
factors are associated in dissimilar ways in aviation mishaps. In the simplest form, 
some factors are far more likely to be seen in a mishap than others. These differences 
are important because an understanding of which factors cause the most mishaps may 
improve the focus o f safety programs, and direct scarce resource to where the largest 
safety impact can be made." [Krulak, 2004, p. 431 ]
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Schmorrow conducted a study o f 470 Naval Aviation Maintenance Related 
Mishaps (MRMs) that occurred from Fiscal Years 1990 through 1997. Analysis 
included coding the mishap data causal factors from the Naval Safety Center using the 
HFACS-ME to account for the scope o f error types. Determination was made using 
the second order error types. Results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Frequency of Error Type by Accident Type and Class 
[Schmorrow, 1998, p. 64]
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FM 68 80 0 4 0 0 0 13 126 52
FRM 8 17 0 0 0 1 1 2 27 9
AGM 75 185 6 16 2 22 2 63 217 121
Class A 30 42 0 2 0 2 1 10 47 25
Class B 25 41 1 3 0 3 0 6 44 21
Class C 96 199 5 5 2 18 2 62 279 136
Total 151 282 6 20 2 23 3 78 370 182
*M-Flight Mishap FRM-Flight Related Mishap AGM -Aircraft Ground Mishap
The study revealed that over 95% of the identified human error causal factors were 
attributed to five error types (listed in descending order): Error, Supervisory / 
Squadron, Violation, Organizational / Unforeseen, and Crew Resource Management. 
[Schmorrow, 1998, p. 64]
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2.3. RESEARCH CONTEXT
Supplementary literature that supports the conduct of this research for 
Modeling and Simulation domain for framework, theory, and formalisms used in 
conceptual and computational model development efforts included:
• Law, A. & Kelton W., Simulation Modeling and Analysis. This text book offered 
many state-of-the art areas within the field of Modeling & Simulation including 
software, validation and verification, input modeling, processes, statistical design, 
and analysis.
•  Zeigler, B., Praehofer, H., & Kim, T., Theory o f Modeling and Simulation: 
Integrating Discrete Event and Continuous Complex Dynamic Systems. This 
manual introduced formalisms, and specifications that define applicable 
components and extensions. Approaches to frameworks, system morphisms, 
verification and validation, design methodology, and system entity structures are 
presented.
2.4. USE OF SURVEY RESULTS TO ASSESS ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY
Organizational surveys completed by workforce personnel provide a means to 
obtain both quantitative and qualitative data regarding perceptions of the unit's 
characteristics. Quantitative results are provided through use of questionnaires that 
use a scaled answering mechanism. Qualitative data are normally obtained through 
use of open ended questions enabling the respondent to provide less-constrained 
details on their individual opinions. Surveys provide a broad-based appeal that impart 
an implied sense of legitimacy, compare favorably with other methods to gain
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meaningful data in ease o f use and base effectiveness. They may be used to explore 
and understand employee opinions and attitudes, assess behaviors and attributes in 
employee day-to-day work experiences, obtain baseline measures for benchmarking 
change, and drive organizational change and development. [Church and Waclaswki, 
1998]
Application of survey questionnaires are used develop and define 
organizational safety climate metrics. Guldenmund [2000] stated, “Organizational 
climate is commonly conceived of as a distinct configuration with limited 
dimensionality surveyed through self-administered questionnaires. Such measures are, 
up to a certain point, objective and semi-quantitative. Organizational culture is often 
determined phenomenologically, i.e. through observations and interviews, through 
trial-and-error, mutual comparison and the like. Such measures are regarded as 
qualitative and thus difficult to quantify.” [p. 221] Safety climate survey 
questionnaires enable statistical comparisons among different variables and 
components as well as means to quantify changes that occur between successive 
occurrences of the survey being taken [O’Connor et al., 201 lb] Command climate 
assessment surveys serve to provide senior leadership with an instantaneous metric to 
evaluate their safety climate at the time of administration. The assessment survey's 
goal is to provide useful information that enables advanced identification of issues that 
may increase risk and mishap occurrence. Ideally, the early ascertained, lead 
indicators allow leadership the opportunity to employ proactive risk mitigation efforts 
to rectify those situations before a mishap occurs. [Buttrey, 2010] Safety surveys have 
wide applications not only in Naval Aviation, but also are used in evaluation of
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clinical healthcare delivery, industry. A relationship was suggested from safety survey 
results demonstrating that employee perceptions o f the safety systems are related to 
management's commitment to safety and related to sustained injury rates. [O'Toole, 
2002]
The Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey contained 43 questions that were 
answered via computer entered radio button selection as shown in Figure 8.
0 o o o o
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
oN /A
o Don't 
Know
Figure 8. Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey Response Options 
Source: Aviation Climate Assessment Survey System
This represented a bi-directional rating Likert scale quantitative five point range as 
shown below
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
No points were assigned for responses o f either N/A or Don’t Know
Additional details regarding use of Likert Scales can be found in section B.l of 
Appendix B.
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2.5. DISCRETE EVENT SIM ULATION M ODELING TECHNIQUES
A wide range of techniques are available for computational modeling. 
Simulations of models possessing continuous states and times are traditionally 
represented using differential equation systems. [Ziegler et al., 2000] Simulation 
using discrete event models involves representing a system's evolution over time 
through state variables that (are considered to) change instantaneously at separate 
points in time. Events are the term used to define the point in time when an 
instantaneous occurrence may change the system's state. [Law and Kelton, 2000] 
Discrete event simulations may reflect either a standardized, incremental time-advance 
feature (i.e., simulation clock) in which state variable metrics are provided or use non- 
uniform time increments that reflect state variable metrics that occur at a point in time 
concurrent with a significant event affecting a state variable component. Discrete 
event formalisms use a stepwise mode of execution to define a model’s state at a 
particular point in time and how the respective state’s change in the future, and 
environmental influences. [Ziegler et al., 2000]
This section reviews five discrete event simulation techniques and lists 
advantages and disadvantages for their use for predictive risk analysis modeling based 
upon MCAS survey results:
2.5.1. BAYESIAN NETW ORK MODEL
Bayesian Network Models (BNMs) rest on the application o f Bayes Theorem: 
If A and B are events with P(B)>0, then
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P ( B \ A ) P ( A )
p (A \ B) ~ — 7m—  (£Q6)
[Jackman, 2009, p. 9] They are discrete event models of domains with inherent 
uncertainty. BNMs are represented by graphical structures that consist of nodes and 
arcs. The nodes correspond to random state variables and arcs represent the direct 
probabilistic relationships between the connected variables. These probabilistic 
relationships are quantified through use of probability distributions which are usually a 
conditional probability table associated to the nodes. [Bayesia, 2001, p. vi]
The goal for use of BNMs is to produce statistics that update conditional 
probabilities in light o f observed evidence. This supports a quantitative method to 
evaluate the model’s subjective sense, i.e., probability as a degree of belief. BNMs 
allow for calculation o f all the possible combinations o f causal connections between 
nodes relating only neighboring nodes. Bayesian networks contain a built-in 
independence assumption. [Chamiak, 1991] Components o f Bayesian Networks 
include:
• A set of variable and a set o f directed edges between variables
• Each variable has a finite set of mutual exclusive states.
• The variables together with the directed edges form a Directed Acyclic Graph.
• To each variable A with parents B i  B„ there is attached a conditional
probability table P  (A \ B t  B n). [Jensen, 1996, p. 18]
BNMs may be used for determining model causality where understanding of 
what's occurring is incomplete. With Directed Acyclic Graphs containing prior 
probabilities of all root nodes and conditional probabilities of all non-root nodes given
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all possible combinational of direct predecessors, the conditional probabilities of 
network nodes are calculated given the values of observed nodes. [Chamiak, 1991]
An example of a BNM is show in Figure 9
Figure 9. Example of a Bayesian Network Model
Advantages for use o f BNMs include capability to:
• Readily accommodate a variety of knowledge sources and data types including 
incomplete data sets.
• Allow one to learn about causal relationships by transparent representations 
between system variables
• Support use observed knowledge to determine the validity of the acyclic graph 
represented in the BNM.
• Facilitate use o f prior knowledge. Causal networks represent prior knowledge 
whereas the weight of the directed edges can be updated in a posterior manner 
based on new data.
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• Perform relatively straightforward construction o f prior knowledge through use of 
“causal” edges between any two factors that are believed to be correlated.
• Provide an efficient method for preventing the over fitting of data.
Some disadvantages for use o f BNMs are:
• There is no universally accepted method for constructing a network from data.
• Potential difficulty for experts to agree on model structure.
• Limit to the spatial and temporal scales that can be represented in one BNM.
• Inability to support feedback loops. [McCloskey, 1999; Heckerman, 2006; 
Landscape Logic, 2009]
2.5.2. HIDDEN M ARKOV MODEL
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are a subset o f Bayesian modeling defined as 
a statistical model employing doubly stochastic process with an underlying stochastic 
process that is not directly observable through another set of stochastic processes that 
produce a sequence o f observed results. Transition functions are utilized to represent 
the dynamics occurring in the unobservable space. This modeling technique is 
represented by the following characteristics:
• N , the number of states in the model with individual states denoted as
S = { S / ,  S ?,... ..S’v/ and the state at time t as q,. (EQ 7)
• M,  the number of distinct observation symbols per state. Observation symbols 
match to the model's output. Individual symbols are denoted as
E = /v /, \ ' 2  vM}. (EQ 8)
Al
• Probability distribution of state transition:
A - {a , ,} where a,l= P ( q , . / = Sj | q,  = S,)  for 1 < i , j  <N. (EQ 9)
• Probability distribution of the observation symbol in state j ,
B  ~  {bj(k)}  where b,{k) = P [ v k at t  \ q, = 5/] for I  < j  < N  a n d  
I < k < M .  (EQ 10)
• The initial state distribution for n  = rti where
ni = P[qi = Si] (EQ 11)
• Input variable values for N, M ,  A,  B ,  and n  are used by the HMM to produce an 
observation vector sequence:
0 = 0 1 , 0 2, ..  . O r  (EQ 12)
[Bilmes, 2002; Rabiner and Juang, 1986, p.5; Rabiner, 1989, p. 259]
Given a finite sequence o f hidden states, probabilities o f all possible transitions 
are multiplied by probabilities of observed output symbols to determine the overall 
probability of all output symbols produced in the current path of transitions to that 
point. Model parameters must be valid probabilities and conform with:
a i j  =  1 . 1 %  b j ( k )  =  1 (EQ 13)
a u  >  0 , b j ( k )  >  0 (EQ 14)
[Boussemart, 2011]
Computational HMMs require the ability to address three issues in:
• Evaluation: Determining the probability that a given sequence is produced by the 
HMM;
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• Decoding: Determining the most probable path of hidden states, given a sequence 
of observable symbols; and
• Learning: How to adjust the model parameters for A,  B ,  and n  to maximize the 
likelihood that the HMM could produce the observed string of symbols.
HMMs are used for automatic word, speech, and hand gesture pattern recognitions, 
and health state modeling. [ Bilmes, 2002; Rabiner and Juang, 1986; Rabiner, 1989, 
Kadous, 1995]. A depiction o f an HMM is shown in Figure 10 below.
Observable States
Figure 10. Example o f a Hidden Markov Model
Advantages of use of HMMs include the capability to:
• Provide a solid statistical foundation for modeling
• Use efficient learning algorithms
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• Develop flexible and general models to represent sequencing properties
• Incorporate prior knowledge into the model's architecture through initializing 
close to something believed to be correct
• Support use prior knowledge to constrain the training process
• Combine individual HMMs into larger HMMs
HMM utility presents the following disadvantages:
• They contain a large number o f unstructured parameters
• Accurate modeling requires large amounts o f data
• Conditional independence properties are inaccurate if there are too few hidden 
states, or if there are inaccuracies in the observation distributions
• They make very large assumptions about the data through the Markovian 
assumption that emission and transition probabilities depend only on the current 
state. [Kadous, 1995; Bilmer, 2002; Salifu, 2003; Zoltan and Zoltan, 2006]
2.5.3. NAIVE BAYESIAN MODEL
Naive Bayesian Models (NBMs) are the simplest form o f a Bayesian network, 
in which this technique “naively" assumes that all attributes are independent given the 
value o f the class variable. [Zhang, 2004] By making this assumption, the probability 
distribution may be efficiently represented as the product o f many simpler 
distributions:
P ( A t , A 2  A n , C )  =  P (C )n?= i P M  I Q  ( E Q  15)
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As a special case o f a Bayesian network, Naive Bayes attribute variables A| ....A n over 
and cluster variable C, in which the parent of each Aj is C and C has no parents. The 
efficiency gains over general Bayesian networks come from using this restricted 
structure. [Lowe, 2005, p. 4] An NBM schematic is depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 11. Naive Bayesian Network
NBMs use a generative based approach in which a conceptual framework combines 
prior knowledge and observed data. It functions as a basic - conditional probabilistic 
classification algorithm through application of Bayes' Theorem by making strong 
(naive) assumptions about the independence of observed characteristic variables. 
Probabilities are calculated by dividing the percentage of pairwise occurrences where 
both conditions occur simultaneously by the percentage of singleton occurrences 
where only the prior event occurs. NBMs use the assumption that all the predictors 
are conditionally independent of the each other. [Oracle, 2005; de Kok and Brouwer, 
2010]
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NBM advantages include:
• Fast, simple, easy to implement, and affords highly scalable building and scoring
• It is one o f the most efficient and effective inductive learning algorithms for 
machine learning and data mining that provides competitive performance in 
classification. [Zhang, 2004]
• Good results obtained in many cases with strong applications for use as a text 
classifier for anti-spam e-mail filtering [Schneider, 2003]
NBM disadvantages include:
• A loss of accuracy may be induced due to the assumption o f class conditional 
independence
• Often, dependencies exist among attribute variables
• Model results often demonstrate produced conditional probabilities that over fit to
observed non-coherent data (i.e., noise in the data)
• Naive Bayesian assumes that events that don’t occur in the data are deemed to 
have impossible probabilities.
2.5.4. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETW ORK MODEL
Artificial Neural Network Models (ANNMs) are a form of Artificial
Intelligence (Al) that use a network o f nodes and highly interconnected synapses to
represent modeled processes. They are widely recognized to have begun by
McCulloch-Pitts regarding the representation of functioning of neurons in the 1940s
through development o f a computational modeled binary decision machine that
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applied weights to input activations, summed the products, and produced output 
activations. ANNM structure is largely distributed in parallel as opposed to sequential 
processing found in other forms of Al. This non-linearity affords flexibility, the 
means to learn to acquire knowledge by adaptation of internal parameters applied to 
previous examples and generalize. ANNMs are considered to be totally connected 
when all the outputs from a level connect with all the nodes in the following level. 
They are partially connected if some o f the links in the network are not facilitated 
[Russell, 1991; Alvarez, 2006; Leverington, 2009; Boussemart, 2011]. A graphical 
representation of a totally connected ANNM is shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12. Artificial Neural Network Model
Applications for ANNMs cover many different fields o f engineering and 
science including speech synthesis, pattern recognition, diagnostic problems, medical 
illnesses, robotic control and computer vision. [Russell, 1991]
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The advantages for use o f ANNMs include the capabilities to:
• Perform tasks that cannot be done through a linear program
• Continue operations when a node fails by its parallel nature
• Learn without the need to be reprogrammed
• Implicitly detect complex nonlinear relationships between independent and 
dependent variables
• Detect all possible interactions between predictor variables.
Disadvantage in using ANNMs include the
• The weighting is usually not interpretable. This leads to inability to provide
explanatory power captured in the intermediate process. It is key to understand
that ANNMs are “black box” operations and have limited ability to explicitly 
identify possible causal relationships
• Requirement for training to operate.
• Necessity o f high processing time for large neural networks.
• Susceptibility to over fitting
• Need to resolve methodological issues in model development due to its empirical
nature. [Tu, 1996; NeuroAI, 2007, Boussemart, 2011]
2.5.5. SUPPORT VECTOR M ACHINE MODEL
Support Vector Machine Models (SVMMs) use supervised learning algorithms
to conduct binary and multi-class discriminatory classification by taking training data
as input to produce an optimal hyper-plane that categorizes new examples. This
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output represents the largest minimum distance between training examples by 
achieving the widest margin across the training data. The original SVMM was 
invented in 1963 by Vladimir N. Vapnik and it denotes a modem outgrowth of 
ANMMs that support highly accurate modeling. This technique uses linear models to 
implement nonlinear class boundaries by transforming input space using a nonlinear 
mapping into a new space. A linear model constructed in the new space may be used 
to represent a nonlinear decision boundary in the original space. SVMMs may apply a 
sigmoid kernel function to transform low dimensional training samples to higher 
dimensional solutions (for linear separability problem) and use Quadratic 
Programming (QP) to find the best classifier boundary hyper-plane. [Boswell, 2002; 
Zhang, 2011; Pedregosa et al., 2011; Tomuro, 2011; DTREG, 2013] A depiction o f a 
SVMM is displayed in Figure 13.
t X  Maximum 
N Margin
Xl
Figure 13. Support Vector Machine Model Classification
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SVMMs have been applied to crowd monitoring systems, intrusion detection,
distracted driving classification, insolvency analysis, predicting common diseases,
decision tree predicative modeling, and image classification. [Auria and Moro, 2008;
We, 2010; Boussemart, 2011]
The advantages of SVMMs are:
• They deliver a unique optimal solution in comparison to ANNMs which have 
multiple solutions associated with local minima
• Effectiveness in high dimensional spaces
• Production o f very accurate classifiers with generally high prediction accuracy
• They are less susceptible to over fitting
• Ability to provide a good out-of-sample generalization. By choosing an 
appropriate generalization grade, SVMMs can be robust, despite cases in which 
the training sample has some bias.
The disadvantages of SVMMs include:
• Requirement for long training time and difficulty in understanding the learned 
function of weights.
• If the number of features is much greater than the number o f samples, the method 
is likely to give poor performances.
• SVMMs do not directly provide probability estimates
• They require extensive computations and therefore run slow comparatively.
[Auria and Moro, 2008; Yu, W, et. al, 2010; Pedregosa et al., 2011; Tomuro, 2011; 
Zhang, 2011]
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3. M ETHODOLOGY
3.1. DESCRIPTION
This dissertation was pursued to conduct research and development o f an 
accurate Discrete Event Model for predictive risk analysis of mishap occurrence based 
upon input derived from Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey responses and 
corresponding organizational mishap report summaries. It involved the following 
research components:
• Real World Applicability: Basic Research attempting to clarify underlying 
processes.
• Purpose: Causal-Comparative Study. Determination if there was an 
association or relationship between variables derived from event sequences and 
conditions that had already occurred. This was conducted to attempt to 
determine the reason for the observed results and differences.
• Goal: Descriptive Survey. Measurement of attitudes obtained by asking the 
same set of questions to a large number o f individuals. In this case the 
personnel who were assigned and / or conduct maintenance within a Naval 
Aviation squadron.
• Perspective: Historical. Research that was based upon previous events. 
[Fraenkel, Wallen, and Hyun, 2012]
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3.2. APPROACH
Research consisted of evaluation of instrumentation for provided, available, 
quantitative data, definition o f key variables, and selection o f Bayesian Network 
Modeling as the discrete event modeling framework followed by, development of 
applicable conceptual models, and construction / implementation of computational 
models. Actual squadron MCAS response data were aggregated for each organization 
(i.e., aviation squadron) and cross matched against corresponding aviation mishap 
report summaries as system input to ascertain model performance and determine 
conditional probabilities distributions for mishap occurrence. The research supporting 
model development was conducted in an iterative process. Verification and validation 
was performed throughout the developmental research to confirm computational 
model correctness and to enable assessment of the dissertation problem statement and 
research questions.
3.3. NAVAL AVIATION ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT AND  
PROCESSES
A preliminary analysis o f a Naval Aviation squadron as an organization was 
conducted to include decomposition, review of instructions, and definition of 
processes. The results are contained within Appendix C.
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3.4. EVALUATION OF INSTRUM ENTATION FOR PROVIDING DATA
3.4.1. DATA SOURCES
Initial data for this research effort were requested in 2005 from the U.S. Navy. 
Data requests included MCAS results, maintenance statistics, and mishap investigation 
report results. This information was necessary to define a methodology that the data 
would support, conduct o f further model development, and refinement from the 
conceptual phase to a computational model that could be executed and analyzed.
USN and USMC aviation squadrons conduct periodic surveys by maintainers 
and aircrew to assess safety issues within their command. Since results are not 
releasable outside of the command, sanitized data were requested that did not provide 
identification o f specific squadrons. In order to validate model results, additional data 
were requested that would provide mishap report summaries that included:
• The summary o f mishap events
• The causal factors identified by the mishap investigation board and approved upon 
review by the chain of command.
It was necessary that the mishap summaries could be associated with the respective 
squadrons' MCAS results from a recent previous survey.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain requested information, the 
Naval Safety Center (NSC) in Norfolk, Virginia was approached in 2008 as a 
repository o f both MCAS data and mishap reports. NSC functions to support the 
Naval Safety Program by providing guidance and direction, safety data and program 
services, and the marketing of safety. NSC's mission is to provide safety assistance
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and advice to senior Navy and Marine Corps leadership in order to enhance the 
services" warfighting capability, preserve resources, and improve combat readiness by 
preventing mishaps and saving lives. [Naval Safety Center, 2010]
The NSC Safety Data Manager offered to sanitize both MCAS results and 
matching mishap reports and coordinated to release the double blind data. This was 
vetted by the CNAF Judge Advocate General and approved by Safety Officer 
contingent upon certification by the Safety Data Manager that all the provided 
information was sanitized. An updated list of detailed data requirements was requested 
from NSC. This is categorized below:
Communication with the Dissertation Faculty Advisor and NSC Safety Data 
Manager was undertaken to determine an acceptable number o f mishap report 
summaries to be used to achieve statistical significance. From Fiscal Year 2000 
through 2009 there had been 2,300 surveys from 369 commands and the Navy/Marine 
Corps had experienced 1,696 Class A-C mishaps from 384 commands. A summary of 
mishaps sorted by classification (A, B, C) and year is provided in Table 6.
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Table 6. Naval Aviation Mishaps Class A-C for Fiscal Years 2000-2009
[Scott, 2009]
Fiscal Year Class A Class B Class C Total
2000 32 21 115 168
2001 21 16 114 151
2002 39 32 106 177
2003 40 29 138 207
2004 34 35 133 202
2005 26 28 131 185
2006 24 37 125 186
2007 19 39 118 176
2008 24 40 102 166
2009 8 21 49 78
Total 267 298 1,131 1,696
The Safety Data Manager requested that this research data inquiry be limited in 
scope by defining the following characteristics required: timeframe, severity, and/or 
airframe. In coordination with the Dissertation Faculty Advisor, the decision was 
made to limit the request for mishap summary reports to squadrons that incurred only 
Class A mishaps and to receive a minimum number of 50 mishap summary reports 
that could be matched against corresponding MCAS results. Additional clarification 
was provided to limit mishap results to those squadrons that comprised aircraft carrier 
air wings, since they incurred similar types of operations and tempos. The 
Type/Model/Series included:
•  E-2C •  EA-6B •  F-14 »C-2A
•  F/A-18 •  S-3B •  SH-60 «HH-60
The Safety Data Manager and Customer Support Division Head at the Naval 
Safety Center took the MCAS data and removed identification containing each 
squadron's name (i.e., VAW-XXX) and replaced it with a unique 3 digit numeric code
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to designate the specific squadron. This 3 digit code was matched against the mishap 
summary reports for Class A mishap incidents which occurred in corresponding 
squadrons. The squadron names in the mishap report summaries were replaced with 
the respective 3 digit code aligned to the squadron. The MCAS data were provided in 
a tabular spreadsheet and the mishap summary report was furnished in text format.
3.4.1.1. MCAS RESULTS DATA
The MCAS results were provided by the Naval Safety Center in tabular 
spreadsheet format for 2,300 aggregated sets of survey data. 2,114 o f the unit survey 
results came from U.S. Navy and Marine Corps squadrons taking the survey, and 186 
survey results were derived from organizations representing Aircraft Intermediate 
Maintenance Departments, Fleet Repair Centers, Naval and Marine Corps Air 
Stations, Marine Air Logistics Squadrons, Research Developmental Test and 
Evaluation outfits, and other entities. Each set o f results for a specific unit was 
assigned a unique 3 digit identification code which served to blind the true identity of 
unit. Each set o f aggregated survey data included information contained within Table 
7.
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Table 7. MCAS Results Raw Data Terminology
Data Description
First Appear Serial Using the 3 digit squadron identification code, this indicated the 
first time within this total data presentation that a single 
particular unit participated by taking the MCAS
Squadron Appear 
Serial
Using the 3 digit squadron identification code to provide a single 
set o f MCAS results from a participating unit
Number of 
Respondents
Total number of individuals who participated in the survey. This 
value ranged from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 742. The 
mean number of respondents for the 2,300 sets of survey data 
was 118 with a standard deviation o f 73.76
Community Represented the type of squadron or unit, (e.g., VAQ, VAW, 
etc.)
Squadron Service Either U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps
First Survey Date The time and date the first respondent submitted a survey
Mean Survey Date Represented a computation o f the mean time and date that the 
survey was taken in the window between First Survey Date and 
Last Survey Date
Last Survey Date The time and date that the last respondent submitted a completed 
survey
Mean Likert Score 
Response to 
MCAS Question
Represented the computed mean value for the aggregated Likert 
Scores from the surveys in the Squadron Appear Serial
The text containing the 43 close-ended MCAS questions and quantitative 
Likert Scale values per response option are contained in Appendix D.
The mean time of survey results covered the span from August 23, 2000 
through January 6, 2009. The breakdown of surveys by the communities that compose 
a Carrier Air Wings is provided in Table 8.
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Table 8. Survey Breakdown by Community and Aircraft
Community Primary Mission Aircraft Surveys
HS/HSC Helicopter ASW/Combat SH-60F and HH-60H 159
VAQ Tactical Electronic Warfare EA-6B 138
VAW Airborne Early Warning E-2C 106
VF Fighter F-14B and F-14D 30
VFA Strike Fighter F/A-18A, F/A-18C, F/A- 
18D, F/A-18E, and F/A-18F
421
VRC Logistics C-2A 18
VS Sea Control S-3B 57
Total 930
3.4.1.2. AVIATION M ISHAP SUM M ARY RESULTS
The Naval Safety Center provided a written summary of the Class A mishaps 
that had occurred in Navy squadrons that comprised Carrier Air Wings for the period 
from October, 1, 2002 through July 20, 2009. Aviation mishap investigations were 
conducted in accordance with the Naval Aviation Safety Program Instruction 
(OPNAVINST 3750.6 series). Per instruction, a mishap investigation panel was 
convened by the Commanding Officer of the reporting unit that was the custodian for 
the aircraft or aircrew involved. (For mishaps involving multiple squadrons, the 
senior Commanding Officer appointed the board members from involved units.) 
Upon completion o f the investigation and analysis, the mishap investigation report 
was reviewed by the Commanding Officer and was routed up through the chain-of- 
command hierarchy. Each sequential reviewing authority is empowered to make 
changes to board determinations and recommendations. The final approved version 
was archived at the Naval Safety Center. The summary provided as data for this 
research was taken from the final mishap investigation reports and contained the 
information provided in Table 9.
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Table 9. Class A Mishap Summary Report Data Terminology
Data Description
Event Serial 
Number
5 digit serial number used to uniquely identify the mishap event
Aircraft Type / Model / Series used to designate aircraft (e.g., E-2C)
Activity Name Corresponded to Squadron Appear Serial in Table 16. The unique 
3-digit number used to indicate a single set of MCAS results from a 
participating unit
Event Date Date of mishap occurrence
Event
Summary
Included the following information:
• Description of incident, equipment damage/loss, and personnel 
injury/loss
• Narrative summary o f mishap
• List of causal factors attributed to:
o Aircrew / Personnel 
o Material 
o Supervisory 
o Facilities 
o Maintenance
The mishap summary data included 57 separate mishap events that involved 67 
aircraft and their aircrew.
3.4.2. CONSIDERATIONS FOR USE OF LIKERT SCALE DATA
The MCAS was composed of 43 questions which evaluate six separate areas. 
The number of questions per area is depicted in Table 10.
Table 10. Distribution o f MOSE Areas within MCAS
MOSE Question Area Number of respective 
questions
Percentage of 
total questions
Process Auditing 6 14.0%
Reward System and Safety Culture 8 18.6%
Quality Assurance 6 14.0%
Risk Management 9 20.9 %
Command & Control 8 18.6%
Communication/Functional Relationships 6 14.0%
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Through use of multiple questions, the MCAS reduces measurement errors 
inherent with single item questions that tend to be less valid, less accurate, and less 
reliable than their multiple item equivalents. [Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994] Details 
concerning Likert Scale as metric data is contained in Appendix B, Section B.2.
In order to evaluate the utility o f Likert Scale derived data, two characteristics 
o f the test / survey were evaluated: Reliability and Construct Validity. “Scales, as 
measuring instruments, are evaluated primarily on the basis o f two criteria: reliability 
or the proportion o f scale score variance that is not error variance, and validity, or the 
proportion of scale score variance that accurately represents the construction or the 
proportion of criterion variance that is predicted by the scale." [Dawis, 1997. p. 486] 
"M easu rem en t e rro rs  a re  induced  from  th e  m easu rem en t in s tru m e n t's  sy stem ic  b iasing  
or random error. Validity references the degree o f bias in the measurement instrument 
while reliability is a reference to the random error introduced by the measurement 
instrument. Validity and reliability are independent of each other. Validity is often 
thought o f as the 'accuracy’ o f the scale while reliability is its 'precision.' Scales that 
lack validity have systematic biases to them, while those that lack reliability have 
large random errors associated with their measurement.” [DeCoster, 2005. p. 7]
In December 2012, a study was published on the conduct o f construct validity 
testing for the MCAS [Brittingham, 2012] investigating the relationship between 
Naval Aviation Mishaps and Squadron Maintenance Safety. This research examined 
the construct of the squadron maintenance safety climate survey and its possible 
relationship to aviation mishaps. The raw data employed included MCAS responses
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from 126,058 maintainers between August 2000 and August 2005 and included the 
same data responses in this dissertation research during that same timeframe.
The author surmised that MCAS content validity, along with factor analysis, 
should yield six distinct categories, corresponding to the six components o f the Model 
of Organizational Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) including Process Auditing, Reward 
System and Safety Culture, Quality Assurance, Risk Management, Command and 
Control, and Communications / Functional Relationships. The research conclusions 
were:
• Through data analysis, specifically, factor analysis, the MCAS was found to be an 
inadequate tool with questionable validity for gauging maintenance safety climate.
• It has one main factor on which every MCAS question loads.
• With one main factor, the MCAS is not providing the results in content areas as 
originally planned.
• The analysis o f the data clearly shows that with only one factor, versus six which 
would correspond to the six MOSE categories, the MCAS is not measuring what it 
was intended to measure.
3.4.3. MCAS RELIABILITY
Reliability is a quantitative assessment used to describe the consistency of 
(repeated) measurements derived from a test. Additional information on reliability is 
contained within Section B.3 of Appendix B.
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Computed Cronbach Alpha Coefficients for reliability of each of the six 
MOSE components across all the aircraft Type / Model / Series groups are shown 
below in Table 11.
Table 11. Computed Cronbach Alpha Values for MOSE components o f Respective
T/M/S Communities
Type / 
Model / 
Series
Community
PA RS/SC QA RM C2 C/FR Average Standard
Deviation
HS 0.944 0.936 0.848 0.898 0.956 0.935 0.920 0.040
VAQ 0.939 0.919 0.925 0.878 0.948 0.914 0.921 0.024
VAW 0.942 0.921 0.941 0.899 0.960 0.940 0.934 0.021
VF 0.938 0.924 0.900 0.904 0.956 0.915 0.923 0.021
VFA-I
Seat 0.944 0.933 0.928 0.897 0.960 0.942 0.934 0.021
VFA-2
Seat 0.966 0.947 0.943 0.914 0.971 0.951
0.949 0.020
VS 0.973 0.967 0.968 0.905 0.981 0.969 0.972 0.006
The above table indicates strong reliability for all 6 components for each o f the 
squadrons that comprise a carrier air wing.
3.5. DEFINITION OF KEY VARIABLES
3.5.1. SQUADRON M AINTENANCE DISCRETE EVENT MODEL  
COM PONENTS
The purpose of this research's Bayesian Network Modeling was to accurately 
represent the conduct o f squadron maintenance as an event-based entity in order to 
clarify knowledge of the system and comprehend the relationship to safety and human
6 8
error. Boundaries for the Bayesian Network Modeling were defined by selecting an 
initial list of model components. Components are entities that were supportable by the 
available data and necessary to properly represent system behavior in accordance with 
the model's purpose. Components within the defined boundary were classified as 
either endogenous or exogenous. Endogenous components contain variables involved 
in providing direct and observable impact to the system. Exogenous elements classify 
components whose values were not directly affected by the system. [Albin, 1997, p. 
10] Excluded components were listed to assure the constructed model was appropriate 
for the purpose o f this research. The initial boundary layer was defined to include 
elements within the sphere of direct influence by the aviation squadron organization. 
Endogenous and Exogenous elements are listed in Table 12. A brief description of 
each component is provided below:
Table 12. Initial Maintenance Discrete Event Model Components
ENDOGENOUS EXOGENOUS EXCLUDED
• Previous MCAS Results
• Current MCAS Results
• Future MCAS Results
• Inter-Period MCAS 
Quartile Transition
• Inter-Period Mishap 
Occurrence
• Future Mishap 
Occurrence
• Previous Organizational 
Climate
• Current Organizational 
Climate
• Maintenance Required
• Maintenance Conducted
• Aircraft Flight 
Operations
• Collateral Damage
• Preventative 
Maintenance
• Operational demand
• Assigned Personnel
• Assigned Aircraft
• Available Parts 
Inventory
• Quality Assurance 
Inspections
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3.5.2. ENDOGENOUS COMPONENTS
• Current MCAS Results. This describes the results of responses from the most
recent iteration o f MCAS that had been conducted within the organization, 
o Likert scale value responses for each of the 43 close-ended questions were 
averaged across all participant responses, 
o Where appropriate, all 43 MCAS responses were aggregated by equal 
weighted averaging to provide a single Likert scale value, 
o Additionally, questions which composed specific MOSE areas (i.e., Process 
Auditing, Reward System, Quality Control, Risk Management, Command and 
Control, and Communications / Functional Relationships) were aggregated by 
equal weight averaging to provide single Likert scale values, 
o Since Question #21 was written with negative connotation (i.e., evaluation of a 
condition that adversely affected safety), in order for all responses to be 
aligned, the inverse o f the value was obtained by subtracting the response 
value from 6 (e.g., response of strongly disagree = 1; 6 - response value; 6 - 
1=5; becomes strongly agree), 
o When results of multiple units were obtained, quartiles for the distribution 
were defined. An organization's aggregated and averaged Likert scale value 
were assigned a quartile ranking as depicted below in Table 13.
Table 13. MCAS Result Quartile Distribution
Quartile Description
Q i Lowest Likert scale values, 0 < x < 25%
q 2 25% < x < 50%
Q 3 50% < x < 75%
q 4 Highest Likert scale values, 75% < x < 100%
Previous MCAS Results. This describes the results of responses from the MCAS 
administered immediately prior to the Current MCAS Results. Its numerical value 
was derived similarly to the means used for Current MCAS Results using 
corresponding Likert Scale values and quartiles as defined in Table 13, above.
The time increment between Previous and Current MCAS Results was not 
constant and varied considerably among the organizations.
Future MCAS Results. This describes the results o f responses from the MCAS 
administered immediately subsequent to the Current MCAS Results. Its numerical 
value was derived similarly to the means used for Current MCAS Results using 
corresponding Likert Scale values and quartiles as defined in Table 13, above.
The time increment between Previous and Current MCAS Results was not 
constant and varied considerably among the organizations.
Inter-Period MCAS Transition. This component represents the change in 
corresponding quartile assignment based upon aggregated and averaged Likert 
scale values derived from two immediate iterations for administering the MCAS 
(i.e., the delta in quartile obtained between Previous and Current MCAS Results). 
This was calculated by:
o Inter-Period MCAS Transition =
Current MCAS Results -  Previous MCAS Results (EQ 16)
o The value of the transition could be calculated by the numerical difference 
in the whole number change in quartiles (i.e., range of -3, -2, -1, 0, 1,2, 3) 
Inter-Period Mishap Occurrence This element is used to describe whether or not 
an Aviation Flight Mishap occurred during the time inter-period between
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successive administrations of the Past and Current MCAS and associated 
responses. The range of responses was binary, either YES or NO.
• Future Mishap Occurrence. This factor describes whether or not an Aviation 
Flight Mishap occurs during the time inter-period between success delivery of the 
Current and Future MCAS and respective responses. The range o f responses was 
binary, either YES or NO.
3.5.3. EXOGENOUS COM PONENTS
• Current Organizational Climate. Although not directly observable or measurable, 
this element was defined to represent the capability of the Current MCAS Results 
to accurately represent an organization's existing climate with respect to 
operational safety within the context o f the MOSE foundation. This definition 
enabled application of HMMs which contained hidden states (safety climate), 
observations (MCAS) results, and probabilities of observation and transition 
occurrences.
• Previous Organizational Climate. Similar to Current Organizational Climate, this 
component described the adequacy of the Past MCAS Results to accurately 
represent the organization’s operational safety climate during the time period 
between administration of the Past and Current MCASs.
3.5.4. EXCLUDED COM PONENTS
Endogenous and exogenous components listed above were supportable by the
sufficiency and scope of the data provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center for this
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research effort. Within this section, excluded components are listed which are within
a sphere of influence that could impact MCAS Results and Mishap occurrence;
however, insufficient data were provided to enable their definition or development.
• Maintenance Required. A measure of the work effort necessary to facilitate 
attainment of operational aircraft. This includes required pre- and post-flight 
servicing and inspections, preventative maintenance, and the correction o f known 
discrepancies that are sufficiently severe as to prevent aircraft from being 
characterized as safe for flight.
• Maintenance Performed. This is an overarching classification of the types of 
maintenance performed by the squadron comprised o f inspections, servicing, 
handling, on-equipment corrective and preventive maintenance, incorporation of 
technical directives, and record keeping and reports preparation.
• Aircraft Flight Operations. Actual flights in which the aircraft are launched and 
the assigned mission is successfully completed.
• Collateral Damage. Impairment to linked system elements which are caused by 
component breakdown, incorrect operation, or failure and result in creation of new 
Aircraft Discrepancies. Collateral damage may also be caused from incorrectly 
performed maintenance.
• Preventative Maintenance is a subset o f maintenance performed, and it describes 
the effort which is conducted to maintain the aircraft in adequate material 
condition to accomplish assigned missions. Preventative maintenance is a 
proactive effort undertaken to mitigate creation of Aircraft Discrepancies and 
related component failures.
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• Operational Demand. Operational demand. A measure o f the demand placed 
upon the squadron thorough assignment of respective missions. Operational 
demand is composed of two inputs: tasking and employment scheduling, 
o Tasking. The number of flight sorties required to be flown in order to fulfill 
training or currency requirements from the squadron's operations department 
or those missions assigned from superior commands, 
o Employment scheduling. For operational squadrons that deploy, Naval 
aviation has adopted the Fleet Response Plan based on a notional 27-month 
Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle (IDRC) which includes 6 months for 
aircraft maintenance, followed by 6 months for training, and a 15 month 
employment window. During the employment window the squadron is 
expected to sustain a high degree o f readiness which may include forward 
deployed operations. A depiction o f the IDRC is shown in Figure 14. The 
IDRC driven employment schedule is the critical driver for squadron receipt of 
operational funding, personnel, aircraft and associative weapons systems (e.g., 
laser designators, forward looking infra-red pods, etc.) inventory, required 
readiness levels, and operational demand.
74
M onth  0 3 6 ■> 12 If* 18 21 24 2 /
Employability
Deployment
Maintenance Training
Funding
Figure 14. Inter-Deployment Readiness Cycle 
[CNAF Training and Readiness Review Conference, 2003]
• Assigned Personnel. Sufficient manpower is required to be assigned to the 
squadron in order to accomplish assigned missions. Personnel are ordered into the 
squadron to fill billets listed in the authorized manpower documents, and they are 
rotated out when their tours of duty are complete.
• Assigned Aircraft. Represents the number o f aircraft assigned to the organization 
that are maintained and tasked to meet Operational Demand.
• Available Parts Inventory. Very few replacement parts are assigned directly to the 
squadron inventory. These replacement spare items are normally limited to 
consumable components or bit / piece parts such as hardware (nuts, bolts, etc.) or 
other items that routinely require removal and replacement due to wear. Primarily 
specific replacement components are maintained in a ready-for-issue status by 
respective supply departments located at either naval air station or shipboard from 
which the squadron is operating. A lack o f parts availability may be mitigated 
through cannibalization of parts from other aircraft. This results in additional 
maintenance performed to remove the needed component from one airframe and
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the subsequent effort to replace it when the needed spare part becomes available 
through the supply system.
• Quality Assurance Inspections. Inspections of conducted maintenance that ensures 
quality workmanship. Quality Assurance (QA) is fundamentally employed to 
prevent the occurrence of defects. The concept embraces all events from the start 
o f the maintenance operation to its completion and is the responsibility o f all 
maintenance personnel. [CNAFINST 4790.2 Vol. 1, 2005, p. 14-2.] Highly 
skilled representatives are assigned to the QA division to inspect maintenance 
work for conformance to technical requirements and to audit work centers for 
evaluation of plans, policies, procedures, products, directives, and records.
3.6. SELECTION OF BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELING AS THE  
DISCRETE EVENT M ODELING FRAM EW ORK
Prior to conceptual model development, the five unique discrete modeling 
techniques described in Section 2.7 were comparatively evaluated for utility for this 
research application. Primary considerations were utility for execution based upon 
data set provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center, ability to accurately represent and 
determine model causality relationships between respective, successive MCAS results 
and mishap occurrence; wherewithal to generate probability distributions for statistical 
comparison; flexibility to enable generation and execution of a set of models with 
minor modifications in causal relationships; and minimum impact of inherent 
disadvantages associated with the modeling technique for this research effort. A 
presentation o f the comparison evaluation is summarized in Table 14.
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Table 14. Comparative Evaluation Analysis of Utility for Discrete Event Modeling
Techniques
Technique
Characteristic
Represent and 
Determine 
Model 
Causality
Generation of 
Probability 
Distributions 
for Statistical 
Comparison
Flexibility for 
Minor
Modifications
Minimum 
Impact of 
Inherent 
Disadvantage
Bayesian Network 
Model (BNM) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Hidden Markov 
Model (HMM) ✓ ✓ ✓ X
Naive Bayesian 
Model (NBM) X ✓ X X
Artificial Neural 
Network Model 
(ANNM)
X X ✓ X
Support Vector 
Machine Model 
(SVMM)
X X ✓ X
3.6.1. M ODEL CAUSALITY
The BNM and HMM techniques contained the requisite capabilities to support 
detailed representation of model causality o f specific nodes contained within the 
models. BNMs support use for determining model causality where there is an 
incomplete understanding of all occurring events and enable learning about the causal 
relationships between system variables. Although BNMs provide for causality 
representation, the naive assumption of a single parent and cluster o f same generation 
child nodes inhibits defining multiple parent-child relationships for multiple sequels 
and branching. ANNM use of neural nets in a similar fashion as a “black box" does 
not afford sufficient explanatory power regarding the underlying relationships to 
represent or determine causal relationships. ANNMs have limited ability to explicitly
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identify possible causal relationships. SVMs possess limited capability to represent 
the dynamics of underlying processes and causalities. [Boussemart, 2011, p. 334]
3.6.2. GENERATION OF PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR  
STATISTICAL COMPARISON
BNMs are built upon direct probabilistic relationships between the connected 
variables that are quantified through use of probability distributions As a subset of 
BNMs, HMMs also provide a solid statistical foundation for modeling. NBM 
definition for efficient generation of a probability distribution represented as the 
product of many simpler distributions provides sufficient capability for statistical 
comparison of model probability outputs. ANNMs and SNNMs are discriminative in 
that they may generate conditional probability distributions but do not allow 
generation of samples from the joint distribution. Discriminative modeling techniques 
contain limitations in their predictive power due to their reliance on conditional 
probabilities. [Boussemart, 2011, p 29] Additionally, a disadvantage o f SVMMs 
includes that this technique does not directly provide probability estimates.
3.6.3. FLEXIBILITY FOR M INOR M ODIFICATIONS
BNM use o f Directed Acyclic Graphs containing causal linkages and observed 
probabilities are easily adaptable to support minor changes to defined relationships 
between state variables. Likewise, HMMs may be used to develop flexible and general 
models to represent sequencing properties and may be constructed to combine 
individual HMMs into larger HMMs. Since NBM uses only one parent and one level
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of child nodes, this technique was adjudicated not to have sufficient flexibility to 
support minor modifications to modeling causal relationships between the state 
variables. Both ANNM and SVM techniques were evaluated to have sufficient utility 
to incorporate minor adjustments in conceptual and computational development and 
modification.
3.6.4. MINIM UM  IM PACT OF INHERENT DISADVANTAGES
Disadvantages o f BNM technique include lack of a universally accepted 
method for constructing a network from data and potential difficulty for experts to 
agree on model structure. Neither of these was considered significant adverse to this 
research effort. HMM disadvantages o f necessity to obtain large amounts o f data for 
accurate modeling and potential for generating inaccurate conditional independence 
properties if there are too few hidden states or inaccuracies in the observation 
distributions were considered to present the potential for substantial challenges due to 
limited data provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center. NBM's inherent disadvantage 
of the potential for a loss o f accuracy induced due to the assumption of class 
conditional independence where often there exists dependencies among attribute 
variables was evaluated to be an unwanted characteristic for selection. The manner in 
which ANNMs store knowledge as weights between nodes and the limitations in 
interpretation of the weights result in "black box" appraisal of the results. These 
inherent disadvantages of ANNM were assessed to be undesirable. SVMs require 
supervised learning and a priori labeled data. They are suitable for use with 
categorical data but do not possess similar capabilities for temporal data.
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3.6.5. SUMMARY O F DISCRETE EVENT M ODELING COMPARISON
Based upon the information presented above and as depicted in Table 14, 
BNM technique was selected as the best fit for this research effort. In contrast, all the 
other techniques contained a documented limitation that impaired their uses for this 
purpose.
3.7. CONCEPTUAL MODEL DEVELOPM ENT
Subsequent to selection of BNMs as the best methodology for this research 
effort, Bayesian Network conceptual models were initially constructed to accurately 
represent the causal relationship between the endogenous and exogenous components 
listed in Table 12, above. Arcs were incorporated to detail the direct probabilistic 
relationships between the connected variables. Inherent in the conceptual design, 
Bayesian Network modeling was the goal to produce statistical output data that would 
update conditional probabilities in light o f observed evidence. Per Section 2.7 above, 
the BNM conceptual models included the following attributes:
• A set of variable and a set o f directed edges (i.e., arcs) between variables
• Each variable has a finite set of mutual exclusive states.
• The variables together with the directed edges form a Directed Acyclic Graph.
• To each variable A with parents Bi, .... Bn there is attached a conditional 
probability table P (A | B |. ..., Bn).
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Review of the inherent disadvantages for application of BNMs (lack of 
universally accepted method for model construction, potential disagreement on model 
structure by subject matter experts, limitation on spatial / temporal scale 
representations, and inability to support feedback loops) was determined to have little- 
to-no relevant impact on this research effort. Evidentiary data for the respective 
probability distributions would be derived from the actual squadron / unit MCAS 
results and corresponding mishap summary reports.
3.7.1. SYSTEM FORMALISM
The BNM foundation resulted in use of a classical Discrete Event System
Specification (DEVS) to specify and describe the notation required to relate input and
model state derivatives for model development. The classical DEVS framework
enabled representation of the BNM for depicting and evaluating causal relationships
between the selected components. The DEVS structure is defined as:
D E V S  = (X , Y, S, 4v„ Smh ta ) where (EQ 17)
X  is the set of inputs
Y  is the set o f outputs
S  is the set of s e q u e n tia l  states
8ext: Q  x X  —> S  is the e x te r n a l  s ta te  tr a n s i t io n  fu n c t io n
Si,„: S  —> S  is the in te r n a l  s ta te  tr a n s i t io n  fu n c t io n
Q = {(s , e )  ] s e  S , 0 = e  = t a ( s ) } is the to ta l  s ta te  set (EQ 18) 
e  is the t im e  e la p s e d  since last transition 
A: S  —> Y  is the output function 
ta: S  — >  R q.oo is the set positive reals with 0 and oo 
[Zeigler, et. al, 2000, p. 75-6, Joslyn, 1996]
Application of the DEVS formalism to the BNM defined variables and causal 
relationships resulted in the following classifications:
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• Input Set X : o Previous MCAS Results
o Current MCAS Results
o Future MCAS Results
o Inter-period MCAS Transition
o Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
o Future Mishap Occurrence
• Output Set Y: o Probability distributions for MCAS Result set variables when
Inter-Period / Future Mishap Occurrence values are set
exclusively to Yes or No
• Sequential States S: o Quartile (1 through 4 dependent upon MCAS Results)
• Time advance function ta: non uniform nor constant time period between 
iterations o f completing successive MCAS surveys
3.7.2. BAYESIAN NETW ORK APPLICATION
Conceptual modeling processes were undertaken to leverage a key features of 
BNM that is they provide a suitable method for decomposing a probability distribution 
into a set of local distributions. Although the component nodes would contain 
quantitative data, the arcs defining causal relationships would represent qualitative 
aspects for the model. The separation of the qualitative representation o f the 
influences between variables from the numeric quantification o f the strengths o f the 
influences presented a significant advantage for knowledge engineering. BNM 
conceptual development supported first focusing on the specific qualitative structure 
of the domain followed by quantifying the influences. This was employed to ensure a 
complete specification o f the joint-probability distribution. (Haddawy, 1999)
Table 15 contains a list o f component variables, respective abbreviations, and 
description o f the appropriate ranges of data. Depictions and overall narrative of the 
BNM conceptual models are provided below.
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Table 15. Component Abbreviations and Data Ranges
Abbreviation Component Variable Data Range
PMR Previous MCAS Results Quartile 1 through 4
CMR Current MCAS Results Quartile 1 through 4
FMR Future MCAS Result Quartile 1 through 4
1MT Inter-period MCAS Transition
Lower: Qi -»  Q, where i > j 
Neutral: Qj Q, where i=j 
Higher: Q, -»  Q, where i < j
IMO Inter-period Mishap Occurrence Yes, No
FMO Future Mishap Occurrence Yes, No
3.7.3. BAYESIAN NETW ORK CONCEPTUAL M ODEL NUM BER 1
P M R
C M R I M O
F M O
FigurelS. Bayesian Network Conceptual Model #1
As depicted in Figure 15, this model is based on the following qualitative 
description of the causal relationships between selected components:
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• Previous MCAS results have an impact on both current MCAS results and whether 
an inter-period mishap occurred
• Inter-period mishap occurrence (Yes/No) impacts current MCAS results and future 
mishap occurrence
• Current MCAS results impacts future mishap occurrence.
3.7.4. BAYESIAN NETW ORK CONCEPTUAL M ODEL NUMBER 2
P M R
C M R I M O
F M O
Figure 16. Bayesian Network Conceptual Model #2
This model shown in Figure 16 is similar to Model #1 above; however, it 
removes the direct influence of the inter-period mishap occurrence on the future 
mishap occurrence.
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3.7.5. BAYESIAN NETWORK CONCEPTUAL MODEL NUMBER 3
I M O
C M R I M T
F M O
Figure 17. Bayesian Network Conceptual Model #3
This model displayed in Figure 17 is based on the following qualitative 
description of the causal relationships between selected components:
• Previous Inter-period Mishap Occurrence (Yes / No) has an impact on Current 
MCAS Results
• Inter-period MCAS result quartile transition impacts current MCAS results and 
future mishap occurrence
• Current MCAS Results impacts Future Mishap Occurrence.
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3.7.6. BAYESIAN NETWORK CONCEPTUAL MODEL NUMBER 4
I M O
C M R I M T
F M O
Figurel8. Bayesian Network Conceptual Model #4
Figure 18 presents a model is similar to Model #3 above; however, it removes the 
direct influence o f the inter-period MCAS results quartile transition on the future 
mishap occurrence.
8 6
3.7.7. BAYESIAN NETWORK CONCEPTUAL MODEL NUMBER 5
I M O
C M R I M T
F M O
F ig u re  19. B ay esian  N e tw o rk  C o n cep tu a l M odel #5
This model as shown in Figure 19 is similar to Model #3 above; however it 
adds the causal impact of inter-period mishap occurrence on inter-period MCAS 
results quartile transition.
3.8. COM PUTATIONAL MODEL DEVELOPM ENT, CONSTRUCTION, 
AND IM PLEMENTATION
This process adapted the conceptual model using software to construct an 
executable program that provided a simulated abstraction of the Bayesian Network 
models. As the conceptual model was a first-step transformation o f the real world 
system, the computational model expressed a second-step transformation into an
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operational entity that was represented by a software coded and a computer 
recognizable version of the conceptual model. Key features in a computational model 
included both composability and interoperability. '‘Composability is concerned with 
how to create different models that are semantically consistent. Interoperability is 
focused on the software used to support communication and synchronization at 
runtime." [Godding. Sarjoughian, and Kempf, 2004, p. 232] The computation model 
was designed to allow for study of the causal relationships between model components 
of the represented Bayesian Network Model through generation of probability 
distributions to match model output.
GeNle software version 2.0.4535.0 was built on June 1, 2012 by Decision 
Systems Laboratory (DSL), University of Pittsburgh was selected for programming 
the computational model. GeNle (acronym taken from Graphical Network Interface) 
was designed to provide a developmental environment for building graphical decision- 
theoretic models [DSL, 2010]. It is implemented in Visual C++ and interfaces with 
the Structural Modeling, Inference, and Learning Engine (SMILE) software also 
developed by DSL. SMILE operates and independent library of C++ classes for 
reasoning in graphical probabilistic models, such as Bayesian networks and influence 
diagrams and using them for probabilistic reasoning and decision making under 
uncertainty. [DSL, 2007]
The Conceptual Bayesian Network Models #1-5 as shown in Figures 15 
through 19 were refined subsequent to definition of the necessary causal relationships. 
Models were executed using actual MCAS results and mishap summary report data. 
Bayesian Network Computational Models were implemented within the GeNle
8 8
software programs based upon the following node variables and equations. Input 
values were provided from actual MCAS results and corresponding inter-period / 
future mishap occurrence. Output probabilities were derived through model execution 
by setting conditions o f respective nodes.
3.8.1. BAYESIAN NETW ORK COM PUTATIONAL M ODEL NUM BER 1
BNM Computational Model #1 node variables and model equations are 
depicted below in Tables 16 through 19.
Table 16. BNM Computational Model #1 Prior MCAS Result Quartile Probabilities
PMR Quartile Probability *
PMR Qi P(PM R  Q,) ~ 0.25
PMR Q2 P  (PMR Q2) = 0.25
PMR Q3 P  (PMR Q3) ~ 0.25
PMR Q4 P  (PMR Q4) = 0.25
Note: * - n = the total number o f observations.
Where n / 4 is equal to an integer, all P (PMR Qi) = 0.25.
£ ? = l  P  ( P M R  Q , )  =  1 (EQ 19)
Table 17. BNM Computational Model #1 Conditional Probabilities o f Inter-Period 
Occurrence Mishap Given Prior MCAS Result Quartile
PMR Quartile / 
IMO
PMR Qi PMR Q2 PMR Q3 PMR Q4
YES / ’ (YES | 
PMR Qi)
P  (YES | 
PMR Q2)
P  (YES | 
PMR Q3)
P  (YES | 
PMR Q4)
NO P  (NO 
PMR Q 0
P  (NO | 
PMR Q2)
P  (NO | 
PMR Q3)
/ ’ (NO | 
PMR Q4)
For /= 1 to 4,
P  (IMO = YES | PMR Qj) + P  (IMO -  NO | PMR Qi) = 1 (EQ 20)
89
Table 18. BNM Computational Model #1 Conditional Probabilities o f Current MCAS
Results Quartile Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence Given Prior MCAS Result
Quartile
PMR PM1*Q> PM1* q 2 PM1* Q a PM1I Q a
IMO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
CMR P P P P P P P P
Qi (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Q i l Q. 1 Qi 1 Q. 1 Q i l Q. 1 Q. I Q. 1
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO - IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
Qi) Qi) Q 2 ) Q 2 ) Q 3 ) Qa) Q 4 ) Q 4 )
CMR P P P P P P P P
Q2 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Qzl 02 I Q 2 I Q 2 I Q2 | Q 2 I Q 2 I Q 2 I
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO YES | NO YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
Qi) Q . ) Q 2 ) Q 2) Qa) Qa) Q 4 ) Q 4 )
CMR P p P p P P P P
Q3 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Qal Qsl Qal Qal Qal Qal Qal Qal
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
Q . ) Qi) Q 2 ) Q 2 ) Qa) Qa) Q 4 ) Q 4 )
CMR P P P P P P P P
Q4 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Q 4 | Q 4 | Q 4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q 4 I Q4 | Q4|
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
Q.) Q.) Q 2 ) Q 2 ) Qa) Qa) Q 4) Q4)
For /= 1 to 4, and IM O  YES or NO, 
£ } = 1  P  ( C M R  Q j  | I M O  | P M R  Q O  =  1
(EQ 21)
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Table 19. BNM Computational Model #1 Conditional Probabilities o f Future Mishap 
Occurrence Given Current MCAS Results Quartile Given Inter-period Mishap
Occurrence
IMO Y1ES N0
CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR
Q i Q 2 Q 3 Q4 Q i Q2 Q b Q 4
FMO = P P P P P P P P
YES (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO
= YES = YES = YES = YES -  YES -  YES = YES = YES
CMR | CMR | CMR | CMR | CMR | CMR CMR | CMR
Q .  1 Q 2 | Q s l Q 4 | Q i l 0 2  I Q 3 | 0 4  |
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO - IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES) YES) YES) YES) NO) NO) NO) NO)
FMO = P P P P P P P P
NO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO (FMO
= NO = NO | = NO | = NO | = NO | = NO | - N O  | -N O  |
CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR
Q. 1 02 | QbI Q4 I Q. 1 Q 2 I Qsl Q4 |
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO - IMO - IMO = IMO = IM O -
YES) YES) YES) YES) NO) NO) NO) NO)
For IMO = YES or NO and / = 1 to 4,
J $ m o = y b s P  (FM O  | C M R Q j  | I M O )  =  1
(EQ 22)
3.8.2. BAYESIAN NETW ORK COM PUTATIONAL M ODEL NUM BER 2
BNM Computational Model #2 node variables and model equations are 
depicted below in Tables 20 through 23.
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Table 20. BNM Computational Model #2 Prior MCAS Result Quartile Probabilities
PMR Quartile Probability *
PMR Qi P  (PMR Q,) = 0.25
PMR Q2 P  (PMR Q2) = 0.25
PMR Q3 P  (PMR Q3) = 0.25
p m r q 4 P  (PMR Q4) ~ 0.25
Note: * - n = the total number of observations.
Where n / 4 is equal to an integer, all P  (PMR Q,) = 0.25.
Z f = 1  P ( P M R  Q , )  =  1
(EQ 23)
Table 21. BNM Computational Model #2 Conditional Probabilities o f Inter-Period 
Mishap Occurrence Given Prior MCAS Result Quartile
PMR Quartile / 
IMO
PMR Qi PMR Q2 PMR Q3 PMR Q4
YES P  (YES | 
PMR Q 0
P  (Y ES | 
PMR Q2)
P  (YES | 
PMR Q3)
P  (YES | 
PMR Q4)
NO P  (NO | 
PMR Q 0
P  (NO | 
PMR Q2)
P  (NO | 
PMR Q3)
P  (NO | 
PMR Q4)
F or i=  1 to  4,
P  ( I M O  -  Y E S  | P M R  Q i )  +  P  ( I M O  =  N O  | P M R  Q i )  =  1
(EQ 24)
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Table 22. BNM Computational Model #2 Conditional Probabilities o f Current MCAS
Results Quartile Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence Given Prior MCAS Result
Quartile
PMR PM1*Q> PMl* q 2 PMl* Q s PMl* q 4
IMO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
CMR P P P P P P P P
Q i (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Qi 1 Q i l Q . l Qi 1 Q i l Q . l Q . l Q . l
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO YES | NO YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
Qi) QO 02 ) QO Qs) Qs) Q 4) QO
CMR P P P P P P P p
Q 2 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
0 2  I Q2 I Q 2 I Q 2 I 02  1 0 2  1 Q 2 I 0 2  1
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
QO QO QO Q 2) Qs) Qs) Q 4) QO
CMR p p p P p p P p
Q3 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Qal Qsl Qsl Qsl Qsl Qsl Qsl Qsl
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
QO QO QO QO Qs) Qs) QO QO
CMR P P p P P P P P
Q4 (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR (CMR
Q4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q4 | Q4 |
IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO = IMO =
YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO | YES | NO |
PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR PMR
QO QO QO Q 2) Qs) Qs) QO QO
For i =  1 to 4, and IM O  YES or NO, 
£ j = 1  P ( C M R  Q j  | I M O  | P M R  Q Q  =  1
(EQ 25)
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Table 23. BNM Computational Model #2 Conditional Probabilities o f Future Mishap
Occurrence Given Current MCAS Result Quartile
CMR Quartile
/
FMO
CMR Q, CMR Q2 c m r q 3 CMR Q4
YES P (Y ES| 
CMR Q,)
P  (YES | 
CMR Q2)
P  (YES | 
CM RQ 3)
P  (YES | 
CMR Q4)
NO P  (NO 
CM RQ i)
P  (NO 
CMR Q2)
P (N O | 
CMR Q3)
P  (NO | 
CMR Q4)
For /= 1 to 4, 
P  (FMO = YES | PMR Qi) + P  (FMO = NO | PMR QO = 1
(EQ 26)
3.8.3. BAYESIAN NETW ORK COM PUTATIONAL M ODEL NUM BER 3
BNM Computational Model #3 node variables and model equations are 
depicted below in Tables 24 through 27.
Table 24. BNM Computational Model #3 Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
Inter-period
Mishap
Occurrence
Probability
IMO = YES P  (IMT = YES)
IMO = NO P  (IMT = NO)
P  (IMT -  YES) + P  (IMT = NO) = 1 (EQ 27)
Table 25. BNM Computational Model #3 Inter-period MCAS Transition
Inter-period MCAS 
Transition
Probability
IMT = HIGHER P  (IMT = HIGHER)
IMT = NEUTRAL P  (IMT = NEUTRAL)
IMT = LOWER P  (IMT = LOWER)
P  (IMT = HIGHER) + P  (IMT = NEUTRAL) +
P  (IMT = LOWER)= 1 (EQ 28)
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Table 26. BNM Computational Model #3 Current MCAS Results Given Inter-period 
MCAS Transition Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
IMO YES NO
IMT HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
CMR
Q.
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P(CM R Q, 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P(CMR Q, 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
Q i
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO =
YES)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P(C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO =
NO)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
03
P (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO =
NO)
P (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P(CM R Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
q 4
/5(CMRQ4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
For IMT = HIGHER, NEUTRAL OR LOWER, and IMO= YES or NO, 
E ? =1 P  ( C M R  Qj | IM T  | I M O )  =  1
(EQ 29)
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Table 27. BNM Computational Model #3 Current MCAS Results Given Inter-period 
MCAS Transition Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
CMR CM RQ, c m r q 2 c m r q 3 c m r q 4
IM T# H c L H N L H N L H N L
FMO 
= YES
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *10 *11 *12
° 
9
U- 
II
*13 *14 *15 *16 *17 *18 *19 *20 *21 *22 *23 *24
Notes: #: H=HIGHER, N=NEUTRAL, L = LOWER
* 1: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q,)
* 2 :  P  (FMO = YES | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q,)
* 3 :  P  (FMO = YES | IMT = LOWER | CMR Qi)
*4: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q2)
* 5 :  P  (FMO = YES | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q2)
* 6 :  P  (FMO = YES | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q2)
*7: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q3)
* 8: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q3)
* 9: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q3)
* 10: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q4)
* 11: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q4)
* 12: P  (FMO = YES | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q4)
*13: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = HIGHER |C M R Q ,)
*14: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Qi)
*15; P  (FMO = NO | IMT = LOWER | CM RQ ,)
*16: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q2)
*17: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q2)
*18: P(FM O  = NO | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q2)
* 19: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q3)
*20: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q3)
*21: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q3)
*22: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = HIGHER | CMR Q4)
*23: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = NEUTRAL | CMR Q4)
*24: P  (FMO = NO | IMT = LOWER | CMR Q4)
For IMT = HIGHER, NEUTRAL, or LOWER and i= 1 to 4,
I fmo^ e s P  ( F M O  | I M T  | C M R Q , )  =  1
(EQ 30)
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3.8.4. BAYESIAN NETWORK COMPUTATIONAL MODEL NUMBER 4
BNM Computational Model #4 node variables and model equations are 
depicted below in Tables 28 through 31.
Table 28. BNM Computational Model #4 Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
Inter-period
Mishap
Occurrence
Probability
IMO = YES P  (IMT = YES)
IMO = NO P  (IMT = NO)
P  (IMT = YES) + P  (IMT = NO) = 1 (EQ31)
Table 29. BNM Computational Model #4 Inter-period MCAS Transition
Inter-period MCAS 
Transition
Probability
IMT = HIGHER P  (IMT = HIGHER)
IMT = NEUTRAL P  (IMT = NEUTRAL)
IMT = LOWER P  (IMT = LOWER)
P  (IMT = HIGHER) + P  (IMT = NEUTRAL) + 
P  (IMT = LOWER) = 1 (EQ 32)
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Table 30. BNM Computational Model #4 Current MCAS Results Given Inter-period 
MCAS Transition Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
IMO YES NO
IMT HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
CMR
Qi
P  (CMR Q, 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO -  
NO)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q, 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
q 2
P  (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
NO)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
Q3
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P(CM R Q3 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P (C M R Q 3 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
CMR
Q4
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO =
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
LOWER 
| IMO = 
NO)
For IMT = HIGHER, NEUTRAL, or LOWER, and IMO= YES or NO, 
£ f = 1  P  ( C M R  Q i  I I M T  I I M O )  =  1
(EQ 33)
Table 31. BNM Computational Model #4 Future Mishap Occurrence Given Current
MCAS Results
CMR CM RQ, CM RQ 2 CMR Q 3 CMR Q4
FMO = 
YES
P  (FMO = YES) 
| CMR Q,)
P  (FMO = YES) 
I CMR Q2)
P  (FMO = YES) 
1 CMR Q i )
P  (FMO = YES) 
| CMR Q4)
FMO = 
NO
P  (FMO = NO) | 
CM RQ ,)
P  (FMO = NO) | 
CMR Q2)
P  (FMO = NO) | 
CMR Q i )
P  (FMO = NO) | 
CMR Q4)
For /'= 1 to 4,
P ( F M O  | C M R  Q O  =  1
( E Q  3 4 )
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3.8.5. BAYESIAN NETW ORK COM PUTATIONAL MODEL NUM BER 5
BNM Computational Model #5 node variables and model equations are 
depicted below in Tables 32 through 35.
Table 32. BNM Computational Model #5 Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
Inter-period
Mishap
Occurrence
Probability
IMO = YES P  (IMT = YES)
IMO = NO P  (IMT = NO)
P  (IMT = YES) + P  (IMT = NO) = 1 (EQ 35)
Table 33. BNM Computational Model #5 Inter-period MCAS Transition Given
Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
Inter-period Mishap 
Transition
IMO = YES IMO = NO
IMT = HIGHER P  (IMT = HIGHER | 
IMO = YES)
P  (IMT = HIGHER | 
IMO = NO)
IMT = NEUTRAL P  (IMT = NEUTRAL | 
IMO = YES)
P  (IMT = NEUTRAL | 
IMO -  NO)
IMT = LOWER P  (IMT = LOWER | 
IMO = YES)
P  (IMT = LOWER | 
IMO = NO)
For IMO = YES or NO
P  (IMT = HIGHER | IMO) + P  (IMT = NEUTRAL | IMO) +
P  (IMT = LOWER | IMO)= 1 (EQ 36)
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Table 34. BNM Computational Model #5 Current MCAS Results Given Inter-period 
MCAS Transition Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
IMO YES NO
IMT HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
CMR
Qi
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
/ ’ (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q] 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO =
NO)
P  (CMR Q, 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
/ ’ (CMR Qi 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO =
NO)
CMR
Qi
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P (C M R Q 2 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO =
NO)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P (CMR Q2 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO =
NO)
CMR
Q3
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P (CMR Q3 
1 IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P ( C  M R Q 3 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO =
NO)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
P  (CMR Q3 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO =
NO)
CMR
Q4
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P {  C M R Q 4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
YES)
P ( C  M R Q 4 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO = 
YES)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
HIGHER | 
IMO =
NO)
P  (CMR Q4 
| IMT = 
NEUTRAL 
| IMO = 
NO)
/ ’ (CM RQ4 
| IMT = 
LOWER | 
IMO =
NO)
For IMT = HIGHER, NEUTRAL, or LOWER and IMO= YES or NO,
4
P  (CMR Qi | IMT | IMO) =  1
(EQ 37)
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Table 35. BNM Computational Model #5 Future Mishap Occurrence Given Inter­
period MCAS Transition Given Current MCAS Results
CMR CM RQ, c m r q 2 CMR Q3 c m r q 4
IM T# H N L H N L H N L H N L
FMO 
= YES
*1 *2 *3 *5 *6 *7 *8 *9 *10 *11 *12
FMO 
= NO
*13 *14 *15 *16 *17 *18 *19 *20 *21 *22 *23 *24
Note: #: H=HIGHER, N=NEUTRAL, L= LOWER
* 1: 
* 2 : 
* 3:
* 4 -
*5:
* 6 :
* 7:
* 8:
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P  
P
* 9 :  P  
*10: P  
*11: P  
*12: P  
*13: P  
*14: P  
*15: P  
*16: P  
* 1 7 : P  
*18: P  
*19: P  
*20: P  
*21: P  
*22: P  
*23: P  
*24: P
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO :
(FM O :
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO
(FMO :
(FMO
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
IM T : 
IM T : 
IM T : 
IMT = 
IM T : 
IMT = 
IMT = 
IMT = 
IMT = 
IMT = 
IM T : 
IM T ; 
IM T : 
IM T : 
IM T : 
IM T : 
IMT : 
IMT ; 
IMT : 
IMT : 
IMT : 
IMT : 
IMT : 
IMT :
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
HIGHER
NEUTRAL
LOWER
CM RQ ,)
I CMR QO 
CMR Q 0 
CMR Q2)
I CMR Q2) 
CM RQ 2) 
CMR Q3)
| CM RQ3) 
CMR Q3) 
CMR Q4)
| CMR Q 4) 
CMR Q4) 
CMR Q 0 
| CMR Q 0 
| CMR Q 0 
CMR Q2)
| CMR Q2)
I CMR Q2) 
CMR Q3)
I CMR Q3)
I CMR Q3) 
CMR Q4)
| CMR Q4) 
|C M R Q 4)
For IMT = HIGHER, NEUTRAL, or LOWER and i= 1 to 4,
T.™ o=yeS P  ( F M O  | I M T  | C M R  Q , )  =  1
(EQ 38)
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3.9. EVALUATION M ETHODOLOGIES
In order for the derived computational Bayesian Network Models outputs to be 
of utility in serving as a predictive tool for naval aviation squadron leadership to 
measure likelihood of incurring a future mishap, the models' performance would 
indicate higher probabilities of future mishap occurrences for worse MCAS result 
performance. Worse MCAS result performance is considered to be those with lower 
quartiles of compared, averaged Likert Scale response values. This translates to either 
lower quartile or transition from previous to current MCAS that decremented to a 
lower quartile. Ideally the probability density distribution would show that the 
probability of a future mishap occurring is greater for the MCAS results of the lower 
quartiles. Mathematically this is expressed as
P fm o  (Qi)  >  P m o  ( Q 2 )  >  / ’fm o  ( Q 3 )  >  P fm o  ( Q 4 ) ,  where Y,t=i P f m o  (Qi)  =  1
(EQ 39)
This is pictorial displayed in Figure 20 below.
P ( Q i )
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Qi Q2 Q3 Q4
Figure 20. Ideal Probability o f Mishap Occurrences Given MCAS Quartile
Results
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3.9.1. SKEWNESS
The statistical attributes in Figure 20 demonstrate a unimodal distribution and 
asymmetry with higher number of occurrences in the lower quartiles (Qi and Qi) vice 
those occurring in the upper quartiles (Q3 and Q4 ). This is right skewness, i.e., the 
asymmetric distribution o f the quartiles with the decreasing “tail" to the right side of 
the chart. Although it is common for right skewness that the mode occurs at a lesser 
value than the median which occurs at a lesser value than the mean, it is not unusual 
for right tailed asymmetry in discrete distributions to violate this rule o f thumb [Von 
Hippel, 2005], Addition details concerning Skewness may be found in Section B.3 of 
Appendix B.
The equations denoted as B and E from Table 66 in Appendix B, possessed the 
best average rank values. These two equations were both used for the evaluation of 
the BNM model outputs with Equation B designated as Skewnessi and Equation E 
designated as Skewness2 as shown below in Table 36. This ensured that at least one of 
the skewness tests did not result in a non-parametric value of zero.
Table 36. Skewness Equations
Designation Equation
Skewnessi
max — m e d i a n  
m e d i a n  — m i n
Skewnessi
1
2 (m in +  m a x ) 
m e d i a n
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Using Skewnessi and Skewness? Equations B and E, the potential 
characteristics of skewness ranges for the distribution of the quartile probabilities are:
• Right Tailed 0 < x < l  (EQ 40)
• Symmetric x = l  (EQ41)
• Left Tailed x > 1 (EQ 42)
To summarize the desired attributes for a BNM to serve as a meaningful 
predictive tool to measure likelihood o f incurring a future mishap, the model's discrete 
output o f probability density distribution attributes include:
• Unimodal distribution
• Qi is the mode
• Right tailed asymmetry
• /’fmo (Qi) > P?mo  ( Q 2 )  > / ’fmo ( Q 3 )  > /’fmo ( Q 4 ) ,  where Z f =1 PFM0 ( Q i )  =  1
(EQ 43)
Additionally, to serve as predictive tool to measure likelihood of n o t  incurring 
a future mishap, the model’s output of discrete probability density distribution 
attributes include:
• Unimodal distribution
• Q4 is the mode
• Left tailed asymmetry
•  / ’fm o  (Qi) <  / ’ fm o  (Q2) <  / ’ fm o  (Q3) <  / ’ fm o  (Q4), where £ f = i  P F m o  ( Q i )  =  1
(EQ 44)
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3.9.2. SLOPE
Slope was the metric used to serve as a quantitative comparative means to 
evaluate performance of probability density functions that were unimodal and aligned 
in Skewness. The larger absolute value of derived slope was considered to be o f a 
higher utility for serving as a predictive tool. The equations for calculating slope 
values were:
• Slope = P ( Q 4) - P (  Qi) / 4 for comparison o f quartile probabilities of 
occurrence (EQ 45)
• Slope = P  (Higher) -  P  (Lower) / 3 for comparison o f quartile transition 
probabilities of occurrence. (EQ 46)
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. DATA PREPARATION
4.1.1. MCAS DATA PREPARATION
The 2,300 aggregated sets of survey data were culled to retain only those from 
organizations that were components of aircraft carrier air wings. Data from the 
remaining 930 MCAS results were organized in a Microsoft Excel ® tabular 
spreadsheet to present survey results categorized by Type / Model / Series (T/M/S) 
aircraft, squadron / organizational unit (as denoted by squadron serial number), and in 
successive chronological order based upon Mean Survey Date. This sorting 
demonstrated that there were 136 distinct units that participated in the MCAS. Likert 
value responses were averaged across the span of 43 aggregated questions, and 
subsequently across each o f the six MOSE functional component areas shown in Table 
37 below.
Table 37. MOSE Functional Components of the MCAS
MOSE Functional Component Area Question Numbers
Process Auditing (PA) 1 -6
Reward System and Safety Culture (RS / SC) 7 -1 4
Quality Assurance (QA) 1 5 -2 0
Risk Management (RM) 21 -2 9
Command and Control (C2) 3 0 -3 7
Communication / Functional Relationships (C / FR) 3 8 -4 3
The Likert value for Question 21 was inverted on the 1-5 scale to account for 
its negative connotation. Embedded software functionality within Excel was used to
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determine MCAS results quartile boundaries and assign result placement in the 
quartile continuum of Qi, Q2, Q3, and Q4 with Q t containing the lowest score values 
and Q4 containing the highest score values.
4.1.2. AVIATION M ISHAP SUM M ARY DATA PREPARATION
Select data from the Class A - Aviation Safety Mishap Summary Reports were 
organized in corresponding Microsoft Excel ® tabular spreadsheets to arrange results 
in chronological order o f the mishap date. These reports involved a total of 67 
aircraft. Additional data included the mishap event serial number, applicable T/M/S, 
identification of primary causal factors, and brief description of the incident. Mishap 
Summary data were cross-referenced with the MCAS results spreadsheets, and where 
applicable and based upon mishap occurrence date, were inserted between MCAS 
results bounded by the Mean Survey Dates. Cross matching mishap summary data to 
corresponding MCAS result data was not achieved for nine mishaps. The reasons for 
these and frequencies o f occasions are depicted in Table 38 below.
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Table 38. Reasons For Mishap Summary Data Without 
Corresponding MCAS Survey Results
Reason Frequency
Unit First Appear Serial Number in Mishap Summary Data 
corresponds to Fleet Logistics squadron (VR) which does not fly 
Type / Model / Series aircraft assigned to a Carrier Air Wing (CVW)
1
Unit First Appear Serial Number in Mishap Summary Data that no 
corresponding organization within the 2,300 provided MCAS 
response data
1
Mishaps occurred in Research, Test, Development, and Evaluation 
(RDTE) Squadrons that were not representative o f subordinate 
components o f a CVW
2
Date of occurrence contained within the Mishap Summary report 
was earlier than the corresponding unit's first MCAS response Mean 
Survey Date
5
O f the remaining individual 58 aircraft mishaps, only 55 had corresponding matches 
for both Previous and Current MCAS Result Quartiles (PMR Qi and CMR Qj).
4.1.3. GENERATION OF INPUT DATA FOR BAYESIAN NETW ORK  
MODELS
Linked worksheets from the MCAS results and Aviation Mishap Summary 
data supported the process to calculate observational frequencies and percentages 
necessary to define the node probability distributions for the Bayesian Network 
computational models described in Section 3.7. Previous and Current MCAS Results 
(PMRs and CMRs) were provided and represented by respective quartile assignments.
Inter-period MCAS Transitions (IMTs) by quartile were computed by 
comparing results of two chronologically successive results taken from the same unit 
and determining the numerical value representing the shift in quartile. (Example: if 
PMR was in Q^ and CMR was in Qi, then IMT = LOWER for a decrement of 2).
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Initial chronological MCAS results for each unit were deemed to be “Not Applicable" 
for IMT.
Inter-period Mishap Occurrence (IMO) value was the binary result (i.e., YES 
or NO) as to whether a reported mishap summary existed with an incident date 
between the current and previous MCAS Mean Survey Dates. Similarly, Future 
Mishap Occurrence (FMO) value was the binary result as to whether a reported 
mishap summary existed with an incident date immediately after current MCAS 
results but prior to the next subsequent MCAS Mean Survey Date.
For each applicable listed mishap, the immediately previous and subsequent 
MCAS responses averaged Likert scale values, quartile placement, and transition 
values were determined.
4.2. AGGREGATED INPUT DATA FOR REFINED RESEARCH QUESTION  
1 BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELS
The BNM input probability distributions for the 930 aggregated MCAS result 
data (responses to Questions 1 through 43) are contained in Tables 39 through 49 and 
presented in Figures 21 through 26, below.
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Table 39. BNM Computational Models #1 and #2 Prior MCAS Result Quartile
Observed Frequencies and Probabilities
PMR Quartile Quartile Likert 
Scale Value 
Lower Bound
Quartile Likert 
Scale Value 
Upper Bound
Observed
Frequency
Probability
PM RQi 3.159 <3.588 233 0.2505
PMR Q2 3.588 < 3.692 232 0.2495
PMR Q3 3.692 < 3.796 232 0.2495
PMR Q4 3.796 <4.431 233 0.2505
Total 930 1.0000
Table 40. BNM Computational Model #1 and #2 Observed Frequencies and 
Conditional Probabilities o f Inter-Period Occurrence Mishap Given Prior MCAS
Result Quartile
PMR Quartile PMR Qi PMR Q2 PMR Q3 PMR Q4
Observed Frequency 233 232 232 233
Final Unit Quartile Observations 36 37 31 32
IMO = YES 16 16 14 12
IMO = NO 181 179 187 189
Total 197 195 201 201
Probability
Inter-period Mishap=YES 0.0812 0.0821 0.0697 0.0597
Inter-period Mishap=NO 0.9188 0.9179 0.9303 0.9403
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Table 41. BNM Computational Model #1 and #2 Observed Frequency and 
Conditional Probabilities o f Current MCAS Results Quartile Given Inter-period 
Mishap Occurrence Given Prior MCAS Result Quartile
PMR PMR Qi PMR Q2 PMR Q3 p m r q 4
IMO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Observed Frequency
CMR
Qi
9 75 7 41 2 34 0 18
CMR
Qi
1 66 3 53 2 40 1 34
CMR
03
3 27 1 53 4 63 2 46
CMR
q 4
2 15 4 32 5 51 9 91
Total 15 183 15 179 13 188 12 189
Probability
CMR
Q.
0.6000 0.4098 0.4667 0.2291 0.1538 0.1809 0.0000 0.0952
CMR
q 2
0.0667 0.3607 0.2000 0.2961 0.1538 0.2128 0.0833 0.1799
CMR
Q3
0.2000 0.1475 0.0667 0.2961 0.3077 0.3351 0.1667 0.2434
CMR
Q4
0.1333 0.0820 0.2666 0.1787 0.3847 0.2712 0.7500 0.4815
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Note: # - There are only 55 individual aircraft mishaps that had corresponding matches 
with both Previous and Current MCAS Response Quartiles. Three o f the 58 had no 
subsequent MCAS response data after the mishap occurrence date.
Table 42. BNM Computational Model #1 Conditional Probabilities o f Future Mishap 
Occurrence Given Current MCAS Results Quartile Given Inter-period Mishap
Occurrence
IMO Y1ES NO
CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR CMR
Q. 02 Q3 q 4 Qi Qi 03 Q4
Observed Frequency
FMO 
= YES 0 1 1 1 18 5 7 15
FMO 
= NO 18 5 7 15 130 152 157 157
Total 18 6 8 16 148 157 162 172
Probability
FMO 
= YES 0.0000 0.1667 0.1250 0.0625 0.1216 0.0318 0.0427 0.0872
FMO 
= NO 1.0000 0.8333 0.8750 0.9375 0.8784 0.9682 0.9573 0.9128
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
20
lMO=YES
20
IMO=NO
15 15
% 10 • / . 10
5 5
0
0 16.67 12.50 6.25
0 Ha IB
Q. Q2 Q3 
CMR
Q4 Qi Q2 Q3 
CMR
q 4
Figure 21. BNM Computational Model #1 Conditional Probabilities of Current 
MCAS Survey Results by Quartile Preceding Future Mishap Occurrence Given Inter- 
Period Mishap Occurrence Equals YES or NO
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Table 43. BNM Computational Model #2 Observed Frequency and Conditional
Probabilities of Future Mishap Occurrence Given Current MCAS Result Quartile
CMR Quartile
/
FMO
CMR Qi CMR Q2 C M R Q 3 CM RQ 4
Observed Frequency
YES 18 6 8 16
NO 148 157 164 172
Probability
YES 0.1084 0.0368 0.0465 0.0851
NO 0.8916 0.9632 0.9535 0.9149
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
15
10
%
5
3.68 4.65
Qi Q2 Q3 Q4
Figure 22. BNM Computational Model #2 Conditional Probabilities of 
Current MCAS Survey Results by Quartile Preceding Future Mishap
Occurrence
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Table 44. BNM Computational Model #3, #4, and #5 Inter-period Mishap Occurrence
Observed Frequency and Probabilities
Inter-period
Mishap
Occurrence
Observed
Frequency
Probability
IMO = YES 53 0.0661
IMO = NO 749 0.9339
Total 802 1.0000
Table 45. BNM Computational Model #3 and #4 Inter-period MCAS Transition 
Observed Frequency and Probabilities
Inter-period MCAS 
Transition
Observed Frequency Probability
IMT = HIGHER 260 0.3275
IMT = NEUTRAL 307 0.3866
IMT -  LOWER 227 0.2859
Total 794 1.0000
114
Table 46. BNM Computational Model #3, #4, and #5 Current MCAS Results Given
Inter-period MCAS Transition Given Inter-period Mishap Occurrence Given
Observed Frequency and Probabilities
IMO YES NO
IMT HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
0 3served Frequency
CMR
Qi
0 9 8 0 75 94
CMR
Qi
1 3 3 66 53 74
CMR
q 3
3 2 2 81 65 46
CMR
04
8 6 0 101 93 0
Total 12 20 13 248 286 214
Probability
CMR
0 .
0 0.4500 0.6154 0 0.2622 0.4392
CMR
q 2
0.0833 0.1500 0.2308 0.2661 0.1853 0.3458
CMR
03
0.2500 0.1000 0.1538 0.3266 0.2273 0.2150
CMR
04
0.6667 0.3000 0 0.4073 0.3252 0
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Table 47. BNM Computational Model #3 and #5 Future Mishap Occurrence Given 
Inter-period MCAS Transition Given Current MCAS Results Observed Frequency and
Probabilities
CMR CMR Qi c m r q 2
IM T# HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
Observed Frequency
FMO = 
YES 0 4 4 5 1 4
FMO = 
NO 0 69 78 54 41 62
Total 0 73 82 59 42 66
Probability
FMO = 
YES N A # 0.0548 0.0488 0.0847 0.0238 0.0606
FMO = 
NO N A # 0.9452 0.9512 0.9153 0.9762 0.9394
Total N A # 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
CMR c m r q 3 c m r q 4
IM T# HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER HIGHER NEUTRAL LOWER
Observed Frequency
FMO = 
YES 3 3 2 4 4 0
FMO = 
NO 70 56 37 92 79 0
Total 73 59 39 96 83 0
Probability
FMO = 
YES 0.0411 0.0508 0.0513 0.0417 0.0482 N A *
FMO = 
NO 0.9589 0.9492 0.9487 0.9583 0.9518 N A *
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 NA *
Notes: # - Not Applicable due to inability to transition 
from a lower quartile than CMR Qi 
* - Not Applicable due to inability to transition 
from a higher quartile than CMR Q4
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Figure 23. BNM Computational Model #3 Conditional Probabilities o f MCAS 
Survey by Quartile Preceding Future Mishap Occurrence Given Inter-MCAS 
Transition Equals HIGHER, NEUTRAL, or LOWER
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Figure 24. BNM Computational Model #3 Conditional Probabilities o f Inter-MCAS 
Transition Preceding Future Mishap Occurrence Given Current MCAS Results Equal
Qi, Q 2 , Q 3, or Q4
Table 48. BNM Computational Model #4 Future Mishap Occurrence Given Current 
MCAS Results Observed Frequency and Probabilities
CMR CM RQ, CMR O2 CMR Q3 CMR Q4
Observed Frequency
FMO = YES 8 10 8 8
FMO = NO 147 157 163 171
Total 155 167 171 179
Probability
FMO = YES 0.0516 0.0599 0.0468 0.0447
FMO = NO 0.9484 0.9401 0.9532 0.9553
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Figure 25. BNM Computational Model #4 Conditional Probabilities of 
Current MCAS Results Quartiles Preceding Future Mishap Occurrence
Table 49. BNM Computational Model #5 Inter-period MCAS Transition Given Inter- 
period Mishap Occurrence Observed Frequency and Probability
Inter-period Mishap 
Transition
IMO = YES IMO = NO
Observed Frequency
IMT = HIGHER 12 248
IMT -  NEUTRAL 21 286
IMT = LOWER 13 214
Total 46 748
Probability
IMT = HIGHER 0.2609 0.3316
IMT = NEUTRAL 0.4565 0.3824
IMT = LOWER 0.2826 0.2860
Total 1.0000 1.0000
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Figure 26. BNM Computational Model #5 Conditional Probabilities of 
Inter-MCAS Transitions Preceding Future Mishap Occurrence
4.3. DATA RESULTS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 1 BAYESIAN  
NETW ORK MODELS
The five BNM computational models were executed by setting evidence that 
either the Future Mishap Occurrence did happen (i.e., P  (FMO = YES) = 1) or did not 
happen (i.e., P  (FMO = NO) = 1). This enabled calculation o f the nodal probability 
distribution for each characteristic. The data are contained in Tables 50 through 54 
and Figures 27 through 31 below.
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Table 50. BNM Computational Model #1 Nodal Probability Distribution
F M O  = Y E S N O
P M R  Q i 0 .2 6 2 6 0 .2 4 9 6
P M R  Q 2 0 .2 3 4 9 0 .2 5 0 6
P M R  Q 3 0 .2 4 6 8 0 .2 4 9 7
p m r q 4 0 .2 5 5 7 0 .2501
C M R  Q i 0 .3 7 2 4 0 .2 2 5 5
C M R  Q 2 0 .1 3 4 5 0 .2 6 0 7
c m r q 3 0 .1 7 0 7 0 .2 5 6 0
C M R  Q 4 0 .3 2 2 3 0 .2 5 7 8
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 27. BNM Computational Model #1 Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 51. BNM Computational Model #2 Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Q, 0.2626 0.2496
PMR Q2 0.2349 0.2506
PMR Q3 0.2468 0.2497
p m r q 4 0.2557 0.2501
C M R Q i 0.3724 0.2255
CMR Q2 0.1345 0.2607
CMR Q3 0.1707 0.2560
c m r q 4 0.3223 0.2578
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 28. BNM Computational Model #2 Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 52. BNM Computational Model #3 Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.2410 0.2347
c m r q 2 0.2904 0.2485
c m r q 3 0.2333 0.2511
CMR Q4 0.2354 0.2656
IMT Higher 0.3418 0.3267
IMT Neutral 0.3549 0.3883
IMT Lower 0.3034 0.2850
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 29. BNM Computational Model #3 Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 53. BNM Computational Model #4 Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.2394 0.2348
CMR Q2 0.2963 0.2482
C M R Q j 0.2312 0.2513
CMR Q4 0.2330 0.2657
IMT Higher 0.3183 0.3280
IMT Neutral 0.3803 0.3869
IMT Lower 0.3014 0.2851
FMO = YES FMO = NO
%
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Figure 30. BNM Computational Model #4 Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 54. BNM Computational Model #5 Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.2419 0.2357
CMR Q2 0.2912 0.2491
C M R Q 3 0.2328 0.2509
CMR Q4 0.2341 0.2643
IMT Higher 0.3416 0.3262
IMT Neutral 0.3554 0.3890
IMT Lower 0.3030 0.2849
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 31. BNM Computational Model #5 Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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4.4. DATA RESULTS FOR RESEARCH QUESTION 2 BAYESIAN  
NETW ORK M ODELS
The five BNM computational models were executed for each of the six MOSE 
components by evaluating performance for the specific questions in each category.
This was done by setting evidence that either the Future Mishap Occurrence did 
happen (i.e., P  (FMO = YES) = 1 or did not happen (i.e., P  (FMO = NO) = 1) enabling 
calculation o f the nodal probability distribution for each characteristic. The data are 
contained in Appendix E.
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5. INTERPRETATION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
5.1. PRELIM INARY EVALUATION OF DATA SET
Prior to evaluating the output from the Bayesian Network Models, a 
preliminary evaluation of the research input data was conducted. The research data 
provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center contained information from 930 MCAS 
results of carrier air wing based squadrons conducted from 2000-2009 and 58 Class A 
mishap events for which there were corresponding MCAS result data for a survey 
administered prior to the mishap date. The initial examination compared the 2000- 
2009 data provided for this research against the April 2004 reference data shown in 
Figure 3 [Ciavarelli-2007, Schimpf, Figlock-2006] from Section 2.2.3. The 
aggregated MOSE component Likert Score values from the most recent 2000-2009 
MCAS result data distribution (without developed Bayesian Network Modeling 
execution) in squadrons that had subsequently incurred a Class A mishap prior to the 
next administration of the MCAS are shown below in Figure 32.
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Figure 32. Previous MCAS Results for Subsequent Class A Mishap 
Occurrences on Data Provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center
The discrete quartile distributions for occurrence frequency of mishaps and 
probabilities from the reference study conducted in April 2004 and the data provided 
for this research covering 2000-2009 are displayed in Tables 55 and 56 below.
Table 55. Mishap Occurrences
Data Set Mishap Occurrence Frequency of 
Aggregate Likert Scale Result 
Quartiles
0 . 0 2 Q3 Q4
April 2004 Study Class A Mishaps 21 19 12 13
April 2004 Study Class A, B & C Mishaps 94 78 54 49
Dissertation Research Data for Class A 
Mishaps with associated MCAS results from 
2000-2009
16 16 14 12
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Table 56. Mishap Probabilities
Data Set Mishap Probability o f Aggregate 
Likert Scale Result Quartiles
Qi 02 Q3 Q4
April 2004 Study Class A Mishaps 0.3231 0.2923 0.1846 0.2000
April 2004 Study Class A, B & C Mishaps 0.3418 0.2836 0.1964 0.1782
Dissertation Research Data for Class A 
Mishaps with associated MCAS results from 
2000-2009
0.2759 0.2759 0.2414 0.2069
A Chi Squared Distribution Test for Homogeneity was conducted to compare
the data received from the U.S. Naval Safety Center covering 2000-2009 for this
research against the study result data from April 2004 by Ciavarelli, Schimpf, and
Figlock that is displayed in Figure 3. This was conducted to assess that the U.S.
Naval Safety Center provided data set was proportionally representational. The test
statistic evaluation was
? v i (Observed-Expected ) 2
* 2 =  L m  quart i les  ----------- <EQ 47)
Test metrics used the four quartiles for comparison of the cells resulted in three 
degrees o f freedom (i.e. n = 4 - 1), using a one sided P-value. (DeVeaux et al., 2012). 
The critical value for 3 degrees o f freedom and a  = 0.05 is 
^o.o5,3 = 1 1-345.
• The null hypothesis for this preliminary evaluation was that the data sets had the 
same distribution o f counts.
• The alternate hypothesis was that the distributions were different.
The derived Chi Squared statistic for comparing the U.S. Naval Safety Center 
provide data against the April 2004 Reference Class A Mishap occurrences yielded 
X 2 = 1.4799, and the derived Chi Squared statistics for comparing the U.S. Naval 
Safety Center provide data against the April 2004 Reference Class A, B, and C 
Mishap occurrences yielded X 2 =1.6174. Neither comparison X 2 exceeded the critical 
value indicating that there was no significant difference for 3 degrees of freedom and 
a  = 0.05. Therefore the null hypothesis was retained serving to demonstrate that the 
research data from 2000-2009 provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center was 
representative in comparison to the April 2004 reference study.
5.2. EVALUATION OF DATA SUPPORTING ANSW ER TO RESEARCH  
QUESTION 1
Research Question 1 queried whether Bayesian Network Modeling provided a 
better predictor for future mishap occurrence than the probabilities generated from the 
MCAS frequency observations in the reference study. Comparison o f the probability 
density distributions and their respective attributes for the results from the April 2004, 
Ciavarelli, Schimpf, and Figlock published study labeled here as “Reference”, 
research data provided from the U.S. Naval Safety Center covering 2000-2009, and 
output from the Bayesian Network Models #1 through #5 are presented in Tables 57 
through 59.
130
Table 57. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions o f MCAS Result Likert 
Scale Quartiles Followed by Actual Mishap Occurrence
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew­
ness:
Slope
Reference 
Class A 
Mishaps
A ll# CMR Unimodal Q . 0.6250 0.8125 -0.0308
Reference 
Class 
A, B & C  
Mishaps
All CMR Unimodal Q i 0.5988 0.7994 -0.0409
U.S. Navy 
Safety 
Center 
Provided, 
2000-2009 
Research 
Data Set 
for Class 
A Mishaps
All CMR Bimodal Q 1 . Q 2 0.8125 0.9063 -0.0172
Note: #- All indicates aggregation of all 6 MOSE components into a single metric 
value: Process Auditing (PA), Reward Systems / Safety Culture (RS/SC), Quality 
Assurance (QA), Risk Management (RM), Command and Control (C2), and 
Communications and Functional Relationships (C/FR)
131
Table 58. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions o f Bayesian Network Model 
(BNM) Output When Future Mishap Occurrence FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode * Skew­
ness i
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #1 All PMR Bimodal Q i ,  Q 4 1.0101 1.0050 -0.1725
CMR Bimodal Q i » Q 4 0.9728 0.9864 -1.2525
BNM #2 All PMR Bimodal Q u  Q 4 0.9767 0.9883 -0.3025CMR Bimodal Q i ,  Q 4 0.9751 0.9876 -1.1750
BNM #3 All CMR Unimodal Qi 0.8818 0.9409 -0.1400IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9259 0.9629 -1.2800
BNM #4 All CMR Unimodal Qi 0.8667 0.9334 -0.1600IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9668 0.9834 -0.5633
BNM #5 All CMR Unimodal Q2 0.8758 0.9379 -0.1950IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9257 0.9628 -1.2867
Note: * - For comparison of PMR and CMR probability distributions, the mode was a 
quartile (i.e., Qi). For IMT probability distributions, the mode was either Higher, 
Neutral, or Lower transition o f quartiles.
Table 59. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions o f BNM Output When
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE 
Charac - 
teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew-
nessi
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #1 All PMR Uniform None 0.9992 0.9996 0.0125CMR Unimodal Q2 1.0568 1.0284 0.8075
BNM #2 All PMR Uniform None 1.0016 1.0008 0.0225CMR Unimodal Q2 1.0568 1.0284 0.8000
BNM #3 All CMR Unimodal Q« 1.0695 1.0348 1.0300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9199 0.9600 -1.3900
BNM #4 Ail CMR Unimodal 04 1.0704 1.0352 1.0300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9177 0.9589 -1.4300
BNM #3 All CMR Unimodal 04 1.0627 1.0314 0.9533IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9205 0.9602 -1.3767
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A review of Table 58 demonstrated that for cases in which future mishaps did occur 
subsequent to the MCAS result data, that there were no sets of BNM output using 
either Previous / Current MCAS Result (PMR / CMR) for BNMs #1 and #2, or 
Current MCAS Results (CMR) /Inter-Period MCAS Transition (IMT) for BNMs #3, 
#4, or #5 that met the desired attributes o f modality, skewness, and slope. Since no 
BNM outputs met all criteria for desired attributes, no statistical analysis was 
conducted to evaluate the significance of the models' performance. Therefore the null 
hypothesis for Research Question 1 listed below could not be rejected.
Hlo: Use o f Bayesian Network Modeling to represent the relationship between 
organizational MCAS results and mishap occurrence will not provide 
improved methodology compared to MCAS frequency observation reference 
study analysis to predict occurrence of future mishaps
In evaluating the converse utility in table 59 for those cases in which a future 
mishap did not occur subsequent to the MCAS result data, as shown in the shaded 
rows, the use o f BNMs #3, #4, and #5 output o f PMR quartiles met the desired 
attributes. No reference data were available for MCAS results of squadrons that did 
not incur an aviation mishap, precluding statistical analysis for comparison to the 
results of the derived data contained in Table 57, above. Face inspection o f the results 
indicates that there are indications for the BNMs #3, #4, #5 that fourth quartile 
performance resulted in higher probability o f not incurring a future mishap.
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5.3. EVALUATION OF DATA SUPPORTING ANSW ER TO RESEARCH  
QUESTION 2
Research Question 2 inquired whether any of the individual MOSE 
components served as a better indicator than aggregation o f all six MOSE components 
for future mishap occurrence using Bayesian Network Modeling. Comparison of the 
probability density distributions and their respective attributes for the results from the 
output from the Bayesian Network Models #1 through #5 broken out by the aggregate 
and individual MOSE components are presented in Appendix F.
Review o f Tables 100 through 101 in Appendix F indicates (as shown in the 
shaded rows) demonstrates that the desired attributes for modality, skewness, and 
slope, dependent upon FMO equal to YES or NO, were evident for these select cases. 
These select cases demonstrating the desired attributes are displayed below in Tables 
60 and 61.
Table 60. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions for Specific MOSE 
Components and Select BNM Outputs When FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness i
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #1 QA PMR Unimodal Q. 0.9238 0.9619 -0.7825
BNM #1 RM PMR Unimodal Q. 0.9026 0.9513 -1.1575
BNM #2 QA PMR Unimodal Qi 0.9448 0.9724 -0.8050
BNM #2 RM PMR Unimodal Q. 0.9201 0.9601 -0.9700
BNM #2 C2 PMR Unimodal Qi 0.9596 0.9798 -0.6525
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Table 61. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions for Specific MOSE 
Components and Select BNM Outputs When FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew-
nessi
Skew­
ness:
Slope
BNM #3 All CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0695 1.0348 1.0300
BNM #3 QA CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0247 1.0124 0.2233
BNM #3 RM CMR Unimodal Qa 1.1231 1.0616 1.6433
BNM #4 All CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0704 1.0352 1.0300
BNM #4 QA CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0243 1.0121 0.2300
BNM #4 RM CMR Unimodal Qa 1.1236 1.0618 1.6400
BNM #4 C/FR CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0454 1.0227 0.7300
BNM #5 All CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0627 1.0314 0.9533
BNM #5 RM CMR Unimodal Qa 1.1222 1.0611 1.6233
BNM #5 C/FR CMR Unimodal Qa 1.0392 1.0196 0.6800
An inspection of the two tables above indicates that there were no specific pairing of 
MOSE component and BNM demonstrated better desired behavior as a predicting tool 
when both:
• MCAS result performance was in a lower or the lowest quartile when a future 
mishap did occur, and
• MCAS result performance was in a higher or the highest quartile when a future 
mishap did not occur.
A summary o f individual examples that contained probability variable quartile 
distributions that met desired attributes is shown below in Table 62.
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Table 62. MOSE component and Corresponding Bayesian Network Model Outputs 
Demonstrating Desired Probability Distribution
MOSE
component BNM FMO
Probability 
Variable Quartile
Aggregate #3, #4, #5 NO CMR
QA
#1, #2 YES PMR
#3, #4 NO CMR
RM #1, #2 YES PMR
#3, #4, #5 NO CMR
C2 #2 YES PMR
C/FR #4, #5 NO CMR
Table 62, above, displays that:
• None o f the BNMs using aggregation of the six MOSE components demonstrated 
all desired traits to serve as a predictive tool for future mishap occurrence (i.e., 
when FMO = YES). There were 3 instances for BNM #3, #4, and #5 using 
aggregated MCAS data that displayed suitable traits when future mishap 
occurrence did not occur (i.e., when FMO = NO).
• There is no single MOSE component that meets desired attributes for serving as a 
predictive tool for both when future mishap occurrences occur and do not occur.
As stated in Section 3.9.1 above, satisfactory model performance would support 
utility as a predictive tool for both future likelihoods to incur and not incur a future 
mishap. None of the developed Bayesian Network Models when applied to 
individual and aggregate MOSE components displayed satisfactory predictive 
performance for both outcomes in which FMO = YES and FMO = NO.
Since none of the output data from BNMs using input aggregated from all six 
MOSE components demonstrated acceptable criteria for all probability distribution
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traits, no statistical analysis was conducted to evaluate the significance of the models' 
performance when compared to input from individual MOSE component. Therefore 
the null hypothesis for Research Question 2 listed below could not be rejected.
H2o: Use of Bayesian Network Modeling with specific component MCAS 
results will not provide improved methodology compared to aggregated MCAS 
results to predict occurrence o f future mishaps.
5.4. ANALYSIS
5.4.1. EVALUATION OF BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELING FOR  
PREDICTING FUTURE M ISHAP OCCURRENCE
In evaluation o f data produced from the developed and executed Bayesian 
Network Models, for Research Questions 1 and 2, the null hypotheses could not be 
rejected. Examination of the model outputs and their characteristic traits did not 
support using Bayesian Network Models o f sequential MCAS results as a predictive 
tool to gauge likelihood for incurring or not incurring a future mishap.
For Research Question 1, in comparison of the aggregated MCAS data for all 
MOSE components to the April 2004 reference study detailed by Ciavarelli in 2007, 
Schimpf, and Figlock in 2006, none of the Bayesian Network models developed for 
this research demonstrated improved performance.
For Research Question 2, statistical analysis of Bayesian Network modeling 
results from specific MOSE component input compared to aggregated input from all 6 
MOSE components was not conducted as the models using aggregated data did not 
demonstrate all required traits for probability distribution. Additional analysis was
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conducted to determine if any specific MOSE component used in a defined BNM had 
superior performance than the others.
Consideration was given for utility of statistical analyses to compare results for 
specific MOSE components and BNM outputs for those cases in which output 
performance met desired attributes for predicting future mishap occurrence. The one­
sided paired /-test was selected for use to compare paired differences in slopes from 
one given specific MOSE component -  BNM case listed below in Table 63 against the 
others.
Table 63. Previous MCAS Result Quartile Probability Distributions for Specific 
MOSE component -  BNMs with FMO = YES
MOSE
component BNM Qi q 2 q 3 Q4 Slope
QA
#1 0.2705 0.2493 0.2410 0.2392 -0.0078
#2 0.2737 0.2405 0.2443 0.2415 -0.0081
RM #1 0.2847 0.2409 0.2360 0.2384 -0.0116#2 0.2761 0.2447 0.2419 0.2373 -0.0097
C2 #2 0.2715 0.2388 0.2443 0.2454 -0.0065
The null hypothesis for this additional evaluation was that the slopes for the specific 
MOSE component -  BNMs were essentially similar while the alternate hypothesis was 
that one o f the slopes demonstrated significantly better performance than the others. 
This calculation was accomplished using the statistic for paired /- test. (DeVeaux et 
al„ 2012)
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t n - 1 =  d  h ° / s E ( d )  ’ where: (E(^ 48)
d  = mean of pairwise differences
S ti = standard deviation o f mean s of pairwise differences
n  = number of pairs
n - l  -  degrees o f freedom
_ 5* /
S E { d ) = y  standard error for the mean, applied to the differences
(EQ 49)
For this analysis: n  = 4, Degrees of Freedom was n - l =  3, with a  = 0.05, the one-sided 
critical t value for negative slopes was t0,05 3 = -2.3534 such that for the derived t 
value to exceed the critical value, it had to be less than -2.3534. Results of the paired 
t-test one-sided statistical analysis are shown below in Table 64.
Table 64. Paired t-Test One Sided Analysis o f MOSE component -  BNM Slopes
Basis Slope Slope
Value
Derived / -Statistic 
compared to other 
MOSE component- 
BNM slopes
Exceeds 
Critical / value 
such that it is 
less than 
-2.3534
QA-BNM #1 -0.0078 1.0478 NO
QA-BNM #2 -0.0081 0.7765 NO
RM-BNM#! -0.0116 -5.4475 YES
RM-BNM #2 -0.0097 1.1162 NO
C2- BNM #2 -0.0065 3.1770 NO
As shown in the gray shaded row above, only the MCAS data results using the Risk 
Management MOSE component for Previous MCAS Results with BNM #1 
demonstrated all the desired attributes for probability distribution with a quantifiable 
slope value that exceeded the one-side, paired /-tests critical value. This enabled
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rejection of the null hypothesis indicating that for the use o f the Risk Management 
MOSE component as input data for BNM #1, PMR provided significantly improved 
performance than the other tested BNMs; however its slope value of -0.0116 did not 
outperform the April 2004 reference study published by Ciavarelli in 2007 and 
Schimpf and Figlock in 2006 for Class A mishaps (-0.0308) / Class A, B, and C 
mishaps (-0.0409) or the dissertation research data set (-0.0172) depicted in Table 64 
above.
5.4.2. APPLICATION OF BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELING FOR 
PREDICTING FUTURE M ISHAP OCCURENCE
Bayesian Network Models developed for this research did not demonstrate 
sufficient performance to meet the intended goal o f providing squadron leadership 
with a tool that could be used for predicting future mishap occurrence. The modeling 
and simulation o f Bayesian Networks is a valid methodology for existing data to 
determine conditional probability, i.e., the probability of an event given that we know 
some other event has occurred. However the developed and executed models in this 
research did not add improved quantitative metrics for representing the relationship 
between sequential MCAS results and future mishap occurrence / non-occurrence. 
Reasons that may have impacted Bayesian Network Model performance include:
• Data provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center did not support development of 
Bayesian Network Models that demonstrated desirable traits for use as a predictive 
tool.
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• Poor construct validity of the MCAS to accurately reflect six distinct categories, 
corresponding to the six components of the Model of Organizational Safety 
Effectiveness.
• The state variable nodes and their inter-relationships in the developed conceptual 
Bayesian Network Models did not capture key elements necessary to produce 
results that could be used as a predictive tool.
• Use of Likert Scale data did not adequately establish significant state variable 
nodes for Bayesian Network Model execution that supports predictive tool use. 
Additional related components to this involve:
o Quartiles were used to differentiate levels of performance from squadron 
MCAS performance. This was done to enable direct comparison with the 
April 2004 reference study published by Ciavarelli in 2007 and Schimpf 
and Figlock in 2006 . This coarse level of gradation with only four discrete 
values may not have demonstrated sufficient distinction to enable 
meaningful model output, 
o Quartile transition was defined as a state variable to reflect direction of 
movement in quartiles from sequential MCAS results. Characterization of 
direction o f change as Lower (Q, —> Q, where i > j ) or Higher (Q, —» Q, 
where i < j) may not have demonstrated a sufficient level of fine distinction 
to enable meaningful model output.
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5.4.2.1. REVIEW  OF ASSUMPTIONS
Assumptions listed in Section 1.7 were reviewed for potential adverse impact on
research results.
• ASSUMPTION 1
o Statement: Design and implementation o f a computational Bayesian 
Network Model using MCAS derived inputs does not substantially change 
the intent of the original framework. MCAS was implemented to capture 
maintenance related items within the MOSE framework, 
o Review: The use o f MCAS results as input data for computational 
execution of Bayesian Network Models should not have imparted any 
substantial change to the intent of the original MCAS framework nor led to 
incorrect assessments of squadron maintainers' perspective of 
organizational risk management and safety climate.
• ASSUMPTION 2
o Statement: Use o f a computational model to accurately produce
conditional probability predictions that reflect causal network relationships 
between MCAS results and mishap occurrences continues to provide the 
means to accurately represent MOSE components, 
o Review: The reliance o f computational Bayesian Network Models to 
accurately produce conditional probability predictions that reflect causal 
network relationships between MCAS results and future mishap 
occurrences should not have introduced means to inaccurately represent 
MOSE components. Simulation through basic Bayesian Network
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Modeling cannot incorporate feedbacks and dynamics. [Albert, 2012] The 
five discrete models contained in this research had no feedback 
mechanisms to distort representation of MOSE components.
• ASSUMPTION 3
o Statement: Averaging aggregated organizational response scores of MCAS 
questions does not alter the accuracy o f survey results, 
o Review: Averaging aggregated organizational responses should not have 
altered accuracy o f MCAS results. Aggregated results were used in 
computation model execution to derive results which were directly 
comparable to the April 2004 reference study published by Ciavarelli in 
2007 and Schimpf and Figlock in 2006 to evaluate models’ performance.
ASSUMPTION 4
o Statement: Changes in an organization’s safety climate reflected by 
MCAS results occur at a linear rate for the time period between 
implementation o f successive safety surveys 
o Review: Discrete event modeling contains an inherent limitation for 
reflecting changes in state variables between observation times. Without 
use of either dynamic modeling techniques or additional observation points 
within a given time period, the use of only two sequential MCAS results 
constrains derivation of a linear rate of change for the for the time period 
between implementation of successive safety surveys.
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5.4.2.2. ADDITIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING EVALUATION OF 
RESEARCH M ODELS’ PERFORM ANCE
A useful model to serve as a tool for squadron leadership was to demonstrate 
performance for accurately predicting likelihood for both when future mishap will and 
will not happen. Although model execution was conducted for both outcomes of 
FMO = YES and FMO = NO, there were limitations in comparative evaluation against 
a reference for MCAS results in which a future mishap did not occur.
• The reference study April 2004 published by Ciavarelli in 2007 and Schimpf and 
Figlock in 2006, contained only data that represented the quartile distributions and 
frequency of mishap occurrences. No complementary MCAS result data were 
available for squadrons that did not incur mishaps. Additionally, no breakdown of 
aggregated MCAS survey results into individual MOSE components were 
available for the April 2004 reference study.
• Disparities in frequency number of events for when future mishaps did and did not 
occur were also significant. There were
o Only 58 instances in which corresponding mishaps occurred and only 55 
that had corresponding previous and current MCAS results (PMR and 
CMR).
o 736 instances in which there were a matched set of previous and current 
MCAS results and no future mishap occurrence.
• The data provided contained MCAS administered between the dates of September 
7, 2000 and January 6, 2009 and mishap occurrence dates between October 18, 
2002 and August 15, 2007. The potential exists that there were additional mishap
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occurrences with dates subsequent to that of the last MCAS result and prior to the 
administration of the next MCAS.
5.5. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presented a methodology for developing conceptual and 
computational Bayesian Network Models to generate conditional probability 
predictions that would be useful as an improved predictive tool for squadron 
leadership. The goal behind employment of these methods was to accurately represent 
the modeling causal network relationships between MCAS results and future mishap 
occurrences. Through leveraging definition o f state variable nodes and their directed 
path connections, resultant conditional probabilities, this endeavor sought to closely 
associate successive MCAS survey results with observed mishap occurrence. 
Comparison o f Bayesian Network Model outputs to reference data and simple / tabular 
presentation of mishap occurrence frequency to quartile placement failed to 
demonstrate improved performance. As such, this dissertation research effort was 
unsuccessful in formally establishing and validating the application of the Bayesian 
Network Modeling methodology in the context for its use for evaluating successive 
MCAS results as a predictive tool for future mishap occurrence.
5.6. RECOM M ENDATIONS
This research addressed an important topic area in striving to develop a 
computational model that would serve as a predictive tool for squadron leadership to 
conduct risk analysis, apply risk management, and reduce susceptibility for future
145
mishap occurrence. The costs in manpower and equipment are worthy concerns to 
assist aviation squadron leadership and our nation with a methodology that will serve 
to reduce mishap occurrence rates and improve our combat readiness.
Although this research did not produce the desired results, it has served to 
narrow the field o f study in this area while providing avenues for future research that 
may serve to achieve the goals of this effort. Recommendations for forthcoming 
scholarly exploration in this field include suggestions regarding data and modeling:
• Data:
o Coordinate and liaison with U.S. Naval Safety Center for obtaining 
additional data that would provide for finer levels of detail and / or 
definition of other critical state variables for expressing causal network 
relationships. Additional data would support model execution for:
■ Squadrons flying supplementary Type/Model/Series aircraft other 
than those that comprise a carrier air wing;
■ Inclusion of both Class B and Class C mishaps;
■ Incorporation of aircraft / equipment damage and personnel injuries 
located in submitted squadron Hazard Reports. These incidents do 
not meet the minimal criteria set for Class C mishaps; however, 
they would provide higher observed frequencies than reliance on 
only Class A mishap data.
o Conduct further analysis on reference data study by Schimpf and Figlock 
(as shown in Figure 3) to evaluate results and respective quartile 
distributions for those squadrons that did not experience a future mishap
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occurrence within 24 months after survey. This would support better 
comparison of modeling results, 
o Collaborate with US Naval Safety Center for potential changes to the 
MCAS questions that would improve construct validity in supporting 
unique features of all six MOSE components. This would address the 
current issue in which every MCAS question loading on one main factor.
• Modeling
o Perform model execution using single specific questions in each o f the 6 
MOSE components and perform evaluation to determine if there is a 
solitary question that may serve as necessary input for the developed 
computation models to produce an operational predictive tool. Initial 
consideration should be given to the questions which comprise the Risk 
Management Characteristic in execution of BNM #1. This case had all the 
desired traits for probability distributions and best slope value 
performance.
■ This is aligned to the results of research conducted of MCAS results 
for U.S. Navy Fleet Logistic Support squadrons, “The two MOSE 
components of greatest concern as identified by aviation 
maintenance personnel of the Fleet Logistics Support Wing while 
participating in the MCAS are Communication/Functional 
Relationships and Risk Management. The focusing intervention 
efforts in those two areas should be a priority." [Goodrum, 1999, p. 
42]
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■ However, since the Cronbach Alpha Coefficient values as shown in
Table 11, in Section 3.4.3 are all greater than 0.9 demonstrating 
excellent reliability, this may not be sufficient to result in improved 
performance over that of the individual MOSE components, 
o Investigate whether the developed computation models demonstrate 
improved performance for a specific Type / Model / Series (T/M/S) 
squadron. Potential exists that tighter scope application may have 
applicability for a specific T/M/S. Within the limitations o f the data 
provided by the U.S. Naval Safety Center, issues with this recommendation 
involve the disparity in numbers o f similar T/M/S squadrons and their 
associated mishap occurrences / rates, 
o Further refine definition of the state variable for Inter-Period MCAS 
Transition (IMT) of quartiles to account not only for direction of 
movement (i.e., Higher, Neutral, or Lower), but also quantify the amount 
o f quartile movement. The potential exists that the scalar value for 
quartile transition (with potential range of (-3, -2, -1, 0, 1,2, 3) may serve 
to impart more utility in the results of model execution, 
o Try use of other discrete event modeling techniques defined in Section 2.7 
such as Hidden Markov Model (HMM) or Naive Bayesian Model (NBM). 
Although Artificial Neural Network Model (ANNM), and Support Vector 
Machine Model (SVMM) methodologies could be used, they possess 
inherent disadvantages. ANNM “black box" operations may not afford 
meaningful understanding of causal relationships between state variable
and SVMM contains a limitation for dealing with temporal data 
relationships and in providing direct probability estimates.
Investigate and determine applicability o f dynamic modeling techniques. 
This will require additional data to support development of a conceptual 
and computational dynamic model that uses a Differential Equations 
System Specification (DESS).
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APPENDIX A. NAVAL AVIATION M ISHAP CLASSIFICATION
A .I. M ISHAP CATEGORY [OPNAV1NST 3750.6S, Paragraph 313, 2014]
• CLASS A MISHAP: A class A mishap is one in which the total cost o f damage to 
Department o f Defense (DoD) or non-DoD property, aircraft or Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) is $2 million or more, or a naval aircraft is destroyed or missing, 
or any fatality or permanent total disability o f personnel results from the direct 
involvement o f naval aircraft or UAV. A destroyed or missing UAV is not a class 
A unless the cost is $2 million or more.
• CLASS B MISHAP. A class B mishap is one in which the total cost of
damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is $500,000 or more, but
less than $2 million, or results in a permanent partial disability, or when three or 
more personnel are hospitalized for inpatient care (which, for mishap reporting 
purposes only, does not include just observation or diagnostic care) as a result o f a 
single mishap.
• CLASS C MISHAP. A class C mishap is one in which the total cost o f damage to 
DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is $50,000 or more, but less than 
$500,000, or a nonfatal injury or illness that results in 1 or more days away from 
work, not including the day of the injury.
• CLASS D MISHAP. A class D mishap is one in which the total cost of
damage to DoD or non-DoD property, aircraft or UAVs is $20,000 or more, but
less than $50,000; or a recordable injury (greater than first aid) or illness results 
not otherwise classified as a class A, B, or C mishap
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A.2. M ISHAP SUB-CATEGORY [OPNAVINST 3750.6S, Paragraph 314, 2014]
• FLIGHT MISHAP (FM). A flight mishap is where there is intent for flight and 
reportable damage to a DoD aircraft or UAV or the loss of a DoD manned aircraft. 
Explosives, chemical agent, or missile incidents that cause damage to an aircraft or 
UAV with intent for flight are categorized as FMs. Mishaps involving factory new 
production aircraft until successful completion of the postproduction flight are 
reported as contractor mishaps.
• FLIGHT RELATED MISHAP (FRM). A mishap where there is intent for flight 
and no reportable damage to the aircraft or UAV itself, but the mishap involves a 
fatality, reportable injury, or reportable property damage. A missile that is 
launched from an aircraft or UAV departs without damaging the aircraft, and is 
subsequently involved in a mishap is reportable as a guided missile mishap.
• AIR GROUND MISHAP (AGM). A mishap where there is no intent for flight 
that results in reportable damage to an aircraft or UAV, or death or injury 
involving an aircraft or UAV. This applies to both on land and on board ship. 
Damage to an aircraft when it is being handled as a commodity or cargo is not 
reportable as an aircraft mishap.
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APPENDIX B. INSTRUM ENT AND M ODEL M ETRICS 
B.I INTRODUCTION
This appendix section contains additional information providing detailed 
descriptions and background information regarding specific metrics that were used to 
support quantitative data generation and analysis for this research.
B.2. USE OF LIKERT SCALES
The scale is attributed to Rensis Likert who developed this technique for the
evaluation of attitudes. A significant amount of literature exists that describes
methodologies for using Likert scale derived data. Likert scales are commonly
aligned with use in marketing, business, social science, medicine and educational
research as well as the service sector. [Gliem and Gliem, 2003, Gob, et al„ 2007]
A common feature o f marketing research is the attempt to have respondents 
communicate their feelings, attitudes, opinions, and evaluations in some 
measureable form. To this end marketing researchers have developed a range 
of scales. Each o f these has unique properties.. .Some scales are at very best 
limited in their mathematical properties to the extent that they can only 
establish an association between variables. Other scales have more extensive 
mathematical properties, and some, hold out the possibility to establish cause 
and affect relationships between variables. [Crawford, 1998, p. 3-1.]
A scale is a collection o f items that provides a means to measure and quantify 
characteristics under evaluation. It serves as an instrument that is constructed by 
researchers in order to obtain quantitative data on variable for which appropriate 
standardized instruments are not available. [Dawis, 1987]
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B.2.1. LEVELS OF M EASUREM ENT
Scale scores are categorized by different levels of measurement that are 
commonly used. Their characteristics are defined below and are presented in 
hierarchical order (from lowest to highest) o f mathematical properties:
• Nominal. A categorical sale consisting of a set of frequency counts. A nominal 
scale often contains a list of categories to which items may be assigned. Chi- 
Square testing may be used to support hypothesis tests to determine whether two 
or more variables are associated and the strength of that relationship. However, it 
does not support use for establishing cause and effect relationships.
• Ordinal (also known as Rank Ordered). This measurement involves the ranking of 
characteristics being scaled. Except for the relative order o f items, there are no 
means to quantify or measure the distance between two scale values. For 
marketing, ordinal number scaling supports determining the order of preference of 
different brands, but it does not contain information about the interval between any 
two brands. Ordinal scales enable the same data analysis available from nominal 
scales. Additionally, positional statistics may be derived which include median, 
quartile, and percentile. Ordinal scales permit tests for order correlation of ranked 
data such as Spearman's Ranked Correlation Coefficient and Kendall's Coefficient 
o f Concordance. The use of mean and standard deviation are inappropriate for 
ordinal data.
• Interval. Also referred to as a cardinal scale, it has equal units of measurement, 
which allow for interpretation of the interval scale’s scores and quantifiable 
relative distances between them. The scale’s zero point is arbitrary and not
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necessarily an absolute true zero (e.g., zero degrees on the Fahrenheit temperature 
scale). Constants may be added or subtracted to an interval scale value without 
affecting the scale’s form; however, this does not apply to multiplication or 
division. Many common statistical analysis methods may be conducted using 
interval scale data. Cardinal measure scales express magnitude.
• Ratio. This scale has the same properties o f interval scales and includes a fixed 
origin or zero point. This provides an indication of the absolute distance o f any 
measured object from a true-zero point on the scale. Examples include lengths, 
time, and weights. Data from ratio measurement scales permit comparison of 
differences and relative magnitude.
[Crawford, 1998; Brown, 2000; Jamieson, 2004; Gob et al., 2007; Dawis, 1987] 
Both interval and ratio scales are considered to be continuous scales.
B.2.2. SCALE DESIGN AND FORMAT
Structured verbal scales contain individual items with a stimulus component 
and matching response section. The stimulus is written as sentence or phrase that 
describes a particular attribute or event related to a specific object. The stimulus can 
be drafted to ascribe different levels of exactness or generality. Response choices may 
vary in the measurement dimension (e.g., agree-disagree, important-unimportant) and 
the range o f associated scale point choices (2, 3, or 5 are most common. The response 
choices may be weighted or un-weighted, and the formats may one or two sided 
[Dawis, 1987] The Likert scale contains brief descriptions associated with each 
category option that are ordered in position with bipolar adjectives at the end point
169
extremes on the scale (i.e., strongly disagree and strongly agree). As a monadic 
scale, the respondent evaluates only one object or question at a time. The Likert scale 
is described as
A set of items, composed o f approximately an equal number o f favorable and 
unfavorable statements concerning the attitude toward an object that is given to 
a group o f subjects. They are asked to respond to each statement in terms of 
their won degree o f agreement or disagreement. The specific responses to the 
items are combined so that individuals with the most favorable attitudes will 
have the highest scores while individuals with the least favorable (or 
unfavorable) attitudes will have the lowest. [Mclver and Carmines, 1981, pp. 
22-23]
B.2.3. LIKERT SCALE IM PLEMENTATION
Ideally, a Likert Scale evaluation is given to a large group o f individuals (N of 
at least 100). After survey completion the individual items are aggregated by item, 
similar groupings, and total score. A Likert scale is termed as a summated instrument 
scale meaning that the composite items are summed to produce a total score. 
Summated scales contain:
• Multiple items whose results are combined, averaged, or summed.
• Individual items that measure an aspect which possesses a property that may be 
represented by an underlying, quantitative measurement continuum.
• The individual items have no “correct" answer differentiating a summated scale 
from a multiple choice test
• Each individual item contains a statement to which the respondents are asked to 
select an answer that best serves to represent their rating. [Spector, 1992]
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Items (i.e., questions) are selected for use in a Likert Scale survey according to 
their capability to be discriminated between high and low scores on total score through 
use of a group-difference procedure. The difference in items means between high- 
and low-scoring groups (e.g., highest and lowest quartiles). The best discriminating 
items are then selected to constitute the survey, and a comprehensive scale score is 
obtained by summing individual items scores for the selected items. Likert Scale 
methodology implementation involves computation of:
• Total score(s)
• Item-total score correlations
• Alpha reliability o f the final set of items. [Dawis, 1997]
B.2.4. LIKERT SCALE DATA ANALYSIS
There are many different views on the processes to evaluate the data derived 
from Likert Scales. “In fact, there is no common standard accepted by the scientific 
community for the correct interpretation and analysis of such data. Interpretation and 
analysis often seem to be in a mismatch." [Gob et al., 2007, p. 602] Both ordinal scale 
based evaluations and interval/cardinal scale derived statistics are commonly used. 
Examples o f these disparate views include:
• Likert scales fall within the ordinal level of measurement. That is, the response 
categories have a rank order, but the intervals between values cannot be presumed 
equal...The legitimacy of assuming an interval scale for Likert-type categories is 
an important issues because the appropriate descriptive and inferential statistics 
differ for ordinal and interval variables, and if the wrong statistical technique is
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used, the researcher increases the chance of coming to the wrong conclusion about 
the significance (or otherwise) o f his research. [Jamieson, 2004, p. 1217]
• Likert scales are treated as yielding interval data by the majority of marketing 
researchers. [Brown, 1998, p. 3-12]
• Likert scaling presumes the existence o f an underlying (or latent or natural) 
continuous variable whose value characterizes the respondent's attitudes and 
opinions. If it were possible to measure the latent variable directly, the 
measurement scale would be, at best, an interval scale...It is probably that the 
Likert scale will be ordinal, but in any event, the population could be totally 
ordered by the magnitude o f the latent variable. [Clason and Dormody, 1994, p. 
31-32]
• Measurement versus statistics. There is an old and continuous debate.. .the 
proponents o f measurement hold that level o f measurement (nominal, ordinal, 
interval, and ratio) constrains the kind of statistical procedures that can be applied 
to the numerical data. The proponents o f statistics maintain that the level of 
measurement in not a constraining factor. Those who accept the latter view 
tolerate the use o f parametric statistics with scores from quasi-interval scales that 
actually are at the ordinal level o f measurement, a common practice that is 
criticized by proponents of the former view. [Dawis, 1987, p. 487]
• In methodological considerations it is generally acknowledged that attitude 
measuring scales should be considered ordinal. Nevertheless, many studies use 
cardinal statistics as sample means, sample variances, f-tests to analyze attitude 
data. [Gob et al., 2007, p. 602]
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• Under certain conditions, treating ordinal data is considered permissible or not 
permissible; however, no clear specification exists to identify the needed 
conditions for making a determination. [Vigderhous, 1977]
Likert Scale results have been considered as interval measurements for 
analysis of MCAS results. Much of the analysis conducted by Schim pf s study of the 
relationship between MCAS and Naval Aviation Mishaps [Schimpf, 2004b] and 
Goodrum's Assessment of the Maintenance Safety Climate in U.S. Navy Fleet 
Logistics Support Wing Squadrons [Goodrum, 1999] utilized statistical analysis to 
derive values such as means and standard deviations of responses to MCAS questions.
B.3. RELIABILITY
In research, the term reliability denotes "repeatability" such that a test result is 
considered reliable if it would repeatedly produce the same result when assessing the 
same object. [Trochim, 2006] Reliability, measured by computed coefficient values, 
demonstrates whether the test was correctly designed such that a certain collection of 
items accurately yield interpretable statements about individual differences.
[Cronbach, 1951 ] Specific definitions o f test reliability are defined by unique 
descriptors:
• Coefficient o f Stability-the degree to which the test score indicates unchanging 
individual differences in any traits. This may be evaluated through use of retest 
methodology i.e., giving the same test twice to the same group.
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• Coefficient o f Stability and Equivalence-the degree to which the test score 
indicates unchanging individual differences in the general and group factors 
defined by the test. Equivalent or parallel tests are techniques used to determine 
stability and equivalence
• Coefficient of Equivalence-the degree to which the test score indicate the status of 
the individual at the present instant in the general and group factors defined by the 
test. Internal consistency tests are generally measures of equivalence. This 
coefficient predicts the correlation of the test with a hypothetical equivalent test, as 
like the first test as the parts of the first test are alike. Split-half methodology 
correlates half the test items with the remaining items to determine if the separate 
half-tests have equal standard deviations. This is used to assess equivalence of 
simultaneously administered parallel tests that provides an estimate o f internal 
consistency.
• Hypothetical Self-Correlation-is the degree to which the test score indicate 
individual differences in any traits at the present moment. This requires 
independent simultaneous identical tests for evaluation. [Cronbach, 1947]
An internal consistency reliability estimate provides the reliability o f the 
instrument by computing how well the items that reflect the same construct yield 
similar results. Internal consistency reliability is a measure of how consistent the 
results are for different items for the same construct within the measure. [Trochim, 
2006] Methodologies for computing internal consistency reliability include: inter-
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item correlation, average item-total correlation, split-half reliability, and Cronbach's 
Alpha Test.
Cronbach adapted work by Kuder-Richardson to develop the means for 
computing a split half coefficient of equivalence. The use of Cronbach’s alpha test is 
a measure of internal consistency to evaluate reliability. It may be conducted with 
only a single test administration to furnish a distinctive estimate o f the reliability of a 
given test. Cronbach's alpha is the average value of the reliability coefficients one 
would have obtained for all possible combinations of items when split into two half­
tests. [Gliem and Gliem, 2003]. The equation for determining Cronbach’s alpha is:
.S"’=total test variance
Cronbach defined the coefficient alpha to be:
• The mean of all possible split-half coefficients
• The value expected when two random samples of items from a pool like those in
the given test are correlated
• The lower bound o f the coefficient or precision (i.e., instantaneous accuracy) and
lower bound for coefficient o f equivalence obtained by simultaneous 
administration of two tests having matched items
• The estimate and lower bound to the proportion of test variance attributable to
common factors among the items (i.e., the index of common factor concentration
(EQ 50)
where ^ n u m b er o f items
.vf=variance for item i
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• The upper bound to the concentration in the test of the first factor among the items. 
[Cronbach, 1951, pp. 331-332]
Table 65 depicts the scale of reliability determined by calculating Cronbach's 
Alpha coefficient for internal consistency [George & Mallery, 2003, p. 231].
Table 65. Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient Reliability Scale
Alpha (a) Value Reliability
>0.9 Excellent
>0.8 Good
>0.7 Acceptable
>0.6 Questionable
>0.5 Poor
<0.5 Unacceptable
B.4. SKEW NESS
Numerous common statistical tests for skewness when applied to discrete 
probability distributions will result in a non-parametric value o f zero when the median 
is equal to the mean. The outcome is zero when the median equals the mean for 
calculating both the formal definition of skewness that derives the third moment o f the 
distribution and Pearson’s skewness coefficient [Tabor, 2010]. These equations are 
depicted below:
-  -  x) 3  /
3rd Moment of Distribution: n / , -----------------
(EQ 51)
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Pearson Skewness Coefficient 
3 ( m e a n  — m e d i a n ) /
/ is t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n
(EQ 52)
Tabor compared 11 different statistic formulas for computing skewness in 
terms of their power for detecting skewness using samples from strongly, moderately, 
and slightly skewed populations. The lower rank value is indicative of the higher the 
power for detecting a skewed population (i.e., rank 1 = most power). The tested 
statistics, estimates o f power, and average rankings are provided, below, in Table 66.
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Table 66. Comparison of Statistical Formulas for Skewness (Tabor, 2010)
Population Skew Strong Moderate Slight Aver­
Name Statistic Power Power Power age
(Rank) (Rank) (Rank) Rank
mean 0.42 0.21 0.098 7.33A median (8) (8) (6)
B
max -  median 0.84 0.31 0.107 2.67
median -  min (2) (1) (5)
c Q3 — median 0.28 0.10 0.065 9.5
median - (9) (9.5) (10)
D
max — Q3 0.85 0.26 0.090 4.5
Q i  ~  m in (1) (5.5) (7)
E
1
2 (m in +  max) 
median
0.56
(5)
0.30
(2)
0.126
(1)
2.67
F \  «?i +  Qi)
median
0.13
(11)
0.10
(9.5)
0.066
(9)
9.83
n
1
2 (m in + max) 0.49 0.27 0.118 4.17U
\  (Qx + Q3)
(6.5) (4) (2)
H
min +  Q1 + median +  Q3 +  max 0.49 0.26 0.110 5.33
5 (6.5) (5.5) (4)
I
|  l ( x - x f  j
0.68 0.28 0.113
S|H
->
M X i Xi to (3) (3) (3)
J
J 3 (mean — median) 0.64 0.22 0.085 6.33
standard deviation (4) (7) (8)
K
(Q3 — median) — (median — Qi) 0.26 0.09 0.061 10.67
_________ ___fia. z .Q i _______ _____ (10) (11) (11)
Note: * - Power estimates were taken to additional decimal place to support ranking
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APPENDIX C. NAVAL AVIATION SQUADRON ORGANIZATIONAL  
DESCRIPTION AND DECOM POSITION.
C .l. INTRODUCTION
The study commenced with a detailed analysis and decomposition of a Naval 
Aviation squadron to determine its function, objectives, and organizational constraints. 
This dissertation contains the initial systems analysis and mapping to support the 
groundwork for selection o f the type of computation model that was developed here 
within. For the purpose o f this research, a squadron is comprised of the personnel, 
aircraft, supplies, and support equipment placed under the responsibility o f a 
Commanding Officer (CO). The CO bears absolute responsibility for his command 
and is entrusted with the commensurate authority to successfully accomplish assigned 
duties. [U.S. Naval Regulations, 1990, p. 47, paragraph 0802] The squadron's 
purpose is to provide trained aircrew and Ready For Tasking (RFT) aircraft for 
assigned missions. Mission type orders are used to communicate the superior 
commander’s general intention and specifically direct the subordinated commander to 
accomplish an operational effect to support that intention. [Major Fischer, 1995, p. 6] 
Missions are assigned to individual units for accomplishment. Within Naval Aviation, 
these unit elements are normally squadrons although they may be assigned to wings 
that are the aggregated entity o f numerous squadrons. A squadron is a complex 
organization that consists of numerous departments and divisions whose actions must 
be coordinated. Major sub-divisions within a squadron include:
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• Maintenance: Provides RFT aircraft in support of the Operations Department, It 
is responsible for conducting scheduled and unscheduled repairs as well as 
preventative upkeep. Maintenance contains the largest share of squadron 
personnel. Its functions include production center assignment and coordination, 
material/supply support, tool control, quality assurance, and ground support for 
aircraft launch, recovery, and between flight aircraft servicing. The maintenance 
department was the significant focus of this research effort.
• Operations: Plans, schedules, and executes operational flights to complete mission 
assignments from higher command and internal squadron requirements.
• Safety: Implements Command Aviation Safety program to enhance readiness by 
preserving material resources and human lives through application of written 
policies, plans, and policies couples with the attitudes and practices that promote 
aviation safety. [OPNAVINST 3750.7R, 2001, p. 2-1]
A depiction is shown in Figure 33.
Commanding Officer
[ Safety j Maintenance Operations j
....."'“" I
Quality Assurance j Maintenance > Material 
Control
Maintenance
Administration
Production Divisions
Production Branches / Work Centers
Figure 33. Squadron Organization
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C.2. M AINTENANCE DEPARTM ENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The functions and objectives of the major units within the maintenance
department are described below:
• Maintenance Officer (MO). A squadron department head who leads, manages, 
and supervises the department. The Mo is responsible to the CO for the 
accomplishment of the department’s mission and aided by the Assistant 
Maintenance Officer (AMO). Per HFACS-ME (Table 4), the MO has impact on 
the first order effects for management conditions, maintainer conditions, and 
working conditions. The MO also has responsibility for accomplishment of 
personnel training that may influence human errors resulting from maintainer acts 
due to inadequacies in their (technical) knowledge, skill, and judgment.
• Maintenance Material Control. A division within the maintenance department led 
by the Maintenance Material Control Officer (MMCO). The MMCO reports 
directly to the MO and is responsible for the coordination and accomplishment of 
the department's productive effort and material support. Actions taken by 
Maintenance Material Control have bearing on management conditions and 
working conditions through tasking the squadron work centers,
•  Maintenance Administration. Assigned under the direction of the AMO, this 
division provides administrative services for the entire department. Work product 
includes correspondence, establishment and control o f reporting and record 
keeping systems, information and publication distribution, and clerical support. 
The Maintenance Administration division impacts management conditions.
Quality Assurance (QA). The QA division is manned by highly skilled personnel 
responsible for monitoring and ensuring the quality o f the department's 
workmanship. This is conducted through inspections and audits to prevent the 
occurrence of defects. QA covers all maintenance actions from start to 
completion. Prevention is essential to thwart maintenance failure and extends to 
personnel safety, equipment preservation, and throughout the entire maintenance 
effort. Additional actions include data collection and analysis. “Prevention is 
about regulating events rather than being regulated by them. QA is a planned and 
systematic pattern of actions necessary to provide adequate confidence the product 
will perform satisfactorily in service, and the monitoring and analyzing of data to 
verify the validity o f these actions.” [CNAFINST 4790.2, Vol. 1, 2005, p. 14-2] 
The QA division has oversight over all HFACS-ME first order categories: 
Management Conditions, Maintainer Conditions, Working Conditions, and 
Maintainer Acts.
Production Division, Branches, and Work Centers. Divisions are the largest 
functional component within the department that may be further divided into 
smaller groups of branches and work centers that are tasked to accomplish specific 
assignments. These units receive tasking from Maintenance Material Control to 
accomplish required scheduled and unscheduled actions in order to prepare an 
aircraft for flight and Ready For Tasking. Each functional entity is responsible 
for a functional area to which maintenance personnel are assigned. An example of 
common production components is shown in Table 67.
Table 67. Maintenance Production Units
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Division Branch Work Center
Aircraft Power Plants Engines
Propellers
Airframe Structures
Hydraulics
Corrosion Control
Aviation Life Support 
Systems
Egress / Environmental 
Systems
Avionics / Armament Electronics Communications, 
Navigation, Radar
Fire Control
Electrical / Instrument
Reconnaissance / Photo
Ordnance
Line Plane Captain
Troubleshooter
Support Equipment
The individual units that conduct the maintenance production have influence 
on all HFACS-ME sub categories.
C.3. ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Two types o f relationships, line and staff, exist between functional entities 
internal and external to the maintenance department. A line relationship is used to 
describe the interaction between senior supervisory personnel and their subordinates. 
Line interaction by the supervisor includes direct tasking of work assignments to 
subordinates, performance appraisal, and responsibility for subordinates actions / work 
product to higher levels within or outside the squadron. Subordinate responsibilities in 
a line relationship include task completion and providing feedback as to assigned work 
status (to include impediments). Line relationship describes responsibilities and
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communications inherent in direction and management of a hierarchical aligned 
organization, (e.g., department, division, branch, and work center). The staff 
relationship exists between an advisory staff supervisor and a production line 
supervisor. “Staff elements are designed to be integral elements of the organization, 
wholly concerned with the exercise of servicing and supporting production elements.'* 
[CNAFINST 4790.2, Vol. 1, 2005, p. 8-1] Staff relationships provide the effective 
means for information flow across hierarchical levels and outside the line relationship. 
Line and staff relationships within the squadron are depicted in Figure 34.
Commanding Officer
------------ h ------------------------
i
| Safety — — *“ 4  Maintenance
\
'  r  _  — z " *
Quality Assurance , Maintenance / M aterial 
Control
Maintenance
Administration
X > 
X
N
k
Production Divisions
N
S
X
Production B ranches / W ork Centers
------------------- Line — Staff
Figure 34. Squadron Line and Staff Relationships
C.4. COM M AND RELATIONSHIPS
Squadrons as organizations are subordinate entities with line relationships to 
two separate superior commands; one which exercises administrative control, the other 
executes operational control. Administrative commands execute staff control of the 
resources and logistics support required by the subordinate unit to execute its
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operational tasking. Administrative commanders are responsible for the aircraft 
material readiness, manpower, personnel training, administration, and inspection of 
subordinate commands. Administrative commands are typically aligned as Type 
Wings comprised o f similar aircraft type, models, and series. Operational 
commanders exert line control, provide tasking and authoritative direction to 
subordinate squadrons to accomplish assigned missions that tactically employs their 
capabilities. Common operational commands are Navy carrier air wings or Marine 
Air Groups. Their responsibilities include the operational readiness, inspection, and 
overall performance o f squadrons under their command. As both administrative and 
operational commanders have overlapping responsibilities for subordinate unit safety 
and maintenance, their influence will require examination for incorporation in the 
design o f the computation model.
C.5. GOVERNING M AINTENANCE INSTRUCTION AND GOALS
There are numerous instructions and regulations that govern policies,
procedures, and responsibilities o f a Naval Aviation squadron. The primary
foundation for conducting maintenance on aircraft is the Naval Aviation Maintenance
Program (NAMP). The NAMP instruction is the overarching document that governs
all Naval Aviation maintenance.
'‘The maintenance of naval aircraft has continually changed and evolved over 
the lifetime o f Naval Aviation. Aircraft maintenance processes and procedures 
have become increasingly complex as aircraft and aircraft systems have 
become more complicated...The NAMP was established by Chief o f Naval 
Operations to provide an integrated system for performing aeronautical 
equipment maintenance and related support functions." [CNAF1NST 4790.2.
2006, p. 1]
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The Navy currently uses two distinct domains to differentiate the degree of 
repair capability to be accomplished. Organizational level maintenance is considered 
"on flight line", that is, routine preventative procedures done at specifically defined 
intervals or unscheduled repairs to restore non-properly functioning equipment. 
Unscheduled repairs are limited in scope primarily to replacement of major 
components or replaceable assemblies. Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) conduct more 
in-depth, “off flight line” repairs and have the capability to fix the components and 
replaceable assemblies making them Ready For Issue (RFI) for squadron use. This 
research was limited to organizational level aircraft maintenance.
The NAMP sets forth a standardized organization that assigns explicit 
responsibilities to "ensure effective management within a framework o f authority, 
functions, and relationships necessary to achieve improvements in performance, 
economy of operation, and quality of work." [CNAFINST 4790.2, 2006, Volume 1, p. 
8-1] The goal o f a properly implemented standardized maintenance organization is to 
improve the following key characteristics:
1. Personnel performance and training.
2. Aircraft, equipment, and system readiness.
3. Maintenance integrity and effectiveness for all material.
4. Safety.
5. Maintenance manpower and materials usage.
6. Maintenance work scheduling and planning
7. Work performance management and evaluation.
8. End product quality.
9. Combat readiness attainment and retention.
10. Personnel and aircraft continuity throughout inter-command transfers.
11. Environmental compliance.
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APPENDIX D. M AINTENANCE CLIM ATE ASSESSM ENT SURVEY
Table 68. Close-Ended MCAS Questions
Number Question
Process Auditing (PA)
1 The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures.
2 The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that 
targets training deficiencies.
3 The command uses safety and medical staff to identify / manage personnel 
at risk.
4 Collateral Duty Inspectors (CDIs) / Quality Assurance Representatives 
(QARs) routinely monitor maintenance evolutions.
5 Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored.
6 Signing off personnel qualifications is taken seriously.
Reward System And Safety Culture (RS / SC)
7 Our command climate promotes safe maintenance.
8 Supervisors discourage Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) or other procedure violations and 
encourage reporting safety concerns.
9 Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and individuals 
feel free to report them.
10 Procedural violations o f SOP, NAMP, or other procedures are not common 
in this command.
11 The command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards 
and incentives
12 Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal problems 
/ illness.
13 Safety Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), QAR, and CDI are sought after 
billets
14 Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in this command.
Quality Assurance (QA)
15 The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards to 
maintain quality control.
16 QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission 
accomplishment.
17 QARs / CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not 
pressurized by supervisors to sign-off.
18 Maintenance on detachments is o f the same quality as that at home station.
19 Required publications / tools / equipment / are available, current, 
serviceable, and used.
20 QARs are helpful, and QA is not “feared in my unit.
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Table 68 (Continued)
Number Question
Risk Management (RM)
21* In my squadron, multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely 
affect maintenance.
22 Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training / support is 
provided as needed.
23 Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards associated 
with maintenance and the flight line.
24 I am provided adequate resources, time, and personnel to accomplish my 
job.
25 Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the command's ability to 
operate safely.
26 Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight 
schedule, and do not permit cutting comers.
27 Day / Night Check have equal workloads, and staffing is sufficient on each 
shift.
28 Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aware of 
individual workload.
29 Based upon my command's current assets / manning it is not over­
committed
Command and Control (C2)
30 My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems.
31 Safety decisions are made at the proper levels, and work center supervisor 
decisions are respected.
32 Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are actively engaged 
in the safety program.
33 Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and 
ensure compliance.
34 In my command, safety is a key part of all maintenance operations, and all 
are responsible / accountable for safety.
35 Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective.
36 All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervised, and staffed by 
qualified personnel.
37 Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities.
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Table 68 (Continued)
Number Question
Communication / Functional Relationships (C / FR)
38 Effective communication exists up / down the chain o f command.
39 I get all the information I need to do my job safely.
40 Work center supervisors coordinate their actions with other work centers in 
maintenance.
41 My command has effective pass-down between shifts.
42 Maintenance Control troubleshoots / resolves gripes before flight.
43 Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance 
activities.
*-Question is written with negative connotation asking individual to score their 
agreement-disagreement with a condition that adversely affects safety.
The MCAS used Likert scale response options as shown in Table 69.
Table 69. Likert Scale Response Option and Values
Option Value
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree |_5
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APPENDIX E. BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODEL DATA FROM  
M AINTENANCE CLIM ATE ASSESSM ENT SURVEYS BY MODEL OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY EFFECTIVENESS SPECIFIC  
CHARACTERISTIC
E .l. PROCESS AUDITING CHARACTERISTIC DATA RESULTS FOR 
BAYESIAN NETW ORK MODELS
Table 70. BNM Computational Model #1 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PM R Q i 0.2658 0.2494
PMR Q2 0.2415 0.2501
PMR Q3 0.2327 0.2507
p m r q 4 0.2600 0.2498
CMR Q[ 0.3738 0.2343
CM R Q2 0.1149 0.2577
CM R Q3 0.1882 0.2612
CMR Q4 0.3231 0.2468
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Figure 35. BNM Computational Model #1 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
Table 71. BNM Computational Model #2 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Q, 0.2707 0.2490
PM RQ 2 0.2401 0.2502
PMR Q3 0.2343 0.2506
PMR Q4 0.2549 0.2502
C M R Q i 0.3739 0.2343
CMR Q2 0.1141 0.2578
CMR Q3 0.1877 0.2613
CMR Q4 0.3243 0.2466
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FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 36. BNM Computational Model #2 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
Table 72. BNM Computational Model #3 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qj 0.2695 0.2417
CMR Q2 0.2687 0.2455
C M R Q 3 0.2014 0.2595
CM RQ 4 0.2603 0.2533
IMT Higher 0.3090 0.3112
IMT Neutral 0.3604 0.3854
IMT Lower 0.3306 0.3034
193
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Figure 37. BNM Computational Model #3 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
Table 73. BNM Computational Model #4 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.2680 0.2417
CMR Q2 0.2705 0.2455
C M R Q 3 0.2014 0.2595
CM RQ 4 0.2601 0.2533
IMT Higher 0.2976 0.3118
IMT Neutral 0.3894 0.3838
IMT Lower 0.3130 0.3044
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Figure 38. BNM Computational Model #4 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
Table 74. BNM Computational Model #5 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQi 0.2701 0.2424
CMR Q2 0.2691 0.2458
c m r q 3 0.2013 0.2593
c m r q 4 0.2595 0.2525
IMT Higher 0.3086 0.3108
IMT Neutral 0.3611 0.3860
IMT Lower 0.3302 0.3032
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Figure 39. BNM Computational Model #5 Process Auditing Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
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E.2. REW ARD SYSTEM  AND SAFETY CULTURE CHARACTERISTIC  
DATA RESULTS FOR BAYESIAN NETW ORK MODELS
Table 75. BNM Computational Model #1 Reward System and Safety Culture 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PM RQ, 0.2675 0.2492
PMR Q2 0.2357 0.2505
PMR Q3 0.2433 0.2500
PM RQ 4 0.2535 0.2503
CMR Qt 0.3525 0.2321
CMR Q2 0.1508 0.2485
CMR Q3 0.1868 0.2642
CMR Q4 0.3099 0.2532
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 40. BNM Computational Model #1 Reward System and Safety Culture 
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 76. BNM Computational Model #2 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
P M R Q , 0.2635 0.2495
P M R Q 2 0.2456 0.2498
PMR Q3 0.2407 0.2502
P M R Q 4 0.2502 0.2505
C M R Q i 0.3506 0.2323
CM R Q2 0.1514 0.2484
CM R O 3 0.1853 0.2643
C M R Q 4 0.3127 0.2550
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 41. BNM Computational Model #2 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 77. BNM Computational Model #3 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQi 0.2130 0.2413
CMR Q2 0.2306 0.2414
CMR Q3 0.2556 0.2589
CMR Q4 0.3008 0.2584
IMT Higher 0.3916 0.3267
IMT Neutral 0.3668 0.3625
IMT Lower 0.2416 0.3108
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Figure 42. BNM Computational Model #3 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 78. BNM Computational Model #4 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.2115 0.2414
CMR Q2 0.2352 0.2411
CMR Q3 0.2557 0.2590
CMR Q4 0.2976 0.2585
IMT Higher 0.3467 0.3291
IMT Neutral 0.3656 0.3625
IMT Lower 0.2877 0.3084
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Figure 43. BNM Computational Model #4 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 79. BNM Computational Model #5 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQ, 0.2141 0.2426
CMR Q2 0.2313 0.2417
CMR Q3 0.2556 0.2591
CMR Q4 0.2990 0.2566
IMT Higher 0.3901 0.3251
IMT Neutral 0.3676 0.3632
IMT Lower 0.2423 0.3117
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Figure 44. BNM Computational Model #5 Reward System and Safety Culture
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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E.3. QUALITY ASSURANCE CHARACTERISTIC DATA RESULTS FOR  
BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELS
Table 80. BNM Computational Model #1 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Qi 0.2705 0.2490
PMR Q2 0.2493 0.2495
PMR Q3 0.2410 0.2501
PM RQ 4 0.2392 0.2514
CM RQi 0.3464 0.2373
CMR Q2 0.1873 0.2617
CMR Q3 0.1856 0.2525
CM RQ 4 0.2807 0.2485
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Figure 45. BNM Computational Model #1 Quality Assurance Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 81. BNM Computational Model #2 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Qi 0.2737 0.2488
PMR Q2 0.2405 0.2502
PMR Q3 0.2443 0.2499
P M R Q 4 0.2415 0.2511
CM R Qi 0.3470 0.2372
CM R Q2 0.1884 0.2616
CM R Q3 0.1849 0.2526
CM R Q4 0.2797 0.2486
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Figure 46. BNM Computational Model #2 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
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Table 82. BNM Computational Model #3 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.1719 0.2464
C M R Q 2 0.4065 0.2475
C M R Q 3 0.1408 0.2530
CM RQ4 0.2808 0.2531
IMT Higher 0.2258 0.3197
IMT Neutral 0.4669 0.3743
IMT Lower 0.3073 0.3059
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Figure 47. BNM Computational Model #3 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Conditional Probabilities
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Table 83. BNM Computational Model #4 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.1748 0.2462
CMR Q2 0.4014 0.2478
C M RQ 3 0.1423 0.2529
CMR Q4 0.2815 0.2531
IMT Higher 0.3231 0.3145
IMT Neutral 0.3726 0.3794
IMT Lower 0.3043 0.3061
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 48. BNM Computational Model #4 Quality Assurance Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 84. BNM Computational Model #5 Quality Assurance Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.1727 0.2477
CMR Q2 0.4058 0.2470
CMR Q i 0.1411 0.2533
CMR Q 4 0.2804 0.2520
IMT Higher 0.2251 0.3184
IMT Neutral 0.4680 0.3747
IMT Lower 0.3069 0.3069
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 49. BNM Computational Model #5 Quality Assurance Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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E.4. RISK M ANAGEM ENT CHARACTERISTIC DATA RESULTS FOR  
BAYESIAN NETW ORK M ODELS
Table 85. BNM Computational Model #1 Risk Management Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Q, 0.2847 0.2479
PMR Q2 0.2409 0.2501
PMR Q3 0.2360 0.2505
PMR Q4 0.2384 0.2514
CM RQ, 0.3491 0.2106
CMR Q2 0.1924 0.2544
C M R Q 3 0.1704 0.2699
CMR Q4 0.2881 0.2651
FMO = YES FMO = NO
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Figure 50. BNM Computational Model #1 Risk Management Characteristic 
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 86. BNM Computational Model #2 Risk Management Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Qi 0.2761 0.2486
PMR Q2 0.2447 0.2498
P M R Q 3 0.2419 0.2501
P M R Q 4 0.2373 0.2515
CMR Qi 0.3468 0.2108
C M R Q 2 0.1901 0.2545
CMR Q3 0.1729 0.2697
C M R Q 4 0.2902 0.2650
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Figure 51. BNM Computational Model #2 Risk Management Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 87. BNM  Computational Model #3 Risk Management Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQi 0.2991 0.2178
CMR Q2 0.2030 0.2532
CM RQ 3 0.2659 0.2619
c m r q 4 0.2320 0.2671
IMT Higher 0.4029 0.3473
IMT Neutral 0.2604 0.3708
IMT Lower 0.3367 0.2819
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Figure 52. BNM Computational Model #3 Risk Management Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 88. BNM Computational Model #4 Risk Management Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQ, 0.2962 0.2179
CMR Q2 0.2065 0.2530
CMR Q3 0.2646 0.2620
CMR Q4 0.2327 0.2671
IMT Higher 0.3195 0.3517
IMT Neutral 0.3735 0.3648
IMT Lower 0.3070 0.2835
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Figure 53. BNM Computational Model #4 Risk Management Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
2 1 0
Table 89. BNM Computational Model #5 Risk Management Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQi 0.2996 0.2181
CMR Q2 0.2029 0.2531
C M R Q 3 0.2658 0.2620
CMR Q4 0.2317 0.2668
IMT Higher 0.4027 0.3471
IMT Neutral 0.2607 0.3710
IMT Lower 0.3366 0.2819
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Figure 54. BNM Computational Model #5 Risk Management Characteristic
Nodal Conditional Probabilities
E.5. COM M AND AND CONTROL CHARACTERISTIC DATA RESULTS 
FOR BAYESIAN NETW ORK MODELS
Table 90. BNM Computational Model #1 Command and Control Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PM RQ, 0.2731 0.2488
PMR Q2 0.2303 0.2509
PMR Q3 0.2482 0.2496
PM RQ 4 0.2484 0.2507
CM RQj 0.3749 0.2262
CMR Q2 0.1537 0.2623
CMR Q3 0.1708 0.2539
CMR Q4 0.3006 0.2576
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Figure 55. BNM Computational Model #1 Command and Control
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 91. BNM Computational Model #2 Command and Control Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Q, 0.2715 0.2489
PMR Q2 0.2388 0.2503
PMR Q3 0.2443 0.2499
PMR Q4 0.2454 0.2509
CMR Q! 0.3736 0.2263
CM RQ 2 0.1546 0.2622
CMR O3 0.1693 0.2540
CMR O4 0.3025 0.2575
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Figure 56. BNM Computational Model #2 Command and Control
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 92. BNM Computational Model #3 Command and Control Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMRQ[ 0.2728 0.2343
CMR Q2 0.2622 0.2535
CMR Q3 0.2039 0.2494
CM RQ 4 0.2611 0.2627
IMT Higher 0.2805 0.3180
IMT Neutral 0.3931 0.3983
IMT Lower 0.3264 0.2837
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Figure 57. BNM Computational Model #3 Command and Control
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 93. BNM Computational Model #4 Command and Control Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CM RQj 0.2707 0.2344
CMR O2 0.2670 0.2533
CMR O3 0.2033 0.2495
CMR Q4 0.2590 0.2628
IMT Higher 0.3001 0.3170
IMT Neutral 0.4011 0.3978
IMT Lower 0.2988 0.2852
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Figure 58. BNM Computational Model #4 Command and Control
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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Table 94. BNM Computational Model #5 Command and Control Characteristic Nodal
Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.2741 0.2353
CMR Q2 0.2621 0.2535
CMR Q3 0.2041 0.2498
c m r q 4 0.2597 0.2614
IMT Higher 0.2796 0.3174
IMT Neutral 0.3939 0.3987
IMT Lower 0.3265 0.2839
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Figure 59. BNM Computational Model #5 Command and Control
Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
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E.6. COM M UNICATION / FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
CHARACTERISTIC DATA RESULTS FOR BAYESIAN NETW ORK  
M ODELS
Table 95. BNM Computational Model #1 Communication / Functional Relationship 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Qi 0.2613 0.2497
PMR Q2 0.2400 0.2502
PMR Q3 0.2280 0.2511
p m r q 4 0.2707 0.2490
CMR Q, 0.3520 0.2227
C M RQ 2 0.1366 0.2665
CMR Q3 0.1517 0.2576
CMR 04 0.3597 0.2532
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Figure 60. BNM Computational Model #1 Communication / Functional 
Relationship Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
Table 96. BNM Computational Model #2 Communication / Functional Relationship 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
PMR Qi 0.2623 0.2496
PMR Q2 0.2371 0.2504
PMR Q3 0.2334 0.2507
p m r q 4 0.2672 0.2493
CMR Qi 0.3521 0.2227
CMR Q2 0.1371 0.2665
CMR Q3 0.1490 0.2578
CMR Q4 0.3618 0.2530
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Figure 61. BNM Computational Model #2 Communication / Functional 
Relationship Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
Table 97. BNM Computational Model #3 Communication / Functional Relationship 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.2023 0.2360
C M RQ 2 0.3535 0.2530
C M R Q 3 0.1730 0.2531
CMR Q4 0.2712 0.2579
IMT Higher 0.3268 0.3328
IMT Neutral 0.3291 0.3818
IMT Lower 0.3441 0.2854
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Figure 62. BNM Computational Model #3 Communication / Functional 
Relationship Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
Table 98. BNM Computational Model #4 Communication / Functional Relationship 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Qi 0.2007 0.2361
CMR Q2 0.3568 0.2528
CMR Q3 0.1731 0.2531
c m r q 4 0.2694 0.2580
IMT Higher 0.3390 0.3322
IMT Neutral 0.3700 0.3796
IMT Lower 0.2910 0.2882
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Figure 63. BNM Computational Model #4 Communication / Functional 
Relationship Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
Table 99. BNM Computational Model #5 Communication / Functional Relationship 
Characteristic Nodal Probability Distribution
FMO = YES NO
CMR Q, 0.2026 0.2368
CMR Q2 0.3541 0.2536
CMR Q3 0.1726 0.2524
CMR Q4 0.2707 0.2572
IMT Higher 0.3257 0.3315
IMT Neutral 0.3302 0.3829
IMT Lower 0.3441 0.2856
2 2 1
FMO = YES
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 . O2 O3 
PMR
35.41 27.0720.26 17.26
Q4
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 .
FMO = NO
23.68 25.36 25.24 25.72
Q2 Q3 
PMR
FMO = YES FMO = NO
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
Higher Neutral 
IMT
Lower
%
50
40
30
20
10
0
Higher Neutral Lower 
IMT
Figure 64. BNM Computational Model #5 Communication / Functional 
Relationship Characteristic Nodal Conditional Probabilities
APPENDIX F. BAYESIAN NETW ORK MODEL DATA SUPPORTING  
ANSW ER TO RESEARCH QUESTION 2
Table 100. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions o f BNM #1 Output when
FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #1 All PMR Bimodal Q l,Q 4 1.0101 1.0050 -0.1725CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9728 0.9864 -1.2525
BNM #1 PA PMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9712 0.9856 -0.1450CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 1.0462 1.0231 -1.2675
BNM #1 RS/SC PMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9873 0.9936 -0.3500CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9869 0.9934 -1.0650
BNM#1 QA PMR Unimodal Qi 0.9238 0.9619 -0.7825CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8737 0.9369 -1.6425
BNM #1 RM PMR Unimodal Qi 0.9026 0.9513 -1.1575CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8467 0.9234 -1.5250
BNM #1 C2 PMR Unimodal Qi 0.9865 0.9932 -0.6175CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8918 0.9459 -1.8575
BNM #1 C/FR PMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9948 0.9974 0.2350CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 1.0467 1.0233 0.1925
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Table 101. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions of BNM #1 Output when
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness i
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #1 All PMR Uniform None 0.9992 0.9996 0.0125CMR Unimodal q 2 1.0568 1.0284 0.8075
BNM #1 PA PMR Uniform None 1.0020 1.0010 0.0100CMR Unimodal Q 3 1.0325 1.0163 0.3125
BNM #1 RS/SC PMR Uniform None 1.0012 1.0006 0.0275CMR Unimodal Q 3 1.0807 1.0404 0.5775
BNM #1 QA
PMR Uniform None 1.0060 1.0030 0.0600
CMR Unimodal Qi 1.0040 1.0020 0.2800
BNM #1 RM PMR Uniform None 1.0080 1.0040 0.0875
CMR Unimodal Q 3 1.1505 1.0753 1.3625
BNM #1 C2 PMR Uniform None 1.0012 1.0006 0.0475CMR Unimodal Q 2 1.0471 1.0235 0.7850
BNM #1 C/FR PMR Uniform None 1.0004 1.0002 -0.0175CMR Unimodal q 2 1.0442 1.0221 0.7625
Table 102. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions of BNM #2 Output when
FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew-
nessi
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #2 All PMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.9767 0.9883 -0.3025CMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.9751 0.9876 -1.1750
BNM #2 PA PMR Bimodal Qu Qa 0.9577 0.9789 -0.3950CMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 1.0492 1.0246 -1.2400
BNM #2 RS/SC PMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.9643
0.9821 -0.3325
CMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.9920 0.9960 -0.9475
BNM #2 QA PMR UntamM Qi 0.944* 0.9724 -0.8050CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8678 0.9339 -1.6825
BNM #2 RM Qi 0.9101 0.9*01 -0.9700CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8625 0.9313 -1.4150
BNM #2 C2 PMR
I lw im A I Q. 0.9596 0.979* -0.6525
CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 0.8932 0.9466 -1.7775
BNM #2 C/FR PMR Bimodal Q b Q4 1.0024 1.0012 0.1225CMR Bimodal Q b Q4 1.0442 1.0221 0.2425
224
Table 103. Attributes o f Probability Density Distributions o f BNM #2 Output when
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness i
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #2 All PMR Uniform None 1.0016 1.0008 0.0225CMR Unimodal Q2 1.0568 1.0284 0.8000
BNM #2 PA PMR Uniform None 1.0032 1.0016 0.0300CMR Unimodal Q3 1.0321 1.0161 0.3075
BNM #2 RS/SC PMR Uniform None 1.0028 1.0014 0.0250CMR Unimodal Q3 1.0803 1.0401 0.5675
BNM #2 QA
PMR Uniform None 1.0040 1.0020 0.0575
CMR Unimodal q 2 1.0048 1.0024 0.2850
BNM #2 RM PMR Uniform None 1.0064 1.0032 0.0725
CMR Unimodal Q3 1.1492 1.0746 1.3550
BNM #2 C2 PMR Uniform None 1.0032 1.0016 0.0500CMR Unimodal q 2 1.0471 1.0235 0.7800
BNM #2 C/FR PMR Uniform None 1.0000 1.0000 -0.0075CMR Unimodal q 2 1.0442 1.0221 0.7575
Table 104. Attributes o f Probability Density Distributions of BNM #3 Output when
FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew-
nessi
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #3 All PMR Unimodal q 2 0.8818 0.9409 -0.1400IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9259 0.9629 -1.2800
BNM #3 PA PMR Bimodal q . , q 4 0.8580 0.9290 -0.2300IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.0442 1.0221 0.7200
BNM #3 RS/SC PMR Unimodal Q4 1.2543 1.1271 2.1950IMT Unimodal Higher 0.7391 0.8696 -5.0000
BNM #3 QA
PMR Bimodal q 2, q 4 0.7289 0.8645 2.7225
IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.1775 1.0887 2.7167
BNM #3 RM PMR Bimodal Qi» Q3 0.9916 0.9958 -1.6775IMT Bimodal Hi, Low 0.8758 0.9379 -2.2067
BNM #3 C2 PMR Bimodal Qi, Q4 0.8692 0.9346 -0.2925IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.0962 1.0481 1.5300
BNM #3 C/FR PMR Bimodal q 2, q 4 0.7992 0.8996 1.7225
IMT Unimodal Low 1.0352 1.0176 0.5767
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Table 105. Attributes o f Probability Density Distributions of BNM #3 Output when
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #3 All PMR Unimodal Q4 1.0695 1.0348 1.0300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9199 0.9600 -1.3900
BNM #3 PA
PMR Unimodal Q 3 1.0525 1.0263 0.3867
IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9845 0.9923 -0.2600
BNM #3 RS/SC PMR Unimodal 0 3 1.0717 1.0358 0.5700IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9687 0.9843 -0.5300
BNM #3 QA PMR. Unimodal Q4 1.0247 1.0124 0.2233IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9730 0.9865 -0.4600
BNM #3 RM PMR Unimodal 04 1.1231 1.0616 1.6433IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.8772 0.9386 -2.1800
BNM #3 C2 PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 1.0500 1.0250 0.9467IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9337 0.9668 -1.1433
BNM #3 C/FR PMR Unimodal Q. 1.0450 1.0225 0.7300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9095 0.9547 -1.5800
Table 106. Attributes o f Probability Density Distributions of BNM #4 Output when
FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew-
n essi
Slope
BNM #4 All PMR Unimodal Q2 0.8667 0.9334 -0.1600IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9668 0.9834 -0.5633
BNM #4 PA PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 0.8570 0.9285 -0.1975IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.0313 1.0156 0.5133
BNM #4 RS/SC PMR Unimodal Q4 1.2386 1.1193 2.1525IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.8886 0.9443 -1.9667
BNM #4 QA
PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 0.7355 0.8678 2.6675
IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9668 0.9834 -0.5633
BNM #4 RM PMR Bimodal Qi> Q3 0.9893 0.9946 -1.5875IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9753 0.9877 -0.4167
BNM #4 C2 PMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.8598 0.9299 -0.2925IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9974 0.9987 -0.0433
BNM #4 C/FR PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 0.7937 0.8969 1.7175IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9084 0.9542 -1.6000
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Table 107. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions o f BNM #4 Output when
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew-
nessi
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #4 All PMR Unimodal Q4 1.0704 1.0352 1.0300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9177 0.9589 -1.4300
BNM #4 PA PMR Unimodal Q 3 1.0525 1.0263 0.3867IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9853 0.9927 -0.2467
BNM #4 RS/SC
PMR Uniform 0 3 1.0725 1.0363 0.5700
IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9594 0.9797 -0.6900
BNM #4 QA PMR Unimodal Q4 1.0243 1.0121 0.2300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9177 0.9589 -1.4300
BNM #4 RM PMR Unimodal Q4 1.1236 1.0618 1.6400IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.8723 0.9362 -2.2733
BNM #4 C2 PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 1.0504 1.0252 0.9467IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9384 0.9692 -1.0600
BNM #4 C/FR PMR Unimodal 04 1.0454 1.0227 0.7300IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9157 0.9579 -1.4667
Table 108. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions of BNM #5 Output when
FMO = YES
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew-
n essi
Slope
BNM #5 All PMR Unimodal Q2 0.8758 0.9379 -0.1950IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9257 0.9628 -1.2867
BNM #5 PA PMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.8546 0.9273 -0.2650IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.0444 1.0222 0.7200
BNM #5 RS/SC PMR Unimodal Q4 1.2452 1.1226 2.1225IMT Unimodal Higher 0.7425 0.8712 -4.9267
BNM #5 QA
PMR Bimodal Q2, Q4 0.7286 0.8643 2.6925
IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.1782 1.0891 2.7267
BNM #5 RM PMR Bimodal Qi> Q3 0.9900 0.9950 -1.6975IMT Bimodal Hi, Low 0.8760 0.9380 -2.2033
BNM #5 C2 PMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.8650 0.9325 -0.3600IMT Unimodal Neutral 1.0984 1.0492 1.5633
BNM #5 C/FR PMR Bimodal Q i, Q4 0.7963 0.8981 1.7025IMT Unimodal Low 1.0375 1.0187 0.6133
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Table 109. Attributes of Probability Density Distributions of BNM #5 Output when
FMO = NO
Model
MOSE
Charac
-teristic
Proba -  
bility 
Variable
Depiction Mode Skew­
ness 1
Skew-
ness2
Slope
BNM #5 All PMR Unimodal Q4 1.0627 1.0314 0.9533IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9205 0.9602 -1.3767
BNM #5 PA PMR Unimodal Q3 1.0483 1.0242 0.3367IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9849 0.9925 -0.2533
BNM #5 RS/SC PMR Unimodal 03 1.0648
1.0324 0.4667
IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9736 0.9868 -0.4467
BNM #5 QA PMR Unimodal 03 1.0214 1.0107 0.1433IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9773 0.9886 -0.3833
BNM #5 RM PMR Unimodal 1.1222 1.0611 1.6233IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.8776 0.9388 -2.1733
BNM #5 C2 PMR Bimodal O2, O4 1.0458 1.0229 -0.3600IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9352 0.9676 1.5633
BNM #5 C/FR PMR Unimodal Q« 1.0392 1.0196 0.6800IMT Unimodal Neutral 0.9122 0.9561 -1.5300
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